

ADMISSION

A cipher point of the US consulate in Krakow established in the 1970s made an impression. The windowless room was built inside one of the rooms at the back of the facility, behind a maze of security features and away from the eyes of the petitioners.

The top secret documents inside were guarded by a thick wall and a vault door weighing hundreds of kilograms closed with a combination lock. Each opening was recorded by a counter mounted inside, embedded in resin and impossible to dismantle. The building was supervised after working hours by the Americans who were chasing him.

At night, members of a specialized penetration group of the PRL counterintelligence entered the consulate. They moved in the dark, occasionally illuminating their path with flashlights held in their teeth. Each step was planned in advance. They were carrying suitcases weighing several dozen kilograms. They were fully aware that if any of them fell to the floor, the Americans sleeping in the rest of the building would jump to their feet.

Officers limited their conversations to occasional whispers. In fact, the only sound that accompanied them at work was a soft beep. The signal was emitted by hand-held radiation measuring devices resembling large calculators. Once all the officers were inside, they could launch a radiological attack on the safe containing secret documents. The sensors then began to play a real symphony - alarming that being here was deadly. But the officers did not move. They had a job to do.

In the special services, even recruiting an ambassador's driver for cooperation is a reason for satisfaction. Obtaining just any documents that pass through the desk of a diplomat's secretary is an achievement that counterintelligence of many countries can barely dream of.

Meanwhile, the officers of the Second Department (PRL counterintelligence) working in the secret IX Department managed to obtain hundreds of thousands of pages of classified documents in dozens of embassies and consulates throughout the country. At one stage, the prints became so many that they simply had to be thrown into cartons like potatoes and placed on top of each other until they reached the ceiling. Moreover, the department simultaneously intercepted diplomatic mail and provided information necessary to control the cipher communication systems of the institutions.

The list of agencies under supervision seemed endless. Due to the political system at that time, the affiliation of the Polish People's Republic to the Warsaw Pact and the ongoing Cold War between the East and the West, the main goal of Division IX were American and other NATO posts. However, there were also countries from outside the Alliance, very distant, sometimes even exotic - from Argentina to India. In the seventies and eighties, some of the representations were visited by Division IX officers even twice a week. They took over archives of interviews, secret materials on current operations and long-term plans of the institutions, guidelines for credit and trade negotiations. Thanks to the data obtained by the IX Department, Polish counterintelligence knew the identity of foreign spies, the government had the content of the most secret international meetings concerning Poland, and the directors of enterprises knew what the plans of Western companies were.

The vast majority of people using the information obtained had no idea where exactly it came from. Only a handful of people inside the Ministry of the Interior knew about penetration actions. In order to disguise the source of the information obtained, specially selected officers from the analytical division of Department II mixed it with data obtained otherwise and sent it to the appropriate officials inside and outside the ministry.

Years ago, a KGB officer who was privy to the activities of Poles wrote about the Polish special group in his memoirs. Department IX officers mention that they saw one copy of these diaries and it was in the counterintelligence library inaccessible to the average person.

In 2011, the former head of the Foreign Intelligence Agency, Zbigniew Siemiątkowski, tried to signal the existence of a penetration group in the special services of the People's Republic of Poland. During the conversation with the journalist, he briefly mentioned that Polish counterintelligence officers entered diplomatic missions, used radiation to open safes with documents, and that most of the members of the penetration group fell into fatal diseases as a result¹. However, he did not provide any further details, so the sensation was not taken seriously.

Soon after, the Institute of National Remembrance published a book, the reading of which could have convinced skeptics that Siemiątkowski was wrong or even made up. The publication covers a few pages of counterintelligence penetration, but it is in vain to find any information about radiation. The author mentioned one secret entry in 1980 but clearly treated it as an incident. In this publication, we can read that the services of the People's Republic of Poland actually entered the buildings of foreign representations at night after the end of World War II, but that after 1955 there were much less such activities, and in documents relating to the later period of the Polish People's Republic, there is practically no trace of them. The author draws the conclusion from this that counterintelligence, in principle, abandoned them at some point due to better and better technical solutions used in institutions².

The argument seems reasonable: it is hard to believe that it is possible to overcome of the security features that could be found in embassies in the seventies and eighties and consulates in Poland. And that radiation too? Who would fall for such a story? At that time, I also put Siemiątkowski's revelations among fairy tales. How wrong I was, I found out only a few years later, in the spring of 2017.

1. Robert Walenciak (script and production), Behind the scenes of the Polish People's Republic, TVP, 2011, youtu.be/4-LVgod4V-0 (accessed on 31/01/2020).

2. Patryk Pleskot, Diplomat, or spy? The activities of the counterattack services commanders of the Polish People's Republic against Western diplomatic missions in Warsaw (1956-1989), Institute of National Remembrance, Warsaw 2013.

At that time, I had been working on a book about Department II for a long time, and in the course of my research I conducted numerous interviews with its officers. Among them were people in high management positions, which during the interviews repeatedly mentioned that they had access to top secret documents of Western intelligence. The method of obtaining these materials was not revealed by my interlocutors. I was wondering if it was possible that foreigners recruited for cooperation with access to invaluable materials could be behind such a counterintelligence success. How many such people would have to be? It is doubtful that any secret service in the world could have such an extensive network of highly placed agents in such a significant number of foreign intelligence services at the same time. Then my thoughts returned to the TV program with Zbigniew Siemiątkowski in.

Determined to find out the truth, I began to piece together the scraps of information provided by my interlocutors. The most important piece of the puzzle turned out to be the details of the specific career path of one of the deceased officers, whose name appeared in conversations about secret documents obtained in the 1970s. Since the materials passed through his hands for some reason, maybe one of the departments he worked for was the one responsible for penetrating diplomatic missions? By searching the lists of officers

I came across the name of a man with a similar career path and decided to knock on his door.

In the back of my head, I still had the fear that I was making a fool of myself. After all, I was going to ask a stranger if he had accidentally brought radioactive material into the premises of foreign representations at night! When I explained the reason for my visit, the man's eyelid didn't even

twitch. After the first thirty seconds, I was ready to give up, absolutely convinced that the man standing in front of me, whom I am going to call "Engineer" here, had no idea what I was talking about and would burst out laughing. It didn't explode, but it didn't confirm anything either. Poker face.

The road from that exchange of views to the moment when we sat down to talk about the greatest secret of the special services of the Polish People's Republic was so long that today I would not even be able to recreate it. The "Engineer" actually turned out to be a long-time member of the Task Force. He put me in touch with a colleague from the department - an officer who will appear here under the pseudonym "Tourist". The men agreed to publish their testimony and in February 2018 my book about the counter-attack hit the market.

day of the People's Republic of Poland, in which one chapter was about "Department IX" ³. The reactions of the readers varied: some believed and asked why I devoted so little attention to this topic, while others stated that the described actions were physically impossible to perform.

I have not ceased to be interested in the subject. Having tips from "Tourist" and "Engineer", I was still looking for inconspicuously described files of the IX Department in the collection of the Institute of National Remembrance. Finally, a few months after the premiere of my book, I managed to find them and in the fall of 2018 they were made available to me in the archives of the Institute of National Remembrance. I was the first researcher to look at them. The documents confirmed every word of "Engineer" and "Tourist" and influenced my decision to start work on another book, this time entirely devoted to this topic.

3 Tomasz Awłasewicz, *Spy Hunters. Red and Black*, Warsaw 2018.

Not all those working in Department IX entered the premises and carried out attacks at the use of radioactive isotopes - only the best joined this group, creating the so-called object group. Determining the exact number of its members still alive is proving very difficult, as the fate of some of them after leaving the service is unknown. Extremely unhealthy working conditions meant that probably no more than ten are still alive today - including "Engineer" and "Tourist", who agreed to continue the talks for the purposes of this book. I was also helped to get in touch with others, and eventually as many as five members of the object group agreed to share their memories. In addition, after a long search, I managed to meet a member of the so-called Division IX airport group responsible for intercepting, opening, copying and restoring diplomatic mail at the Okęcie airport.

Two officers of the operational departments of Department II also shared their memories with me: General Andrzej Kapkowski, who regularly accompanied the officers of Division IX at the entrances to American institutions, and an officer with the pseudonym "Recruiter", dealing with the Swedish and Spanish embassies. A retired secret service officer who will appear in this book under the pseudonym "Brunetka" told me about the work of the external observation division, which secured the penetration operations.

All my interlocutors are now between sixty and seventy years old and were still relatively young at the time of the fall of the Polish People's Republic. Among the IX Division officers with whom I spoke, only one did not continue his service in the Third Polish Republic, as he was fired in the 1980s for having a family in the West. The rest, not getting confused with the People's Republic of Poland, went to the newly created Office for State Protection. They will not reveal what activities they were delegated to after the change of the political system. One can only hope that they have found a job that has not wasted their potential. And this book proves that a Pole can really do something.

NOBODY KNOWS WHAT THEY ARE DOING
UNDER THE BLIND ARKADS
CHAPTER 1

PHOTOGRAPHER: During the first two weeks of my service in Division IX, I had the impression that someone was making fun of me. It was arranged that I would take care of my beloved photography there, and in the meantime I was ordered to make friends with rappers, such specialized tools for opening locks. I entered the department immediately after graduating from officer school in the early 1980s. Before that, I worked in the "B" office, that is in observation. You know - there was one figurehead, you followed him, rode a car, a bicycle. By the way, a lot of pictures were taken of him, and I was just doing photography there, developing, everything related to it. Today I can take a photo with a digital camera and send it instantly to the computer, and then I had to sit in the darkroom, make sure that nothing was missing in it, maintain the entire the mass of equipment.

I knew the specifics of this job very well, because in Beta, that's what we called "B", my father also worked. I was still a small child when a covered point was organized in our apartment - a place from which one could discreetly observe a building or street. My father's friends were in my house every day, sitting and staring out the window, because there was a Western diplomat living opposite. Of course, I didn't know what it was about, for me they were uncles and aunts. You know attraction, something was going on.

My mother was very ill and spent a large part of her life in the hospital. It was early Gomulka, completely different times, so when my mum was away and dad had no one to leave me with, he just took me to work with him. I drove around the city with him and various uncles, I was very pleased. All my childhood I heard that my dad works in the services, only those who put out fires. It is true that he did not drive a red car, but he did not go into such details, and I believed. What it was all about, I found out only many years later, as an adult.



Father of "Fotograf" in the Warsaw M-20 car belonging to the "B" office, the turn of the 50s and 60s

For much of his career, my father was in the so-called Mercedes section of Japanese surveillance. It consisted in following the diplomats, but in an open way - so that they would be aware that you were keeping an eye on them. More than once the officers even said hello to them, and then they both got into their cars and drove. Sometimes foreigners wanted to get away, and since they had nice machines, we had to have a bit under the hood as well. Dad's section was called Mercedes precisely because most of it was driven by good German cars. There was also a Citroen DS, but nobody wanted to get in because it had almost no brakes.



Fotografia wykonana w trakcie prowadzenia tzw. obserwacji japońskiej – funkcjonariusze Biura „B” podążają bezpośrednio za znajdującymi się w pierwszym samochodzie dyplomatami. Lata 60.

The photo was taken during the so-called Japanese surveillance - officers from Bureau follow the diplomats in the first car. The 1960s.

In the mid-seventies, I also landed in a beta, except that I mostly sat in the laboratory and dealt with all this photography. I handled the equipment there that hey. I had everything in one finger.

I was a really valuable employee and at one point it became my nightmare because, paradoxically, it prevented me from getting a promotion. The age-old problem of the services is that the chiefs do not want to let people who know their stuff out of their department. I not only had an idea about the job,

but also was exceptionally available. Back then, he was a bachelor, and a non-whitening one - my only addiction was cigarettes, because I never liked alcohol too much. There was a telephone in the house, so my boss knew that if he called me in the middle of the night, I could be ready to leave in just a few minutes. That is why every time I asked to be transferred to another department, so many times the management would try to make me stay. Once, when I wanted to go to the officer school in Legionowo, playing for time, they thought that first I had to do a school for ensigns of Bureau "B". It was in Warsaw, in Okrzei. I sat there for maybe two or three months and I was bored like a pug, because I knew everything that was there from my work.

After I finished I went back to the department so the boss won. I asked for a referral to Legionowo again and when I was refused, I couldn't stand it anymore. The director of the forensics department promised me that if I applied for a transfer to him, he would do anything to get me admitted and send me to college right away. I was about to implement this plan, but then my dad is leaving! just from betka and the problem was solved differently. My father worked there for almost thirty years and had a farewell conversation with the very head of Bureau - director Krawczyk. This was often practiced. The director asked if there were any wishes, so dad said that he would like his son to be released to Legionowo. It struck lightning.

At the end of their studies, the so-called merchants came to this school, that is people from various sections of the Ministry of Internal Affairs looking for new employees. They were sitting in the auditorium, you could come and talk. I was very interested in counterintelligence, i.e. Department II. So when two of them came, I applied and they accepted me to Department IX, which didn't mean anything to me at the time.

It was the beginning of the 1980s. At that time, the department had its premises at the Headquarters on Rakowiecka Street. It was entered from the back, from Batory Street. Under these blind arcades there were doors exclusively for us, and behind them a few small rooms. We were isolated from the rest of the officers who had no idea what was inside. No one was allowed to enter this enclave

come in, and we were not allowed to talk about it. I remember the first conversation with the warden. I was overjoyed because he clearly told me then that I would continue to work with photography. The boss was crazy about technology and he took a Nikon camera from his closet. It was going to be good. Then he told me to slide into the department storeroom and pick up my equipment. Only that sitting there, Mrs. Jadzia, whom everyone in the department was afraid of at all, instead of photographic equipment had for me the aforementioned rappers for opening locks, a vice and some other tools completely unrelated to my specialty. You can't ask too many questions in the services, so I kindly gave it all, got a desk, sat down. It was then that I met the "Engineer" who came, threw a whole pile of locks on my countertop and ordered each one to be opened with these rippers. I sat there for days, picking until my fingers swollen. I was so tired with one of these locks that at some point Mr. Zenek, already such an older employee, approached me and said that the "Engineer" was not around at

the moment, so he would help me open it secretly. He hid behind some such wall and I can hear him struggling. Curse after curse, and finally it comes to tell me that this lock can't be twisted at all, because it's broken.

And so the days passed and no one told me what was going on. I had been working in the services for a few years at the time, so I guessed what connection photography could have with locks.

You know, secret entrances - apartments, hotels. I was only surprised by this training program, because normally during searches the photographer does not have to touch any locks - someone else opens them for him.

At the time, I had no idea that Department IX carried out such complicated activities that even me I had to know every aspect of the job, including defeating security. When two weeks had passed since I came to the department, and instead of taking pictures, I was still making friends with rifles, sawing something or cleaning lathes and milling machines, I finally went to the warden to complain.

ENGINEER: I came to the department much earlier, in the first half of the seventies. At that time, it was not actually Department IX, but a section in the structure of the Department U, but if you shake it, so shake it. I already graduated from the Warsaw University of Technology, I had an engineering degree. As they saw at the Ministry of the Interior, they immediately sent me to this section. Honestly, it was the only thing I got in and left almost right away, I didn't even have time to sit down. They sent me for six months to training at the General Operations Technique Division, the locks department. I learned the basics: how to open latches, probably everyone knows Yale locks, I read a lot. I was doing well - so much so that at one point I asked the warden if I could take care of something more complicated. I noticed that in a box on one of the shelves there was an unusual combination lock, and I wanted to play with it a bit. The warden allowed. The manual was in German, and as I knew the language very well, I translated it thoroughly, got acquainted with the mechanism, and then I packed everything nicely into a box and put it back in its place. At that time, I did not know yet that the story would begin with this lock, and it would end with receiving a medal.

In the field of technology, they liked me very much. At the end of the training, they even persuaded me to stay with them and not return to counterintelligence. As I was delegated to them only for study and they had to send me to Division IX, they suggested that they would simply write me a fatal opinion that was false to the truth. So bad that nobody will want me back there. It was a bit hard for me to decide because I still didn't know what my parent unit was doing. In the end, I decided that since I was sent to general technology only to kindergarten, then where I am supposed to be, they must deal with some more specific activities. I said goodbye, took my toys, and went to find out what they were up to in this whole Division.

HUNTER: I am an electronics technician and I started my service in the seventies in surgical technique. From there, I was sent to the officer's school in Legionowo, after which I returned to the same line. It was the first half of the eighties, I was young, I wanted to continue my studies terribly and I immediately asked for permission to start studying at our departmental university - the Academy of Internal Affairs. There was a new warden then and, naturally speaking to me as comrade, he tells me that he does not know what I represent, this, that, that. These studies weren't really a problem, because they were probably only one-year studies and for sure extramural, so they wouldn't interfere with the job in any way. I told him that since the previous management trusted me and sent me to the officers' school for three years, they must have placed some hopes in me, and he said that nothing about a comrade and that he would let me go. It was then that I had a different idea. I did well in operational work and had previously received a referral to Department II of the U Department dealing with countering British espionage. Well, I tell him about it, and he - that nothing is wrong and the way is clear. I ran to the office, wrote a request for a transfer, and a few days later a personnel officer called me. I remember him well, such an old-time officer, he wrote all documents beautifully with a fountain pen, normally calligraphy. He tells me that yes, I have a recommendation for the British department, but since I'm an electronics technician, he has a better idea. He told me how to get into Department IX and told me to report there for an interview.

Senior technical officers said that some "bomb" was stored at this location. When you asked them what was going on, they didn't say anything, they probably didn't even know what the "bomb" was, they just heard something somewhere and just repeated it. Anyway - they scared. It was 1983 and then the department was no longer located in those rooms on Rakowiecka Street, where some of my colleagues started. At that time, he already had his own, well-guarded facility in Mokotów. It still smelled of paint because they had just moved in. I remember it was Saturday when I got there and the deputy warden greeted me. He asked me about my graduation and experience. He said the department has a lot of different sections, but every employee needs to be fully trained: the electronics technician has to be able to take pictures, the photographer has to open the locks. At the end, he informed me that for now he would assign me to such a senior officer and together with him I would create a group code-named "Czołówka".

TOURIST: I was originally offered a job in the Government Protection Bureau. When, at the turn of the sixties and seventies, I was doing my basic military service in Warsaw, I was asked to prepare a daughter of an officer from the Ministry of the Interior for my final exams. I graduated from a technical secondary school, science subjects did not cause me any problems. I think the guy liked me, because he said that I had to submit the papers and he would put me in the Government Protection Bureau. I liked the idea in principle, but I figured that maybe first I will try to go talk to human resources and find out if I have a chance to work in the services at all. When I went to the police station and started talking, I immediately filled in the forms. And then somehow it went like an avalanche and instead of in BOR I ended up in the operational technique division in Silesia, where I come from. Specialization - wiretaps. Zdzisław Marchwicki, known more widely as the Vampire from Zagłębie, is one of my first cases. He was given the death penalty for killing a dozen women. There was a lot of work on

Marchwicki, because we installed wiretaps everywhere: from his cell to the apartments of family members - closer and more distant, there was a lot of it. My duties included both the installation of the cradle of the entire apparatus and its subsequent operation. More than once you sat somewhere in a nearby room with a note, a pencil and headphones on your ears and you had to wait for hours for them to say something interesting. After several years of working in Silesia, I asked to be transferred to Warsaw. You know, I came to the capital for my girlfriend - my wife. It was also here that I was tapped and then to an officer school in Legionowo. When I was finishing it in the early 1980s, the head of Division IX came and I had the opportunity to talk to him. I was a good candidate because I had good technical preparation and, importantly, I had already had children. I did not know about it then, but attempts were made to admit people with a stable family situation to this cell, due to the health risk associated with the service in this place. Initially, no one told me what the lam was doing, and I did not inquire, because I was not allowed to. An order is an order. In wiretapping I had such my-

his best friend, then we were also in Legionowo together. Normally lovebirds. Well, just imagine that they also accepted both of us in Department IX, so I was very happy.

Beard: Well, I was also pleased! Anyway, all the time I was telling "Tourist" that after school we only go to counterintelligence. I was laughing that I wanted to chase spies, and that's it. I graduated from a mechanical technical school, my dad worked in the services, he put me in touch with the right person and originally I ended up with all these wiretaps in the Ministry of the Interior. Then I went to Legionowo and when it turned out that there was a technology section in Department II, I had no doubts about where I wanted to go. When the day of, let's say, a job fair came, together with "Tourist" we started asking which table someone from counterintelligence was sitting at. The head of Division IX was there at the time and he received information about what we are interested in. He invited us for an interview, we talked for a while, he thanked us. He said nothing about how it went, much less what exactly they are doing there. Technical department and that's it. A few days later, information came that we would be working for him. We applied to the department, at that time it was still on Rakowiecka Street. We had barely crossed the threshold, and he had already announced to everyone there that the two crooks had to be galloped and put into work immediately. The "Engineer" caught up with us and it started, as usual: he punched us a whole pile of locks on the table, threw rappers and chisels, you don't know about such things. We were both technicians, but we were doing completely different things there. It gave us an hour or so to throw ourselves at those locks, put them in vice and load the rugs inside blindly like two morons. Time passes, half of the tools are broken, our hands hurt, and we can't see the end. "Engineer", good boy, but he fucked us well. Well, we learned, no need to talk. And I can tell you that it was just such a moment that the department needed people terribly, so we were put into work relatively quickly, and especially to the most delicate one. Less than a month has passed, and without a word of explanation they ordered us to get into the assembly hall and the pipe to Szczecin. It wasn't until the lama that we found out what this is all about.

Chapter 2

"LEADERS"

R0ZDZ1AŁ 2

HUNTER: In my first period of service in Division IX, my main responsibility was reading the newspapers, half-jokingly, half seriously. Before initiation in the most secret activities, I was assigned to the "Czołówka" group - the hotel section. It was supposed to be such a start-up for me. It consisted in the fact that we were sitting in a room with such an older officer, who has been dead for a long time, and we searched the press for information that an interesting delegation was coming to Poland.

We also received orders from other divisions of the Ministry of the Interior, special lists from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we had contacts at the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and sometimes we also found out through some other channel that we found out unexpectedly that there was someone in the country who was worth looking at. When such information appeared, it was necessary to swipe the client in the hotel, as it is said in our jargon. To "flip" is to do a search - of course, so that he does not find out. Basically, the searches in the hotels could be done by officers from the Department of Technology, that is, the basic operational technique division where many of us used to work. Only that the dynamics in Department IX was completely different. Officers from the usual "T" had to write applications first, a lot of people signed them above, and when everything was ready, the figurehead was lying on the beach at the other end of the world for a long time. It was very fast with us, Department IX was privileged. Sometimes permission to mount someone, another word for a search, was done quickly over the phone, and then the paps were overwhelmed. and such a diplomatic mission went to Gdańsk on business and can have documents with him at the hotel, what was waiting for?

ENGINEER: I was not permanently in the hotel group, but each of us used to go to work like this from time to time. In this case, apart from people suspected of espionage, we were most interested in people coming to Poland for some trade negotiations. From the briefcase of such a man we pulled out documents on the strategy of talks. It was invaluable knowledge, we were immediately guaranteed the best offer. The piece of paper said the guy could go down to a hundred dollars a kilo of some product. Well, now the man representing the Polish side in the negotiations could easily walk away from the table when he was asked for one hundred and twenty dollars. He knew he wouldn't even get to the door before he heard that they'd get along somehow. It is a pity that it is now impossible to calculate how much money the country will save! Thanks to these actions in hotels. As was the era of Gierek, the propaganda of success and the time of great shopping, many companies came to us with an offer to sell various licenses. And we were buying it all with money from loans taken by the first secretary. I remember how Pietrzak sang in the cabaret that Gierek robbed so many banks. After all, a lot of money was spent on licenses and it is good that we paid a little less thanks to our shares. After all, enough debts have already accumulated. For many officers, hotel works were a good introduction to work in the department, because they are the basis of the basics - this is what services all over the world do. Imagine that the Swedes were building the Forum hotel for us, that is today's Novotel, so normally, without any wrapping around the bush, they asked if we wanted them to leave some room for some goodies in some rooms. It is known - wiretaps, cameras. Of course, the Polish side was indignant: we said that we are not such a country and that we thank you very much.

HUNTER: Swedish buildings had a big advantage, because both in hotels and office buildings, for example in Intraco, they put a so-called low-voltage installation in

virtually every room. Basically you used Lego for fire alarm systems, alarm systems and so on, but after plugging everything in, there were still some wires left. There were such orders in the "Leader" that it was necessary to register the customer's stay - just the sound or the image. With whom he talked, about what, and of course with whom he slept. In such a Forum hotel there was no problem with connecting devices. The Swedes themselves informed us about all these cables.

ENGINEER: Because they were doing the same at home, simple. Every larger hotel in the civilized world has had, and probably still has, its own, say, guardian. Here it was an officer of Bureau "B" - observation division. We always had to be close to such a man, because he was the one who created the conditions for a secret search.

HUNTER: Office "B", which we called betka, had the entire hotel manned. They recruited workers. The receptionists were theirs, and the maids were theirs. The Betkarze told them not to care when we were going there. But sometimes when the cleaners saw something happening, they deliberately tried to enter the rooms where we were sitting. They were just hoping to get some extra cash. During one action, in the Forum, she wanted to get inside like this. I heard at the right moment that she was trying to open, and as we were doing some things with the electronics that she really couldn't see, I blocked the door. She thought they were already open, and the poor bounced off them. The Betkarzy were supposed to prevent just such situations, but you know, life.

ENGINEER: Close cooperation with Betka was essential. Wherever I went - to Victoria, to Grand, to this whole Forum - everyone knew me. Office "B" always had its own room, separate from the reception desk, and I first went there to find out what and how. I will never forget one of these rooms. It had no windows, and inside there was a whole group of bettors smoking one cigarette after another. Sir, there a man did not see his own hand, and if I let the suitcase with my tools out of my hand, it would probably hang in the smoke. Man normally began to wonder if he really needed oxygen for life. They sat there for so many hours and functioned somehow, it must be a nonsense with that oxygen, right? Or only those bettors had some other lungs.

BEARDED: Specific, but good guys. Sometimes it was funny with them, because they also wanted to prove themselves, there was some kind of healthy competition. A man would come to their room, and they were sitting and they were just saying under their breaths that there was no need to search. It was immediately clear that they had dealt with the matter themselves, because they hoped that they would find something interesting in the room and get a bonus.

HUNTER: It used to be, but their role was mainly to guard our figurine. You know, when this guy came for business negotiations, you knew hotel searches were standard. So he usually tried to keep an eye on it, but for a day or two he wanted to and dragged these suitcases with him, and then when he got tired, the atmosphere relaxed and he wanted to jump out somewhere outside the protocol at night, he left it all in his room. He was sitting in some place in the city or even downstairs in a cafe, and we were boiling him upstairs. It happened that a client was simply at such a softening, very important for the upcoming negotiations, an exit with representatives of the Polish side, who often knew well that we were doing a search in the hotel room at that time. After all, they ordered these documents themselves, they cared, and therefore kept the guy for dinner as long as possible. In addition, the figurehead was watched by the bettors all the time, so if he moved from the table, a signal was sent to us via the radio.

ENGINEER: There were two types of radio in use. The Betkarze used ordinary, three-channel, militia, called walruses, to communicate with each other. We, on the other hand in addition, we also had much more expensive ones - Danish, Storno brands.

They operated at higher frequencies than the militia ones. We didn't want to hear what the bettors were saying among themselves, because it just bothered us. It was enough for one of them to provide us with the most important information through the reversal and that's it. These radio stations had one more advantage - there was a lower risk that our conversation would be caught by some random radio amateur. Even if he overheard us, nothing terrible would happen. After all, no one was saying in plain text: "Listen guys, I just finished copying documents in room seven, so Poland has a guaranteed discount on a vacuum cleaner license".

Codenames, slogans, neutral words, sometimes even the usual "stop" were used. The Betkarze controlled the traffic in the corridor and they gave us the signal that we could leave the room after the search was over. Sometimes it happened that we were about to grab the door handle and suddenly the "stop" signal came, which meant that someone was coming and we had to wait. When we got green, it came out and quickly hid into the so-called base room, which was always on the same floor. There was a bettor sitting there, we could leave our rubbish there too, and so on. Usually it was just a room prepared for a new hotel guest, so after we left, someone else came to see if we had messed up. Down-to-earth matters: didn't we throw off the 'towel in the bathroom or crumple the sheets. I remember that in one of the hotels there was a Mrs. Stenia from Office "B", who always checked it after the action. It was just that there should be no situation when a new guest comes to the room and immediately complains to the staff that they did not clean up after the previous one.

TOURIST: First of all, the order had to be left in the room where we did the search. After all, there could not be any traces of our presence, each thing had to be exactly in the same position as before. That is why we always took Polaroid photos of the interior immediately after entering, so that we could recreate everything perfectly later. It was very important, because first of all, the figure could have noticed something by accident, and secondly, some people simply set traps for us. When leaving, they noted the position of a pencil on a briefcase and a T-shirt in a suitcase, and when they arrived they checked that nothing had changed. There were various tricks.

ENGINEER: The cap on the doorknob! Some rooms had doors leading to an adjoining room. When a larger family came, it opened and there was an apartment. But on a daily basis the door was locked with a key that was not given to hotel guests. Of course, the wiser guessed that it would be the easiest way for us to go that way. We used to go in and there was a hat on the floor. And now the question - was it hanging on the doorknob? Or maybe the guy put her on the floor on purpose and wanted to see if we would hang her? In such cases, we just left it on the ground. If it was actually on the doorknob before, it would be difficult. After all, if it was lying, it was by no means conclusive proof that we were there. The guy then wondered if the cleaning lady had knocked her down or if some curious tourist from the next room had pulled the door handle.

But I do remember a smarter guy who put a rolled-up tie on top of his suitcase and a pile of coins in a specific order in the middle. He traveled a lot, he had the most different currency. If I picked up that tie without noticing that there was a surprise inside, the coins would scatter and the birds were gone - the guy would know that someone was picking up his suitcase. Nobody will play it back. On the other hand, there were those who ought to be on their guard, but not. Once, I was doing a search in the room of "Jackal", a famous Venezuelan terrorist and bomber. The guy had ten different passports with his photo in his room. Today he is in a French prison, and then he was killing on the orders of the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Apparently he also collaborated with some services from the Eastern Bloc, but I did a search for him, that's a fact. Same as lo, that such a guy will not protect! my belongings before the search and I had all his passports in my hand.

HUNTER: When viewed from the perspective of a figurehead, the best security is to always carry all your belongings with you and that's it. Sometimes security specialists came to the diplomatic missions for inspection. They didn't even leave a single piece of paper, because they knew how to do such a job. When we saw that someone only had panties and T-shirts in the room, you knew what it was for the guest. The others, on the other hand, watched it at the beginning, and then they refused to do so. At most they set these traps or locked things in a suitcase. Back then, it was believed that the locks on Samsonite suitcases were extremely difficult to open. And we did it in a dozen or so seconds without leaving any traces. The myke was such that we opened it with an ultra-thin plate. We cut them ourselves, from razor blades. We didn't need much to be happy.

TOURIST: For full happiness, we needed a device for copying documents. Beating a lock in a suitcase is one thing, but the other is done quickly clear photos of lego what's inside. With an ordinary camera, we would have been doing this for a million years, so we used a so-called combine.

ENGINEER: The combine did what we would use a scanner for today, but copying was much faster. There was a small desktop with A4, A5 and so on next - to put a piece of paper in the right position. At the top, on the booms, there were two linear bulbs, or, more simply, such oblong lamps. And the most important thing - in the center there was a camera mounted on a bracket.

TOURIST: If the page was put in the right place, the photo always came out sharp, ideally illuminated. Two types of triggers could be connected to the equipment - manual or foot operated. A postcard to the desktop, a tick, another card, another tick. It was very fast, and please imagine that it all could be put into such a handy suitcase. It was a Soviet equipment, fast, simple and reliable.



*Soviet harvester used by Division IX officers to quickly copy documents.
There are lamps on the left and right, and a camera on the top.*

PHOTOGRAPHER: You know, there were more modern, maybe better, more fabulous machines in the world. But they didn't work. The famous German company Robot, (Rollei?) producing cameras, some trafipaks or - if you prefer - speed cameras and other miracles intended for the services, once launched such an ultra-modern combine, which for us was one big misunderstanding. First, the contraption was battery operated, so the whole thing weighed about fifteen kilograms. Ruthenians, on the other hand, were connected to the mains and weighed only a few kilograms, and if there was a need, he also used a car battery, so there was always an alternative. The second problem was that while the lamps were on continuously in the Russian combine, they flashed in German with every shot. We could not afford it for two reasons. First, the flashing light is damn eye-catching. Yet something like this would be visible even through the gap under the door. Secondly, we even took several thousand photos during one search. It is after such a session that a person would go out and read only in Braille and would need a cane to move around. Let your flash flash straight into your eyes four thousand times, you won't recognize me. And in the Russian combine harvester, the lamps were simply lit steadily, and that's it. We put a cassette with even five hundred frames wound into the camera and the robot was finished in a second.

BRODACZ: The Russian harvester did exactly what it was supposed to do, despite the fact that it was not beautiful, it was not equipped with any goodies and at first it smelled for a kilometer. He was It was painted with hammer varnish and each time we got a new copy, we had to turn on both incandescent lamps in our rooms for two days to get them old. Without it, never move, because we couldn't go on a secret search with such a stinker. During firing, the lamps were heated to such a temperature that it was possible to fry on them. Only after two days did they stop stinking and the equipment could be used normally. And then it was poetry. No jams, perfect photos. And after work, the lamps puffed forward, lay in two seconds, then the flap was cut and the combine was assembled. Even in complete darkness, it was done without. The problem.

ENGINEER: It all went fast, but to make it even faster, it was necessary to separate documents worth photographing from 100-page documents as much as possible. garbage that is of no use to us. Remember that we have dealt with writings in all sorts of languages. Obviously, there was no problem with English, German or some other popular language. It was only fun when we delivered Japanese documents to the translator, and he informed us that he would not waste any time on stupid things. We photographed a whole pile of papers and it turned out that they were manuals for radio receivers, also available on our market.

PHOTOGRAPHER: I remember an even better number. Once one of my colleagues came to the department overjoyed that he had copied some very long and evidently very important Japanese government document. He walked proudly like a peacock, and then came information from the translator that it was a constitution. In addition, Poland.

ENGINEER: We had to solve this problem somehow, so we finally asked the translator to write down the most important symbols for us. Then we walked around with a note full of these bushes, for example those that meant something was confidential. We looked for them in the headlines and these documents were copied. Once I had a suitcase in my hand A Japanese who must have been carrying some interesting materials. His luggage had a total of eight combination locks on the left and right side. Eight! Evidently the suitcase was commissioned by some ministry. I have never come across anything like this before and never after. There, everything was so well folded that even the dental foil could not be inserted. With standard locks in Samsonite or Presto suitcases, nothing was a problem for us. With the help of a flashlight, it was sometimes even possible to look at their mechanism through a

slot, but in the case of this particular piece of luggage the light did not pass at all, nothing was visible. I couldn't spend more than a few minutes with this suitcase, the Japanese left Poland, and unfortunately I never got inside. But I was not sad for a long time, because I immediately found out where the transport of the Japanese "enigma" would go.

Chapter 3

LIKE THROUGH FAILURE
"TAIFUN" GONE

CHAPTER 3

TOURIST: In the light of international law, diplomatic mail is inviolable, but no one is so naive as to believe that the services are not bothered how to look at it. That is why each country tries to develop effective methods of securing it, from seals, through special belts, to metal cassettes equipped with some unusual locks and opening counters. At the Warsaw Okęcie airport, the driver of a given facility always waited with a watch in his hand and moved with his feet. He was to make sure that the post office was not in the hands of Poles longer than necessary. Their timekeeping calmed them down. They did not believe that the short time between the landing of the plane and the receipt of the mail by the driver is enough for us to deal with security in the room under the floor, open envelopes, photograph all documents, and then restore the whole to its original state. And leave no traces. And we did it. The same thing happened in ports and stations, wherever the post office appeared. This section of our department was formally called "Typhoon".



ENGINEER: It was the late seventies, maybe early eighties. With a friend, I came to the Gdynia port warehouse belonging to the Hartwig shipping company. There was a box from Tokyo, a few meters long. The Japanese tied it with plastic straps, but not the ones you could buy from a meter on a roll. These were special products, printed, made to order. There was no way we could cut it, we couldn't stretch it afterwards, we didn't have the proper heat sealer to clean it up. The security is solid, but I thought, "What if you open it without taking the tapes off at all?" At three in the morning, we finally managed to remove the deeply driven nails, which we then put aside in a specific order, just in case, so that everyone would return to exactly the same place. We pulled out the boards one by one and finally got inside. There were loads of facility items, electronics, manuals, all secured, packed in tar paper to keep out moisture. We were most interested in the encryption machine. The details of its design were needed by colleagues outside the faculty who specialized in developing methods to control such communications. They were jumping for joy when they found out that we had opened this chest. They would not be able to cope alone in life. The saying goes, nails are easy to pull out, but they were machine hammered, deep. In order to take them out, we had to part the boards, and yet we couldn't leave any traces. The idea was that, even with a magnifying glass, no one would notice that someone was picking at it. In addition, the Japanese clearly deliberately used nails with square heads there. Everyone had to be hammered in the same position they were in before, because if you turned a bit, the wood would end up showing an asterisk, not a square. Precise work.


TOURIST: We were used to open all kinds of parcels, sometimes quite peculiar. For example: the CIA left agents at an agreed place such spy containers made of plaster and blackened. They looked like pebbles, so it was hard to see. The addressee was to take the container to a discreet place, break it down and take out any intelligence instructions, money or whatever was hidden there. One day the American department will intercept! such a stone and then it will hit! he to us - with a request for a gentle opening. Obviously, the point was not to destroy the content, because the prosecutor will stick to it, because it is evidence in the case, because this, because that, because that is. It wasn't my problem, but I remember my colleagues standing over this stone and discussing how they would cut it. They worked out the whole strategy, how one will hold it, the other will use a saw to cut the wax, the other. They thought and thought, they were preparing as if they

were going to war, until finally one of them could not stand it, grabbed the hammer and simply fucked the stone with all his might in the world. I remember it like today, because it stunned me. He didn't destroy the contents, there was no problem, but he was taking a great risk. I don't know what came to his mind, especially since he worked in the airport group and dealt with opening the diplomatic post on a daily basis. Who if who, but he was able to open even the best secured package so delicately that there was no trace of it. Besides, he himself will tell you how you will meet him.



POSTMAN: I remember the silence when I smashed that rock, oh, I remember. But it wasn't the first time I'd seen it, so I had some idea of how to handle it. In fact, such a blow could not destroy anything inside. After all, if this container got to the agent, he would have to destroy it as well. I made a male decision and I was right, nothing happened. But such a brutal opening was rare in this work. Like most of my colleagues dealing with diplomatic mail in Okęcie, I come from the "W" Office. This was the department responsible for checking letters, parcels, anything that could be sent by post. It had to be opened without leaving any traces, and with ordinary envelopes and boxes it wasn't too much of a problem, we had a lot of people for it. Aleja spent eight years in the "W" office with the so-called difficult documents, that is, everything that required a long thought before opening. At one point, in the seventies, one of my colleagues from "W" found their way to Department IX. He knew that I was sitting on difficult documents, that I was good, he brought me back. We had a room in Okęcie, and in this room there was a hidden descent to another one. It was necessary to move the table aside, open the hatch and go downstairs. There you could work in peace and the system we developed worked for years. The fun began when the plane landed. The diplomatic mail was passing through the airport. Entrance to the 9th Department room under the floor at the Okęcie airport. the same control as other luggage - is there a bomb or the bomb is not. It was the key to our happiness. Over the years, we have had a number of associates among the airport staff. There was, for example, a lady who signaled to us that the plane was already there and the luggage would be behind and behind. I also remember a retired military major who made some extra money in Okęcie. He was theoretically responsible for delivering the mail for this security check. So he threw the bags through the door into the room where it was supposed to take place - or so the airport workers thought. But of course we didn't do anything in this room, we just opened our door on the other side, grabbed sackcloth and ran to our rooms. The complexity of the digging, of course, depended on the security measures applied by a particular country. It is known that such parcels are normally sealed. Usually, you managed to make a copy of the seal, but sometimes we saw right away that there would be a problem with that. At that time, we used a primitive but effective method of tightening the strings closing the bag. We just twisted the sack at the top, twisted it, twisted it, until it finally came off the securing device. Not that kind of philosophy, but now put it back on. It was already a philosophy, and in addition, before closing the bag, the material of the bag had to be smoothed, because there were visible signs of squeezing. Counterfeiting the seals was much safer. Any bigger problems? There were, for example, tapes with which the Finnish and Swedish mail were sealed. First of all, it was difficult to buy the same one, because it was not an ordinary tape, but an unusual one, with prints. Second, she was going down terribly hard. In order not to break the paper layer, it had to be heated, cut, some kind of nightmare. Ordinary tape on other packages came off quickly, you just had to be careful how you pulled off one that had some stamps on the surface. The point was that part of B's stamp was on the tape, and some on the envelope or some cardboard. Then we had to use the same piece of tape to seal the package and set the tape in exactly the same position. Members of the airport group most often managed to make copies of the seals securing the

diplomatic mail. Thanks to this, they could afford to damage the originals when opening the bags with documents, which significantly improved the work. which originally, otherwise the stamp would have come out crooked. Petroleum ether was used to peel off most of the tapes. that is, unfortunately, a poisonous substance. After sitting in these fumes for years, my pancreas has completely crumbled and I suffer from diabetes. And it probably could have been prevented, there were other means by which the tapes could be peeled off. I know, because once from Japan, the Russians brought me lacquer. It was purified gasoline, normally like water, with no smell. Items necessary for airport group officers: on the left you can see, among others, the seals standing on the shelves, the seals hung on the nails and the sealers standing on the table. On the right, a set called by the officers "knopka" containing, among others, scalpels and tongs. And non-toxic. A great experience. They left me some, but only a little, because they said that our intelligence would buy me more in Asia. So what? , I asked and I never lived to see it. For years it was necessary to act on ether.



Entrance to the Department IX room located under the floor at the Okęcie airport.

BREADDER: You must remember that we had very little time to check these parcels. Everything had to be perfectly synchronized so that no one would notice any delays. Besides, the posts constantly asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for permission to collect mail from the plane itself. We had people there who informed us about such things, and of course we told them that there was no way and that they were to say that, in fact, there are even longer delays lately, traffic at the airport, one great chaos and that we are sorry.

HUNTER: But the Americans did in fact get that permission not long before 1989. At the diplomatic level, they negotiated it, and the checking of their mail at Okęcie ended.

POSTMAN: You know, so many years have passed that now it's hard for me to say exactly how long it took us to open, photograph and close the bag. It was surely short enough for the embassy driver not to notice. At the same time, you must remember that we were gaining some time by having the diplomatic post leave the plane in the absolute first place, and only long after the rest of the stuff. And the embassy drivers didn't know this, and while we were already operating, they thought their bags were still on board. We have opened the post offices of so many countries that I am not even able to list them all now. Other sections of our department did not touch demoludes, but we even looked at their mail from time to time. Since there was an opportunity, it was a shame not to look at it, right? As for the photos, they show diplomatic mail addressed to the US Embassy in Warsaw. The Americans hid the documents in addition to custom-made black plastic bags and then sealed the inlet. Division IX officers forged the bags, which allowed for regular checks on American parcels. o the West, did you know that I received the golden cross of merit for copying the documents that allowed Gierek to prepare for negotiating one of the loans? When he went to the interviews, he already knew all the questions. I got them out of the German diplomatic post.

ENGINEER: Anyway, I also received an award for the same cause. Do you remember the combination lock I told you about? I played with it when I was in the Department of Technology in training. I translated the instructions from German, put it on the shelf, nobody was interested in it. Some time later, when I finished my studies and went to the Department IX permanently, guests from the KGB came to us. I was in the department for only two weeks, so as a mouse, I was sitting facing the wall in the corner, sipping my cup of coffee politely and not participating in any discussions. Well, but I heard my superiors talking to these Russians by the force of things. At one point, it was about some kind of metal cassette for transporting diplomatic mail that was used by West Germany and passed through the hands of the Bulgarians. Those from the KGB complained that it was equipped with an unusual combination lock and that they could not figure out what the contraption was. They talked about what it looked like, scratched their heads, complained, and at some point I realized that I knew exactly what it was. I turned around and communicated it to them. The whole group looked at me - such a kid, he just came to the department and he knows everything? They almost laughed at me, but I insisted on my own, I assured them that I had seen such a castle in the technical field and even developed a Polish instruction. So they told me to fly and fetch it quickly. When that main KGB guy saw it, his eyes lit up. He took the lock with him and when he arrived two months later, he already had its operation in one finger. I remember today, it was the S2000 model made by the Nordmende company, known rather for the production of televisions and radio receivers. The German cassette with this lock finally appeared at our Okęcie, so naturally we started working on the method of opening it expressly, and the lock was not the only problem there. Even though I just came to the department, I already had points with my boss, Mr. Jerzy, and not only for associating this lock. In those days, cryptographers returning from their offices in the West often bought expensive watches and then did not want to give them to a random watchmaker in Warsaw. My boss was good at it and for a small fee he did

repairs after hours for colleagues. When he found out that I was also on the subject, he brought me all his tools and said that now I will be the counterintelligence watchmaker. Importantly, he also gave me such an antique watch from his wife, which he has reportedly tried to repair for ten years. I think I did a great job, because as soon as that case with depka-75 came out, because that was the name of the German cassette, Mr. Jerzy flew straight to the then director of Department II, General Władysław Pożoga, and told him that he had such a young, talented man in the department. an engineer, I mean me. He suggested that I be responsible for developing a method for quickly opening the cassette. Conflagration nodded, and so I became responsible for the flax project. We opened depka-75 for the first time together with the Ruskies, but it took a lot of time, something unacceptable. The plus was that I made precise drawings of it then, and photos were also taken. It was essentially a metal box with two holes inside. There were no bolts in the lid of this box. Everything was well thought out, perfectly folded and it was difficult to tinker with it without leaving traces. To make matters worse, the cassette also had an openings counter.

POSTMAN: First, we used a time-consuming but effective method of resetting the counter. After some time, we luckily managed to get the same counter, forge the serial numbers and we just swapped one counter for another. Opening The metal cassette Depka-75 was equipped by the West German services, incl. in an atypical design, a lock and an opening counter. the epki-75 was actually done by only three people in our department, including me. In the depot it was nice at least that the Germans, wanting to save space, put documents and letters inside without any envelopes. So when a man opens! cassette, you just put the papers on the combine, cut photos and it's ready. Then, of course, you had to put everything in the same order, because even such details were taken care of. However, when opening this cassette, you really had to know what you were doing.



ENGINEER-. It was difficult to get it right, because anybody could do it, as I once found out. One time my friend and I open this cassette, we are at the step of heating one of the screws with a nipple torch and suddenly we look, and a piece of it simply "pops" - falls off. I called the warden and I tell him that something is wrong here. So we heat up the second bolt and the situation repeats: "pop" - a piece of the bolt is gone. I look to the side of the cassette and see a cut off piece of the word "-EST". I say: oho, probably "Bukar-est" or "Budapest-est". This cassette circulated all the demolished people and apparently recently it was in Romania or Hungary, where the services struggled with these screws, destroyed them, and then simply repaired them with glue.

POSTMAN: I remember that the cassette smelled like glue when the cassette came from Leningrad, so the Russians also screwed up. Of course, they also opened the depot intensively, but with a different method. I saw how often they do it, when one time one of the KGB came to talk to us, he sat in our room and looked at the ashtray. He looks and stares and I don't know what he means. Suddenly, he reaches out with his hand, pulls out a small screw from under that ashtray and says, "Oh, spare, for the epilepsy."





The members of the airport group most often managed to make copies of the seals securing the diplomatic mail. Thanks to this, they could afford to damage the originals when opening the bags with documents, which significantly improved the work.



Items necessary for the airport group officers: on the left you can see, among others, seals standing on shelves, seals hung on nails and sealers standing on the counter. On the right, a set called by the officers "knopka" containing, among others, scalpels and tongs.



The photos show the diplomatic mail addressed to the US Embassy in Warsaw. The Americans hid the documents in addition to custom-made black plastic bags and then sealed the inlet. Division IX officers forged the bags, which allowed for regular checks on American shipments.



The metal Depka-75 cartridge was equipped by West German services, incl. in an atypical design, a lock and an opening counter.

HUNTER: Okęcie is also a place of other actions. I remember once we got a signal that there would be a South American diplomat at the airport and that he had drugs in his luggage. Yes, it is. I went there with a friend and we grabbed his suitcase somewhere in the back. A friend couldn't open these combination locks, so I tried it - pop, pop, open both. So we look inside and there are T-shirts ironed and folded, just like straight from the factory. We pick up these clothes, and there are indeed drugs.

Beard: Did you check? Maybe mothballs.

HUNTER: No, it was checked, drugs for sure.

Beard: You probably assessed the differences in mood before and after?

HUNTER: These were professional tests, not organoleptic.

Beard: Sure.

HUNTER; Okay, I took pictures of everything Lego, we closed the suitcase and let it go so the client would pick up normally. We also figured out the code, gave it to the customs officer and waited to see what happened. The customs officer actually took the diplomat aside, says there are comments to the suitcase, that the smell is not that dogs are interested, and so on. So he asks if the guy will mind if he looks inside. To this the diplomat says that of course, no problem, but he forgot the combination. Our customs officer replies that he knows, then begins to pretend that he opens it by some method, when he actually sets the code we gave him. Bach, the suitcase is open. The air left the client in no time. You know, sometimes such a show on our part brought some benefits in the celebration of diplomacy. Our Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked and the guy had to say goodbye to Poland.



Chapter 4

"OBJECT" ROOM 4

HUNTER: "Objects" were those employees of the department who entered the premises. It was the top shelf, the elite. Once I proved myself with the hotel works, the "object" only allowed me to ride to the embassy and wait downstairs - and that was a great ennoblement for me. A lot of very heavy equipment was needed to perform penetration, so the next step was the role of porter. I remember the first time I was allowed in. It was the French consulate in Krakow. Such an older friend, Johnny, told me to sit in an armchair and not move. It was completely dark, they only shone lanterns held in their teeth, rummaging in one of the locks. There were no diplomatic talks there, this is work under terrible time pressure, curse after curse, only whispers, of course. It didn't even occur to me to move - I was told to sit on my butt, so I was sitting there politely. I got up only when it was time to go and my friend let me. When I was leaving, I checked a hundred times that the chair was not crumpled and was standing in the same place as before.

Beard: But there were those who could not understand that they were not to hang around the object. There is no worse player than the inquisitive. The one who walks around and only his hands move to the right and left. I remember one fool who entered, started looking through books for some reason, and knocked over the bookshelf. Can you imagine? I also did not like when someone entered the facility and immediately looked for a toilet, because he drank too much tea with dinner. What's this gonna be? We use the toilet before the action, and not in the embassy building, where the sound of flushing water can lead to a tragedy. If it happened repeatedly, you thanked them too. Very few were assigned to the object group, because apart from the ability to behave in the object, the candidate also had to be extremely resistant to stress. After all, it happened many times that we were working and suddenly we heard the American footsteps over our heads. You had to wait for them to quiet down, then a little more to be sure, and then it was back to work. There were those who could not withstand the tension. Some of them came in, immediately got stomach upset and had to be evacuated. I remember one of our chiefs sweating like a mouse as soon as he walked over the threshold. He was completely unfit for this.

HUNTER: I remember, I remember. He flew around the object, survived, held his head. One time he also started to complain about something on his stomach, I asked him what he ate before the action, and he says it was a knuckle. He was so anxious and had to choose a knuckle from the whole menu.

TOURIST: There were also those who gave up working in the department at all when they found out what really needed to be done. As for me and the "Bearded Man", we were quickly thrown into deep water. We ended up in the object group after a few weeks of work in the department. One day, our older colleagues just told us to get in the car and took us to work in Szczecin, to the Swedish consulate. In the end, it became clear what the job would be and why they tormented us so much with this learning to open locks. Why were we initiated so quickly? They saw that we were learning fast and there was a demand for employees in the facility group. It was terribly difficult to find the right people for this job. We went, we went in, and we had the first time behind us. But, you know, it's easy to say, "we went and we came in," but it was a great undertaking. The fact that we were able to enter like this was the result of many years of preparation of our older colleagues. With time, we became responsible for the flax process and saw for ourselves what it meant. What are the stages? Each counterintelligence has departments responsible for specific directions - countries, and in some cases entire groups of countries. This was also the case with us. Department I dealt with fighting American espionage, Department II - British, and so on. The people working

there were operational officers - they recruited foreigners and Poles working in embassies for cooperation, because each institution had such. The help of the operational officers was extremely important to us, because they, thanks to their agents, could tell us that on such and such days the facility will start work two hours earlier than usual, that from now on the cleaner comes to work late in the evening, and not early morning and so on. Honestly, you should also talk to my colleague from the operations department about working with the agency.

DRIVER: From the seventies I worked in the 5th Department of the II Department. Oh, we had a million directions underneath us. I mainly dealt with Swedes and Spaniards, but the department was also responsible for Finland, Switzerland, and various countries of Central and South America. There were also Asian countries, mainly Japan and India, but also a number of others. There was too much work. And, I would have forgotten, there was also Africa. I was responsible for entries to the Swedish embassy for several years. I knew everything about this place, as well as about the Spanish Embassy.

Working with agents is a lot of psychology. It is important that the cooperation proceed slowly, in stages, and that there are no sudden movements. The source cannot be covered on the first day worthy questions, because it will scare you away. We often started conversations under the legend, i.e. we did not reveal that we were from the services. Only then did we slowly reveal what it was really about. It was important to show the agent that our actions were not aimed at him or his friends at all, that it was nothing personal. In the case of Poles, it was good for a person to see that it was about the interests of the state, and not some stupid things. People looked at us differently when they finally found out that we were from counterintelligence. They were much more open.



Ambasada Szwecji w Warszawie przy ul. Bagatela 3, widok współczesny.

The Embassy of Sweden in Warsaw at ul. Bagatela 3, present view.

Did we use blackmail in our recruitment? There are no sentiments in the services and no jokes. When there was a need, foreigners in hotels were mistaken for young ladies. In the "B" office there was a department responsible for hotels and they always had nice ladies in touch. They selected intelligent, often knowing foreign languages. These weren't random girls. It suited them, because it allowed them to enter the hotel - after all, it was the bet that decided who would enter and which would not. I had a figurehead whose girl had wrapped up so much that he even started seeing her in her apartment. And when I say "her apartment", I mean, of course, our apartment equipped with all sorts of technological wonders. People are not fully aware of what the use of compromising materials was like. When we already had a recording of such a guy with a lady, we did not run to him right away with the TV and we did not make a projection. First, the client had to be examined. Sometimes it was enough to suggest that we knew something, and the guy was already changing his tone and making friends with us.

TOURIST: The operations department provided us with not only information from the agents, but even the keys that these agents had access to. Bureau "B" also had such possibilities to some extent. For example, it was in contact with the housekeepers working in the houses of diplomats, who had both many interesting things to say and the opportunity to get, for example, the keys from the boss's jacket. Usually, they were not some very important keys, let alone combinations for safes, which we had to deal with ourselves. But if the housekeeper took the keys to a corridor or utility room out of the diplomat's briefcase and made it possible to make a copy - it was always some convenience for us, saving time.

ENGINEER: One morning I received a bunch of a dozen keys belonging to the ambassador. We managed to get these keys precisely through the agent of Bureau. I

was told that I had to make copies quickly because they had been pulled from the pants of this ambassador who is currently lying drunk after a night out in his residence, but sooner or later he will drag himself out of bed. It was not even clear what the keys were for, but if they are, you have to do it. It was quite a challenge to do it so quickly, because mapping the keys does not consist in pressing "copy" and "paste" as in the computer. The easiest way is when we have a raw key, i.e. an "empty", not yet cut key of a specific type, profile and length. When you need to copy a model to which there is no raw key, then an imprint is made and then a copy is made on its basis. The most difficult, however, were the specific, very complicated keys, for which you had to copy a special method, developed by the way. by me and relying on the use of a tube filled with silicone. Somehow it worked, I made it and the bunch returned to the ambassador's pocket in time.

DRIVER: Agents helped us a lot with such things, but you had to talk to them in a laconic way so that they wouldn't know everything. It didn't seem like I was asking him for the keys and saying, "Tomorrow night we're coming for a secret search, thanks."

TOURIST: The most important thing is that the agents do not know how far we are going. They couldn't have known we could open the crypto door and the most important safes. Let the agent think that we are only entering a few offices from the shore, going through the contents of drawers in the desk, maybe we are wiretapping and that's it. He will be paid, he will not ask for details. And the truth is, our department did not wiretap. They were installed by another division, most often still at the construction stage.

HUNTER: A good and conspiratorial opportunity to get the keys was also the visits of security specialists, who from time to time came from abroad to replace the locks. You always looked for a way to get to their luggage, and many times it succeeded. What does it mean? That they put on locks for which we already had the keys!

TESTER: Have we tried recruiting ciphers? No, they were trained people and it didn't make any sense.

TOURIST: Likewise, we've never tried to get a lock on a security door from any other person with this knowledge. There was simply a huge risk that such a man would report it to his counterintelligence. In the best case, then they will let all friendly countries know about our attempt to get inside the protected zone, and from then on, three soldiers will be sleeping in the safe in each outpost. And we'll never get inside again. A worse scenario is that they will give us a code for a puffer, let us go inside, and there will be a trap waiting for us. We couldn't afford it. We were able to open code points and safes ourselves and continue such activities for years, without anyone's knowledge. We also often duplicated the keys to the most important doors ourselves. First, the lock was opened with searchlights, and then, over time, it was possible to take it apart, make a suitable key, and no one had to be asked for help. Our strength was the conspiracy of activities. After all, even our colleagues in the service did not know exactly what we were doing. Each private officer was convinced that our department was dealing with technical problems inside the counterintelligence, i.e. the repair of some devices, standard searches in hotels and apartments and that was it. I will say more - in the second half of the 1980s there was a group of officers in our department who dealt with the electronic control of encrypted communication of the Italian and Swedish embassies. We worked in one department and some of these colleagues had no idea what we were doing at night either!



BRODACZ: An insanely important element of preparing the entrance to the facility was to do the research ourselves, because we were only partially relying on the information from the operational officers. The basis was to see the object from the outside: where the light from the lantern is shining, and where we are beyond its reach, where there is a gate, where a balcony, where a window - such clichés, in total, but very necessary. Then you had to look inside. In order to see the embassy of the village from the inside, at one point I got a job with a Polish team renovating the building. Sir, it was just hard work - and I'm not talking about just painting the walls. The point is that I could not arouse any suspicions either among Italians or among my new colleagues. Everyone had to be convinced that I was one of the workers. If you come among the crows, you must croak as well, right? And that was a real challenge, because this repair crew were the biggest drunkards I've ever seen. On a normal day, I was still able to get away from drinking. Alejak, there was a salary, and there were weekly wages, I couldn't refuse, because soon there would be whispers that something was wrong with me, since I was sober all the time. Well, I remember the first payday coming in. I said that of course I go to party with them thinking naively that we will sit in some more or less civilized place. Meanwhile, my new colleagues went to the store, bought vodkas, one onion and two tomatoes. The Italian Embassy is located in the very center of Warsaw, at Dąbrowski Square.

From there, we walked a bit to the back of the Holy Cross Church at Krakowskie Przedmieście. There we sat down on some bench, around which there were a lot of bottles of some kind of dirty that only the worst alcoholics drink. And the pouring began, of course, into the one and only glass from which everyone drank. I look, and they bul, bul, bul - they drink such a glass in a gulp. For this a piece of onion, tomato and time for the next competitor. It came to me, I drank bravely, took a bite, took a few dozen deep breaths, I'm alive. Before I had a chance to look back, the glass returned to me. I drank again and took a bite. Sir, I did not eat anything that day except a small sandwich for lunch, and since these renovation works were not light, I was terribly hungry and tired. When they poured this vodka into me after such a day, I barely crawled home - I thought it was over, it's time to say goodbye to this world. Well, you had to sacrifice yourself, because such activities gave a lot to our department. At one point, I also worked in the renovation team at the American consulate in Poznań, but I must admit that the Americans were closely guarding us and it was difficult to look around. On the other hand, with Italians, I would sneak out every now and then and go here and there. I was fucking stupid that someone sent me a bucket of water and I got lost, I talked to them in Polish, they answered me in their own way, somehow I was getting away with this wandering around the facility. Of course, I did not try to enter these most important rooms, because they would take me out of there, but basically in this embassy I was able to see a lot thanks to employment in such a renovation team.

ENGINEER: I entered the facility once as a member of the plumbing crew. Together with an authentic plumber, I worked with the radiators. We unscrewed them, rinsed them, and cleaned them. The embassy employee was looking at us all the time, but from time to time I managed to see what alarms there are, what doors, what locks they have.

HUNTER: If we didn't have copies of the keys, it was very good to find out in advance what locks the embassy has. It wasn't like we caught a set of searchlights and the problem was solved. In Western institutions, locks were often extremely unusual, expensive and precise. First, we tried to find out what the mechanism was, and then we had to get the same lock to check it carefully.

TENSIONER: There was a big problem with one of the castles at the Swedish Embassy. You couldn't just buy it, but the Swedes made a mistake at one point. Namely, the

rule was that once a quarter the castle is replaced with a new one, and the old one is sent back to Sweden. One day, one of the gentlemen working there at the embassy began to ask them to give him this wonderful castle as a gift, because he needed a solid one for the door at home. He begged and pleaded with them until they finally agreed. The guy was, of course, my agent, acting on my behalf. The castle was immediately on the table in Department IX, dismantled for the first part.

HUNTER: In such situations, we calmly analyzed everything, completed the right set of tools and simply practiced opening such a lock to be ready to repeat it during the action, in uncomfortable conditions, in the dark, under stress.

Beard: Once we knew what the locks were in the facility, it was also checked if we had matching raw keys, which would later be potentially needed to make a duplicate. In the department, we had such a huge wall, on which there was a nail by a nail, and there hung countless numbers of raw keys of German production. We checked the catalog that we needed at the moment, and if it wasn't, it was ordered through the structures of the Ministry of the Interior. But there were also products that we had to go for ourselves.

HUNTER: So twice a year you went to West Berlin to buy things that were simply unavailable in Poland. It was everything: from photographic materials, through items needed to open locks, to various adhesives, gels, everything you could imagine.

Beard: You know, we didn't touch the embassies of the Eastern Bloc countries, but when we spent the night in East Berlin to go shopping the next day, Stasia was interested in us. Imagine that one time when I was there, I noticed that the lock on my car door was jamming. I started rummaging and took out the tip of a searchlight that would not have been picked by a common thief there. So "Aunt Stasia" was clearly watching. although they are kind of friendly services.

TOURIST: I had a similar story. One time I was with the warden in East Berlin, we came to our embassy in Unter den Linden, we took the key to a flat that belonged to the facility, we spent the night and when we got into the car in the morning, I noticed that someone was rummaging inside. Our department did not cooperate with the Stasi at all. I doubt if they knew who we were exactly, and maybe that's why they were so interested in us. Only that in our car they could not find anything, because the lama was just nothing interesting. We were going shopping, so we didn't need anything but money. After shopping, you returned to Poland and that's it. You had to get down to work, not wander around the world.




TOURIST: As far as alarms are concerned, in the 1980s mainly so-called reed switches were used, which are still common in security systems today. At the edge of the door or somewhere in the middle, a few centimeters are glued and another, identical-looking, on the frame. One is a reed switch and the other is a magnet. When they are close to each other, with the door closed, everything is fine, we have a closed electrical circuit. However, when someone opens it, the circuit is broken and an alarm is triggered. Before entering the facility, it had to be determined whether such reed switches were installed and where. It was sometimes a difficult task, even for the agents who worked there on a daily basis, because all the reed switches were visible to the naked eye. Sometimes they were let in the door itself, not sticking in front of it, so even if someone came close, he might not notice them. If we already established that there is an alarm on the door, then we had to decide whether it is worth fighting it, and there are ways to cheat the

reed switches using magnets, or it is better to leave the door alone and go another way, through some window, basement, balcony.

ENGINEER: I remember that once I managed to make a copy of the key for the alarm control unit at the Danish embassy, but it was just such a moment that this alarm was not used at all, so I did not have the opportunity to test if my key fits. One time while in this facility, I put it in the hole and only made a slight movement to the right and left to see if it was walking properly. Everything was fine, the next day I wrote in my report to my supervisor that the key was checked, that everything was fine. Before I knew it, the boss said, "To me!" I flew over to his office, wondering what had happened, or maybe some mishap or something. And he asks how I know the alarm key works. So I'm saying I put it in the switchboard. He replied that there was nothing in the plan and that I could have set off the alarm this way and lead to a catastrophe. I told him it was a dead move, a turn so many degrees that nothing was happening yet. Then the Danes started turning on this alarm and the key served us for a long time.

PHOTOGRAPHER: If "Engineer" did not tell you what adventure he had with the Italians, I will tell you. One day he went there to Dąbrowski Square near "Diona", it was the code name of this embassy, and he just wanted to insert the newly made key into the lock on the gate, check if it fits: open the door lock, close the door lock and quickly leave.

But when he got there, just then the gate opened by itself and an Italian with a rifle, an armed guard, stood in front of him. Before this guard realized that the stranger standing in front of him had a key in his hand, the "Engineer" began to argue how much strength he had in his legs, and on the bend he found out that he had problems with his leg for some time.



Ambasada Włoch w Warszawie przy pl. Dąbrowskiego 6. Fotografia wykonana na potrzeby Departamentu II w pierwszej połowie lat 80.

The Italian Embassy in Warsaw at pl. Dąbrowskiego 6. Photograph taken for Department II in the first half of the 1980s.

Now I also remembered the situation when I went to the American consulate in Poznań with the head and my colleague from the department, Czes. We stood there in front of one of the castles, Czesio took out his ruffles and starts rummaging. Something does not suit him, cinema and cinema, at one point he somehow crouched next to that door. Suddenly, the doorknob begins to lower in front of his nose. Normally someone opens the door from the other side! I remember shivering down my spine. The door opens, I look, and on the other side the warden is standing and says: "Czesia, don't get tired anymore, here, on the other side, the key is put in the hole". It turned out that the warden simply took a different route to this room, opened a door there, and got through the second entrance. And we almost fell into a collapse. I also remember when I once felt hot at the Swedish Embassy. Sometimes I went there without a flashlight at all, because I knew the object very well. So one time I go in the dark and suddenly I feel that I am standing on a human. I lean forward and this is my friend. He just had nothing to do, he bounced to rest on the floor.

POSTMAN: Sometimes I went to actions with my colleagues, to help with the mail at the facility or to open the cipher blocks. I remember my first visit to the American Consulate. My friends opened the door for me and told me to go ahead. I go in, I look through the darkness, because we always walked in in the middle of the night, and I can feel my hair rising up on my head, literally. In front of me is an American soldier in full uniform, guns in hand. At this point, I hear a soft chuckle behind me, I turn around and my colleagues say to calm down because

everyone has to be fooled the first time. You know, that soldier was just a very realistic wax figure that the Americans put up there to decorate the consulate.

TOURIST: It's a joke, but the American consulates in Poznań and Kraków were one of the most difficult facilities, because you entered there when the hosts were there all the time. Besides, not only there. For example, at the aforementioned Italians, we walked under the noses of guards armed with rifles! How did we do it? You had to walk in such a way not to meet them - that's the simplest way to put it. The research done by us, by the observation division, and by the operations department gave us knowledge about which routes they are moving, at what time, and so on. Besides, the operations department was doing what he could - trying to create some circumstances that would distract the guards or lure them out. Or they were looking for some holes in the schedule. I remember that in one of the facilities there was a guard every night, who at one point was hospitalized for two days. There was no substitute and we did a lot during those two days. There were also agencies that were theoretically protected by Poles. I say: "theoretically" because, as you can imagine, such protection was not a big problem for us. They were often retired officers from our observation division. They were often retired officers from our observation division. Take, for example, the Spanish embassy. Today it is on Myśliwiecka street, but then, in the 1980s, it was located in the complex of skyscrapers on Starościńska Street. There was a security guard, a porter sitting at the arrival. It would be hard to sneak past him, so you had to get along with him.





Ambasada Hiszpanii mieściła się na VI, VII oraz VIII piętrze widocznego na zdjęciu wieżowca stojącego przy ul. Starościeńskiej 1b w Warszawie. W latach 80. Hiszpanie zamontowali w drzwiach bardzo skomplikowany zamek, który funkcjonariusze Wydziału IX ominęli wchodząc przez balkon znajdujący się po drugiej stronie budynku.

The Spanish Embassy was located on the 6th, 7th and 8th floors of the skyscraper standing at ul. Starościeńska 1b in Warsaw. In the 1980s, the Spaniards installed a very complicated lock on the door, which the officers of Division IX bypassed by entering through the balcony on the other side of the building.

DRIVER: I remember exactly what it was like with that porter on Starośćńska Street. We really got along with him and the arrangement was such that two officers came to him before the action, and then he went out to another room for a moment so as not to see too much. The group was let into the garage, from where it was allowed to enter the upper floors with the equipment. The porter then returned to his desk and remained there for the entire duration of the action. So he knew something was going on, but it was a huge skyscraper and there were more than one embassy there, and all kinds of offices and apartments, so the risk of him finding out exactly where we were going was minimal.

ENGINEER: There was also something like the Special Battalion of the Citizens' Militia. As today our policemen are standing in front of the posts, so they stood then. There was absolutely no problem with these, because we dealt with their commander, who gave the order to change the schedule and that's it. And then our man, in an appropriate uniform, was on watch, borrowed from colleagues from the observation department. They had a special cloakroom with different outfits. Sometimes it happened that the uniform had out-of-date markings, some missing details, but at night no one had the right to notice it.

TOURIST: You have to remember one thing. Most countries treated security guards, whether their own or Poles, as a secondary matter in the plan of securing the facility. There were even those in which no one sat at all at night. When they left, diplomats locked safes and doors, put a thousand padlocks on and walked on to home. For people from the West it was simply inconceivable that such poor Polish women would come at night and without leaving any traces, they would overcome the alarm system, open all those doors and top-class safes, and copy the disks with intelligence documents. The Spaniards had an armored safe equipped with a timer. When they left, they set it up so that the clock would not sound until the morning, and at that time even they couldn't open it. So they thought the matter was settled. What do they need a bodyguard for? And we opened this cash register. I also remember that the Spaniards had one such unusual lock that even when we bought the same one, took it apart, looked at it closely and then tried to make the keys on the original raw materials for practice, nothing came of it. It was a castle that was terribly difficult to open. But when there was a problem, a solution had to be found. We got inside differently - if we couldn't enter through the door, we went in through the window, from the balcony, right? It was not easy, because, of course, the Spaniards also secured themselves from that side, but in the end they succeeded. Inside, we found a spare key for this problematic lock, made a mold in silicone and a cast in resin. I remember when my friend saw it for the first time, he asked what it was, because in fact this transparent resin object did not look like a key at all. But it is important that it worked properly. Can you? You can.

ENGINEER: We also managed to enter the Danish embassy through the window, at the very top of the building. We took the rope ladder with us, went up to the roof of the adjoining house, then to the roof of the one we were interested in, and then inside.

TOURIST: It was fun there, because the first secretary of the Warsaw Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party lived opposite, or someone like that. Paradoxically, we feared him the most, because from the windows he could see exactly the place on the roof on which we wanted to walk. What if he called the militia?

BEARD: We knew how to walk, we underwent special training in urban mountaineering. We were taught by the people of this famous anti-terrorist, Edward Misztal. I remember walking under the Poniatowski Bridge over the scaffolding without any protection, to see who was fit for it, and who was nothing.

TOURIST: Do you remember when we were on Gwiazdzista? There were such tall buildings, like twenty stories, and we descended from them on ropes.

BEARD: And not only during the day, but also at night, in the dark.

ENGINEER: I wasn't there at the time, but I heard that one friend had all theoretical training and then there was going to be a swing jump from the building, and then he stood on the edge and said no way and he won't move. Honestly, if I had been there, I would have pushed him. The first time is the worst.

TOURIST: I remember that stupid feeling standing up there looking down. The friend was afraid of heights, he was definitely not happy, which is a lot to talk about.

HUNTER: Do you remember that consulate in Szczecin?

TOURIST: Well, I remember walking on a plank located between one window and the other on the opposite side.

HUNTER: What board? There was no plank. I will tell you. It happened that we went there, actually, ready, because the consulate was already under control, we had additional keys, everything fastened with the last button. But on the spot, it turned out that the keys did not suit us at all, because the locks had been replaced shortly before, and the operating department there, in Szczecin, had missed it. But it turned out that one consulate's window was ajar, and it was in the corner of the building, quite close to the window of another room to which we had access. It was enough to take a big step from the window sill to the window sill, only that we were quite high, so such a step would be really risky. Of the two of us, I was the bigger one, so I say to the "Tourist" that I will be able to hold him if his leg skips while crossing. So I grabbed him by his belt, got stuck in that window somehow, and he jumped from the sill to the sill.

TOURIST: Maybe you were holding me, but I'm telling you that we put the board there and I walked over it. Which does not change the Takt, it was absolute stupidity, utter insanity.

HUNTER-. There was no plank.

BEARD: With or without a board, if "Tourist" made the slightest mistake, they would both fly otherwise, because "Hunter" would not be able to hold him. Death on the spot.

TOURIST: I am alive. I went over, opened the window, and inside there was a cupboard with spare keys. We did the digging and the object was captured again, the matter was settled in one night. Fortunately, because to cross half of Poland and bounce off the door is a bad feeling. Besides, when going to the outposts, we always had the thought that a lot of other officers had organized themselves so that we could work there safely. It is true that these people had little idea of what they were really participating in, but we were aware that someone out there would blow the night away by our action. I am talking here, for example, about bettors. After all, during our entry, they had to constantly watch all the diplomats closely. Well, nothing but diplomats, but in general anyone who could potentially come up with the idea of coming to the facility we penetrated at night - a cleaning lady, a secretary, anyone. that the figurehead is in motion.

HUNTER: I remember this situation with the Swedes. We sat with them at the embassy, and at the same time all the diplomats were at some party in the city. At one point they ran out of booze, a few of them went to the city and there were concerns that they would come for it at the facility, because they had supplies there. There was

no time to evacuate, and since we knew they would be looking for vodka upstairs, we all went downstairs and with all the equipment we went to the basement.

TOURIST: Well, that's why we needed the help of "B" Office. Even though most of the bettors didn't know what it was really about, the fact remains that their work was one of the key elements of the whole machine. And it is not only about controlling the figureheads during entry, but also about a number of other things. After all, officers from operational departments who cooperated directly with us, obtained some information from Bureau. Colleagues from observation had extensive possibilities to determine what the routine of the facility employees looks like, whether the guard likes to sleep on duty when the cleaning lady comes, when diplomats leave the facility, when the lights go out.

PHOTOGRAPHER: Before coming to the IX Department, I worked for a long time in Office "B", so I know something about their work. But honestly, it's best for you to talk about it! not with me, because I was involved in photography there, but with someone who was an intelligence officer and followed these diplomats. I'll give you a phone call for my friend. You will meet, talk. I know that you have already met a few employees of betka, but believe me - she is worth talking to. It is an encyclopedia of Bureau. Demon driver.



CHAPTER 5

"B" TAB

CHAPTER 5

Mathematics interested me. And physics. Oh, and chemistry. I passed my high school diploma, submitted my papers to the polytechnic university, but my dad suddenly fell very ill. My family was small, actually just me, mom and dad. Suddenly, it turned out that there was not enough time to study and we had to look for a job.

I found myself at PSS, Powszechna Spółdzielnia Spożywców (Universal Food Cooperative?). It quickly turned out that sitting in the finance department is not for me. I liked math, but it was nothing for me to do. I quit after three months.

Friends advised me to go to Rakowiecka Street and find out if there would be anything for me there. So I came to the pass office and said I was looking for a job. There was a nice old man there who started to talk to me. He asked what exactly I would like to do in the Ministry of the Interior. I told him I didn't know. After all, I had no idea what the departments were there, how it was all organized. He looked at me patiently. The conversation dragged on. At one point, this old man slipped his watch from under his cuff and began to stick around his pockets in search of glasses. He found nothing. So he extended his hand towards me and asked me to read the time to him. So I did. We talked for a longer while. I was just telling him something when he suddenly interrupted me and asked if I knew what brand he was wearing. I knew. It was Atlantic, I remembered it as I read the time. Then the gentleman smiled and said: "Oh, then I know where you will work."

It was 1965. I was twenty at the time. Even less, because when I started working, I was still nineteen. I stayed in the service until the second half of the nineties.

I remember the first conversation with the warden. He asked me if I knew what the department did. I told him honestly, still not, just more or less. He gave me his first advice that day. It wasn't about the nature of the work itself, it was very general, but as I noted later, very important to him. He told me that he hated when someone didn't have an opinion and forbade me to nod at what my new colleagues would say. Even if I agree, I have to say why, what are for, what are against and why there are more of the former. Then it turned out that he really enforces it. If someone did not speak, the warden called to the blackboard.

Individual departments of Bureau were scattered around the city, sometimes very far from Rakowiecka Street. The point was that we could not be associated with the Ministry of the Interior and it is best that even nothing should be known what kind of cars we have. The rooms of my department were therefore located in the famous House Without Kants on Krakowskie Przedmieście. It was a partially normal apartment building. Seemingly for the military, but still residential. We were instructed to go there one at a time so as not to draw attention to ourselves. In one of the corridors we had a series of apartments belonging to us.

Immediately after coming to work, I was assigned by the head of the section to the shift manager, an elderly gentleman. For the first few weeks I was with him all the time and he taught me the basics. Then I was assigned to a specific group of scouts and started to ride with them normally, learning further how to conduct observation. After some time, I was sent to an officer school. It was located in Ksawerów, the front address was 22 Niepodległości Avenue. There was a large building where the classes were held, and at the back there was an old palace where the lecturers had their offices. For a time, Department I, intelligence school, was located in the same place. I studied there for ten months, got an officer degree and went back to work. The next stage of my training was learning to drive a car.

As for women, not all of them became drivers. I had predispositions, so I was delegated to a six-month course organized by the Capital City MO. It was not an ordinary driving license, but a so-called professional one. After completing the course, I had a month of driving around the city and its surroundings, and then a month of driving around the country, in all weather conditions. There were days when we traveled even three hundred kilometers. Believe me - what I learned there then stayed with me for the rest of my life. Braking, difficult turns, avoiding obstacles ... It was a very, very professional course. I even have authorization for the coach. And then I had an amazing experience while working.

I have been driving a car for over fifty years and have never had a bump. Sometimes a boy stands next to me at the traffic lights and I see him looking and certainly thinking to himself: "Oh, but an old woman at the wheel." And I think that we can race, because I would probably be able to deal with it today as well.

Working in the beta was exciting from the beginning, but at the same time I knew I didn't want to stay there forever. I loved movement, I was in my element, but at the same time I saw no future for myself in observation. After a few years of work, I returned to my studies, but quietly. There used to be such a thing as referrals to universities. They were given at the workplace and taken to the dean's office. It helped a lot. In my department, in my position, there was no way I could get one. The warden wouldn't agree. I didn't say anything to anyone and started looking on my own.

I went to SGPiS, today's Warsaw School of Economics. I was interested in foreign trade. I remember the introductory interview. They asked me about retention reservoirs in Poland. I knew one - Goczałkowicki. The gentleman on the committee looked at me and asked in surprise if that was all. Unfortunately, that's all. If I knew more, I would have gotten in, I missed so few points. Oh, and if I had points for background, I would have been in college too, but I didn't.

After receiving the result, I went to negotiate. I said that I really care about this studies, I realize that I don't have a referral, but at work they don't even know anything. I couldn't say where I work, but somehow I got out of Lego. I told you that your superiors can go to college and I would also be ciicjala. The gentleman who spoke to me at the time said that he could not help me at home, I mean at SGPiS, but that he felt sorry for me, so maybe he could arrange something at the University of Warsaw. I was glad, I said that I would like to go to the law. He smiled, said he was not right, but he could get me a place for rehabilitation. I thanked him and decided a year later to take the exams at the law faculty on my own. Again, I only missed a few points, so I returned to this man at SGPiS. He remembered me. He got me a place for rehabilitation, as he promised.

For a year no one at work knew about it, except for one friend and one colleague. They took pity on me. At that time, I already had a husband and a child. This friend said that if I have so much on my mind at home, work and then I still want to go to college, then he is full of admiration and will try to help me. They both exchanged with me - so that I could adjust the work schedule to the schedule of evening studies. After the first year, my average was above 4.5 and I got it certificate. I took them to work and only then did I officially say that I was studying. Obviously, it was a bit awkward to report it so late, but overall the response was positive. I even got a cash prize for my average.

There were three shifts in my department. Morning did not actually have a starting time - it started according to the needs of the department on that particular day. Just when the boss said to come. Not all of them had a telephone back then, so sometimes a person ran to the phone booth the day before to ask who he was supposed to be at. It rang once, twice, or the third time you might have heard. If someone

had a phone at home, it was easier, only then they could call him anytime and call him to work.

The first shift was until about 11.30, sometimes until noon. The second ended at 5:00 p.m., and then the third, the longest, would come in, which was actually left to the stop. Sometimes it could be late evening, other times it could be late night, and sometimes you had to stay until morning.

The worst were those who had to go to get the car in the morning. Initially, our garages were located in Stalingradzka, in Gołędzinów. Later we moved to Mokotów. Especially the first place, Praga, was far away from most of us. You had to go by bus to be there half an hour early. The reason was the obligation to check the car before going to the city. It is known, liquids and so on, but also the apparatus inside the vehicle. Each car, of course, had its radio station usually hidden in a glove compartment. These were 'unmarked cars after all, so it was impossible to install such apparatus in plain view, where it would attract the attention of every passerby. It took some time to check the vehicle before setting off, because it was enough for one cable to disconnect and there was already a scandal.

You also had to get the appropriate license plates, and even a few sets, along with the documents. After all, they were twisted during the working day to mislead the figurine. These were 'real arrays' in the sense that they were reflected in the registers. When the police stopped us for a check, we didn't even say anything - we just handed in the driving license and the car's documents. They featured private persons, some institutions, and so on. Our governor made it clear - we are to not admit where we are from, take tickets as normal and bring them to the department.

Did I know who I was driving after? No. I was given the address of the figurine, description of the appearance, possibly a photo, car registration numbers and that's it. If this was some sort of routine surveillance, the section director would check in. If something special was happening, the warden himself would come. They were the ones who talked to the client and could undoubtedly know the reason for observing this particular person. They knew which pawn was interested in the results, but they never told us.

The diplomats were easy to recognize. After all, I saw that such a figurehead works in a specific facility, drives a western car, it looks like this and so. It was clear to me that the surveillance was commissioned by Department II, but even this was not officially told to us by the management. We did not know the names of these people, because we only used codenames. We also did not know what position they occupy at the embassy.

In the case of Poles, we knew even less. Our knowledge about a given person was formed, at best, involuntarily, during the very observation. If someone was a criminal, after some time I knew it. I saw what he looked like, I saw how his friends looked suspiciously, how he visited characteristic places. One day I had to follow one into a block of flats to see which apartment I would go to, or at least on which floor. It was in buildings near Woronicza. We got into the elevator together and it just happened that I had to press the first button. I chose the top floor to make sure she didn't get off to pick me up. He didn't press anything anymore, he was going to do the same. The elevator started pulling us upstairs and he was staring at me. At one point, he put his hand on the wall of that elevator, next to my head, and leaned over to me. I didn't know what he was trying to do, or if he figured out who I was, or maybe I got his attention in a different way because I had very long, dark hair that he was looking at now. I was horrified. In the end, he didn't do anything and just said, "I'll give you away." We got upstairs, he left and I followed him. Admit it? I didn't know what to do, I was scared, confused. He entered one of the apartments, a friend opened the door for

him. Then he said to him: "Help the lady, because I don't think she knows which way is the exit."

As for diplomats, it was by no means an option for them to stand outside their homes. Unless we wanted them to see us. Diplomats within the city were closely watched from the hidden points, PZ for short. These were usually just flats located in such a place that you could perfectly see the place of work or residence of such a foreigner. They were not necessarily at our sole disposal. More than once, you just paid a family for a room. And since sometimes it was just a room with a kitchen, they had to sit in the kitchen. People agreed, because the financial argument, and secondly, how were they supposed to disagree if they were told it was about catching a thief who was prowling around? It was a typical argument, in a way it was about making them care about our presence.

It was different in places where observation was carried out continuously for years. For example, the apartments at the American embassy in Warsaw were at our exclusive disposal. I don't know if they were owned by the Ministry of the Interior or if they were rented from someone, at least no one lived there. There was furniture inside, everything set up as if someone were living there, but no one kept their private belongings there.

It was different in the case of the Italian embassy at Dąbrowski Square. On the other side of this square there was an apartment that belonged to us, which is permanently inhabited by one of the intelligence agents, our colleague. So you just came to his house for an observation. I am not sure, but it seems to me that due to the obvious inconvenience of our almost constant presence, this colleague did not have to pay the rent. As far as I remember correctly, the Ministry of the Interior did not give him any money for tea, coffee and cookies for us. We tried to bring ours, but it is known that when we came, he always gave us something. He was divorced and had a bit of a bad situation: his friends from work were sitting on his head all the time, so he couldn't even invite guests to his house. Eventually he got married a second time and left this apartment.

atwierdzam"

Poznań 1987-01-25 239

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Sgz. poj.

87-01-25

R E G U L A M I N

dotyczy : Punktu Sygnalizacyjnego Nr.3.

W celu utrzymania właściwej konspiracji na PS i należytego organizowania pracy pracowników korzystających z mieszkania podaje się poniżej do wiadomości i ścisłego przestrzegania:

1. Punkt Obserwacyjny będzie czynny od godz. 6.30 do godz.22.00 i uzależniony od konkretnej sytuacji operacyjnej , na którym przebywać będzie na zmianę trzech pracowników.
2. Dla utrzymania legendy mieszkania prywatnego , pracownicy tam zameldowani są zobowiązani do prowadzenia życia rodzinnego.
3. Wszystkie sprawy związane z mieszkaniem w administracji , u dyrektorki przedszkola , dozorczy itp. załatwia główny lokator względnie jej mąż.
4. Główny lokator oraz jej mąż zobowiązani są do oficjalnego dokonywania porządków mieszkania i tak w pewnych odstępach czasu, czyszczenie okien, odkurzać dywany , wnosić śmieci oraz przynoszenie z miasta pakunków i innych przedmiotów pozorujących produkty żywnościowe. W godzinach wieczornych należy w pokojach palić światło a w kuchni 2 razy w tygodniu w zależności od sytuacji operacyjnej.
5. Na mieszkaniu nie wolno prowadzić głośnych rozmów na tematy służbowe.
6. Zebrania się również prowadzenia głośnych i długich rozmów tak przez telefon jak i przez radiostację.
7. Na mieszkaniu konspiracyjnym nie wolno wprowadzać bez zezwolenia kierownictwa Wydziału nie pracujących na tym punkcie osób.

Utrzymanie stałego punktu umożliwiającego obserwację placówki było dla pionu „B” priorytetem. Dokument zawiera zasady zachowania w mieszkaniu znajdującym się obok konsulatu amerykańskiego w Poznaniu.

Maintaining a permanent point enabling observation of the facility was a priority for the "BM" department. The document contains the rules of conduct in the apartment next to the American consulate in Poznań.

8. Zabrania się wywiadowcom wynoszenia z MK nie zapakowanych zakupionych artykułów spożywczych dokonywanych przed pracą.
9. Nie wolno ujawniać nr telefonów zainstalowanych na mieszkaniach znajomym, członkom rodziny, pracownikom innych Wydziałów a w przypadkach pilnego skontaktowania się z pracownikiem / w czasie pracy/ członkowie rodzin dzwonią na telefon zainstalowany w Wydziale "B" / sekretariat lub dyżurny Wydziału/
10. Jeżeli do mieszkania zadzwoni ktoś, to wywiadowca chowa dokumenty i przedmioty mogące zwrócić uwagę danej osoby, a osoby obce zachodzące do MK należy przyjmować w korytarzu. W czasie nieobecności na MK wywiadowcy, który legenduje mieszkanie osobom obcym drzwi otwiera wywiadowca pełniący służbę, jednak nie może załatwiać spraw związanych z mieszkaniem, w takich wypadkach tłumaczy, że jest kuzynem i nie może załatwić tych spraw a lokatorów tego mieszkania nie ma w domu. Wywiadowcy, którzy przyjmują na MK osoby obce zobowiązani są o tym pisać w raportach dziennych, o ważniejszych sprawach pisać oddzielne notatki służbowe.
11. W pobliżu PS nie należy umawiać się ze znajomymi, członkami rodzin i pracownikami innych mieszkań. Wywiadowcom legendującym nie wolno spacerować z dziećmi w pobliżu MK.
12. O wszelkich uwagach i spostrzeżeniach odnośnie PS pracownicy są zobowiązani meldować kierownictwu Wydziału raportami
13. W celu utrzymania pełnej konspiracji naszej pracy na PS zabrania się pracownikom tam pracującym zawierania znajomości towarzyskich z sąsiadami i pracownikami przedszkola oraz wchodzenia do MK-1.

Z powyższym regulaminem zapoznają się użytkownicy MK-3 i wszyscy zapoznani podpisują.

KIEROWNIK SEKCJI I WYDZIAŁU "B"

kpt. T.N. [signature]

Punkt sygnalizacyjny (PS) umożliwiał przede wszystkim obserwację osób wchodzących do placówki i wychodzących z niej. Informacje o nich przekazywano funkcjonariuszom znajdującym się na zewnątrz.

The signaling point (PS) made it possible, above all, to observe people entering and leaving the facility. Information about them was passed on to officers outside.

The covered point was usually occupied by one or two people. You know, it was always better to sit with someone, not only because it was possible to chat, but it also solved the problem of toilet breaks and so on. I will not say, sympathies were born at work. Well, there were conditions for this, it is impossible to hide. Lots of friends had a crush on each other there. I already had a husband and only him, but I knew what was happening around me. Once in the department there was such a beautiful girl with a gypsy beauty, dark eyes, dark complexion. When my friends saw her, their eyes came out. First she was with one, the field was with the other, and then she stopped thinking about them and began to drink. I met her on vacation, in a sanatorium. I really couldn't understand what she meant. Such a girl, and she was ruining her own life. It was summer. She was dead in early fall. It was only then that I found out that she had had cancer for a long time, incurable, without any hope.

I understand that it is hard to believe, but while sitting on the spot by ourselves, we were really staring out the window all the time. And when I say non-stop, I mean literally non-stop. There was no one to be missed. If an applicant entered the embassy and did not leave by the end of the working hours, we were to make a note of it. It could mean that they wanted something from him, more than from others. And you have to take into account that they used to visit the American embassy huge numbers of people every day. How did we count it? Normally, taking notes. We made a list of everyone who went inside. You had to find something distinctive in each person. One had red shirt, another was limping, the third was terribly tall or not meeting short. When someone was leaving, I was looking for that person on the list and ticked off.



Literami PS (punkt sygnalizacyjny) oznaczono okna mieszkania, z którego funkcjonariusze prowadzili obserwację konsulatu USA w Poznaniu (budynek po prawej).

The letters PS (signaling point) marked the windows of the apartment from which the officers were observing the US consulate in Poznań (building on the right).

There was one exit at the Italian embassy, from the front, so I had full control over the flow of people. But it was different with the Americans, because there were at least two exits that I remember - one from Piękna Street and the other from Aleje Ujazdowskie. So if someone came out whom I did not have on my list of people entering, I had to let my colleague sitting on the other side of my radio know that such and such a person was coming out. Then he ticked it off at his place and the matter was settled.

There was no custom of identification. If someone caught our attention, we had to verify their identity by other means. This person was followed home by scouts who were not working on a covered point that day. Once upon a time there was a situation where a girl came out of the embassy and an order was given that it was necessary to establish who she was. I followed her, with my friend. This woman got on the bus towards Suwałki. We had no choice but to get in behind her, sending a signal to our colleagues via the radio. Nobody else went behind the bus then, but the father of "The Photographer", otherwise very, very witty and well-liked betka worker.



Stojący przed mercedesem Biura „B” ojciec „Fotografa” prezentuje doklejone wąsy, baczki oraz (słabo widoczną na fotografii) bródkę. Lata 70.

Standing in front of the Mercedes of the "B" office, the father of the "Photographer" presents it stuck on mustache, sideburns and a goatee (barely visible in the photo). 70's.

We go and ride this bus and at each stop we hope that this woman will get off. It's completely dark outside, and we're going on. We have almost no money with us, we have no food, we have nothing. Where is this lady getting off? In Suwałki. It was probably March, in Warsaw that day was beautiful weather, spring, we got off there and what? Winter is in full, and we are in slippers. The dad of "Fotografa" picked up for us, we managed to find out where the lady had gone, and we had to come back. We were 'penniless, the father of "Fotografa" also had nothing with him, because he did not think we would get to Suwałki. for free on a command, but no one gave us any extra money, and I remember today that the only thing for which we had enough, a few candies. We drove all night to Warsaw and ate slowly, so that there would be enough for the entire journey.

During the observation, of course, we took photos and even videos - both from hidden points and from cars, and even while walking. The equipment was hidden in various places - in a purse, briefcase or under clothes. The lens hole could even be in the button. Besides, you had to have a radio with you all the time to stay connected. It was easier for women because they carried handbags. The man might have had a satchel, but this already attracted the attention of experienced diplomats. In my time, that is from 1965 for a little over ten years, because then I did not work directly as an intelligence officer, there were no earphones, they appeared only later.

Talking "to the purse" was obviously a problem. When you walked in, the radio went down and you knew someone was talking to you only because there was such a vibrating buzzer. Then I discreetly brought the purse closer to my ear, if only in such a way that I took it under my arm, after all, the average woman does this sometimes as well. You just had to be even more careful when speaking, because talking into a purse doesn't look very natural.

These bags weren't ours, we didn't put the radio in our private ones. These were special "B" Bureau bags with a built-in mount for this device. We were also not obliged to buy a wardrobe for every occasion, because the department had its own cloakroom - not only stationary, but also mobile. When we went for the observation, we could take our clothes for later, but when some unexpected circumstances arose, we could call for a special cloakroom located in a large car. In addition to the costumes themselves, there were wigs, you could put on makeup, attach a mustache. The girls didn't really practice sticking a mustache, but when it comes to colleagues, turning into a woman was already an option.

The cloakroom was really useful, because there were times when the evening outfit was needed. After all, if the diplomat decided to spend the evening in an elegant place, we could not suspend our observations, we simply had to follow him. The warden even picked pairs from us, a man and a woman, who matched each other, and sent! them to dance lessons. When it happened that you had to go to the ball, they were there.



Funkcjonariusze Biura „B” aparaty ukrywali chociażby pod ubraniem. Otwór na obiektyw musiał być jak najmniejszy, czego skutkiem są cienie widoczne w rogach powyższych fotografii, które wykonano w latach 80. przy ul. Agrykola w Warszawie. Jeden z mężczyzn na zdjęciach podejrzewany był o szpiegostwo.

Officers of the "B" Bureau hid the cameras, for example, under their clothes. A hole the lens had to be as small as possible, which resulted in visible shadows in the corners of the above photographs taken in the 1980s at ul. Agrykola in Warsaw. One of the men in the photos was suspected of spying.

Our boss put a lot of emphasis on making us know and know as much as possible. I don't know if something like this happened in others departments, but the boss brought us foreign press, reprints in Polish. He was taking it from somewhere inside the Ministry of the Interior, there was a lot of it. He insisted on us every day they had come to work even fifteen minutes earlier and had a look at what was happening in the world. And then once a week we all met for half an hour and one of us gave a report, there was a discussion.

I remember when my dad died. I mentioned to you that he was sick, it was the sixties. The same governor found out about his death and came to me home with the driver. He told me that I could take a break as long as I wanted and go back to work once I had all my affairs in order. I admit, in Office "B" there were enormous, even sharp pressures against going to church, and the boss told me that he knows nothing, sees nothing and that I can bury my dad in Catholic if I want. Twenty years later my mother died again. Before she died, she told me to bury her so as not to get into trouble. At that time, I was still working in the services, but already a kind of intelligence officer. When my mother died, I was called by the director of the entire division, who asked me what funeral I was planning. I said Catholic. He said he was warning me, actually letting me know that I would be fired. I replied that it was difficult and I just left. I went back to my desk and my then warden asked why I was at the headmaster. I told him the truth, and he got up and went to the director's office. I don't know what he said to the headmaster, only heard from a distance that he slammed the door as he left. No hardship happened to me. There were people and folks, as it happens in this world.

From time to time, opinions were written about us, which showed exactly what we can do and where we have gaps. It was even so that they counted up how many details we remembered about a case, and where we missed something. I, to be honest, handled such things quite well. If a car passed me by, all I had to do was take a look to remember the registration number right away. There were no cell phones back then, so people usually called from pay phones. I have to tell you, I was able to see what number someone had dialed from a distance and memorize it flawlessly. I didn't even need a notebook. What does not change Takt is that you made notes of your observations. Of course, when driving a car or walking, you did not write up to date, because there was no time for it, but you had to make a note at a convenient moment. After all, it was important where and at what time the figurehead was doing something. At the end, all the scouts met in one place, sat at the table, and everyone read and talked about their observations. In this way, one long observation message was created, which was then read aloud. If anyone had any comments, it could be added, and then the message was sent to the department concerned, i.e. the client - in the case of diplomats, for example to Department II. And we were finally able to go home.

If work ended after ten o'clock, it was such a custom that someone would drive us all home by car and then drive to the garages himself. This was strictly followed. I must say that even people living outside of Warsaw were taken to the house. There were also downsides to this practice. After all, the neighbors were extremely nosy and quickly noticed that I was being driven home by more and more different, sometimes good cars, with more and more men inside. This information spread and finally reached my husband's aunt, who told him that you should be interested in it, because it can't go on like this. She didn't know where I worked. My husband knew, however, that he was in the Ministry of the Interior, but not in observation. He must have felt stupid to listen to such things, too.

I must admit that my spouse was extremely patient. The truth is, a lot of it was he who sat with the kids during the years I worked as intelligence officer, that is, over a decade. It happened many times that he went alone with them on vacation,

because I couldn't be afraid. It was Christmas Eve and he was alone with the kids and my mother. I was leaving, I didn't know when I would be back, and I didn't have a cell phone to let him know. The morning was coming, the husband had to go to his work; and more than once I was still gone. At one point, when I had already finished my studies and over ten years of work experience in observation, I ended up interviewing the director of Bureau "B", Colonel Lech Krawczyk. He asked me what I wanted to do next. I said that it is enough to work with shift work, that I want it all to look normal somehow, that my husband, that the children, that I am. He sent me to the analytical department and, thankfully, my career as a scout ended. It was better after that, but to be completely honest, if I had to turn back time, I wouldn't have chosen to work in the services at all.

Please don't get me wrong, it was a very interesting job, but nevertheless exhausting. Recently, I had the opportunity to talk to a young girl who was planning go in that direction. I asked her if she was aware of what she was doing. Plans had already changed.

I am an only child, brought up, as the saying goes, in greenhouse conditions. When I came to work in Office "B", I was nineteen. What did I know? What have I seen so far? Thread. Working with the lama, I have gained absolutely unique experience and this is certainly a great advantage of this choice.

Some time ago the police stopped me for talking on the phone while driving. Of course, the policeman was absolutely right, but when I left with my lecture, I thought to myself: boy, you were not even in the world when I was driving along these streets, then full of ruts, in a car without any ABS and traction control, I looked at the car of my figurehead in the rear mirror with one eye, because sometimes the observation was carried out at night, from the front, so that the figurehead would not see that he was being followed, with the other eye I looked ahead, and at the same time leaned over to the glove compartment on the passenger's side, I pressed there is a button on the radio station and I was talking to my friends that the figurehead was moving this and that along the street.



MINISTERSTWO SPRAW WNEHETRZNYCH
WYDZIAŁ IV BIURA "B"
L.dz.Tc-091/0188/89r.

Warszawa, dnia 1989.03.02
T A J N E
Egz. Nr .1..

K O M U N I K A T
=====

o obserwacji fig. ps. "KAR" nrolec. 899/89,
prowadzonej dn. 1989.03.01 w godz. 6,45-23,00

W toku obserwacji stwierdzono:

- O godz. 8,40 "KAR" wyszedł z hotelu "GRAND" i zatrzymał się u zbiegu ulic Kruczej i Wspólnej. Tutaj wyjął z kieszeni płaszcza mapę Centrum Warszawy i oglądał ją przez ok. 20 sekund. Następnie udał się wschodnią stroną ul. Kruczej w kierunku północnym. Na wysokości ul. Żurawiej "KAR" przeszedł na zachodnią stronę ul. Kruczej i zatrzymał się przed wystawą sklepu z kosmetykami /ul. Krucza 41/43/. Przez ok. 1 min. oglądał wystawę sklepu. Następnie poszedł dalej ul. Kruczą, wchodząc do bramy budynku ul. Krucza 47a, gdzie oglądał zdjęcia wyeksponowane w gablocie.

Była godz. 8,47

Po chwili obserwowany poszedł dalej ul. Kruczą przechodząc na drugą stronę Al. Jerozolimskich i poszedł dalej ul. Bracką. Na wysokości ul. Rutkowskiego "KAR" zatrzymał się i ponownie wyjął mapę i przez ok. 1 min. oglądał ją. Następnie przeszedł na wschodnią stronę ul. Brackiej i poszedł dalej ul. Szpitalną zatrzymując się przy witrynach wystawowych DOMU CHŁOPA.

Była godz. 8,52

Po chwili poszedł dalej pl. Powstańców Warszawy przechodząc na drugą stronę ul. Świętokrzyskiej i dalej ul. Małowiecką pl. Małachowskiego skręcając w ul. Królewską. Tutaj przeszedł wzdłuż hotelu "Victoria" i dalej ul. Królewską. Po dojściu do ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście obserwowany zatrzymał się przy przejściu dla pieszych na drugą stronę ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście. Po chwili "KAR" wrócił do przejścia dla pieszych

./.

Komunikat z obserwacji musiał uwzględniać najdrobniejsze szczegóły – nawet takie jak obejrzenie wystawy sklepowej przez podejrzanego. Podczas przerwy w spacerze szpieg mógł przecież chociażby szukać znaków sygnalizacyjnych od swoich mocodawców np. w postaci kawałka taśmy nalepionego na parapet.

The observation message had to include the smallest details – even such as seeing a shop window by a suspect. During a break after all, a spy could even look for signaling signs during a walk from their principals, e.g. in the form of a piece of tape stuck to the window sill.

Chapter 6

GREEN LIGHT

CHAPTER 6


BEARD: It is difficult to say how much truth there is, but for years there was a story circulating in K9 in our department about a Hungarian counterintelligence group, which entered one of the NATO posts in Budapest and never came out again. It was said that they were killed and burned on the embassy grounds.

TOURIST: Everyone knew this story with us, but during all these years of work we never had signals that anyone, except us and the Russians, would make such penetrations. In my opinion, the KGB itself went on this type of action to all socialist countries, except Poland, where we operated. I am not saying that the story with Hungary is a hundred percent lame, but I am not sure that it is true.

HUNTER: I think it's true. Do you remember our colleague from the Department of Technology, Andrzej, who is the keyer? After all, he went to the Hungarians, to the general surgical technique division, and I remember how he mentioned that counterintelligence has its own separate surgical technique department, just like ours. What were these Hungarians doing? Just some apartments and hotels? In my opinion, they could go into embassies, and this hobbies story is not at all improbable. And you surely remember the stove that was installed in one of the facilities here in Poland. It was supposed to destroy documents, but the temperature was so high there that the metal could melt. Nothing would be a human burn problem.

TOURIST: It's just that it wouldn't fit all the way, you'd have to dismantle it. Blood, that's all, a cleaner would have cursed them over there.

BEARD: But the Saudis recently arranged this way in their consulate in Turkey for this journalist, Khashukji, and supposedly Kultka cleaned up after themselves in a flash.



Niszczarka (po lewej) i wspomniany piec w jednej z regularnie odwiedzanych przez funkcjonariuszy placówek.


A shredder (on the left) and the aforementioned furnace in one of the facilities regularly visited by officers.

TOURIST: Each facility had its own file in our department, which you always had to take when you went to an action. It was an ordinary document folder, just like in an office, and inside there were copies of the keys that we had at our disposal, all information about known security features, building plans, work schedules. They were thick folders. Most of these documents have been destroyed. What is left to this day is just a small fraction of the whole.

BEARD: There you could even find information like "The first step on the stairs between the second and third floors creaks when it comes to it on the left side." We remembered all this after some time, because some places, such as the American ones, were visited even twice a week. Nevertheless, such comments were made. If we couldn't show up for some reason, our colleagues would have all the instructions in their briefcase.

TOURIST: Items that we took with us can be divided into two basic groups. The first included those that were always necessary for us, regardless of the object we were going to. Flashlights, radio stations, searchlights and so on - without. don't touch it. It was a lot of equipment, and there were also things from the second group, i.e. those that were needed in a specific facility. Take, for example, one of the most important objects, not to mention which exactly, so as not to give instructions to enter the building, because it may still have the same security in the door. Today it no longer houses a diplomatic mission, but a headquarters of a private company, but let's skip the address anyway. In any case, there was a reading room downstairs in the outpost's funnel. During the day, anyone could go in there to read the country's press, watch a movie, and so on. You could enter this room through a second door, as if from the garden, and we managed to make a key for it. However, in order to get from the reading room to the staircase and to the main part of the representative office, we had to go through another door with a great security device installed. Namely, they were closed with a bolt from the side of the facility. There was no keyhole on the side of the reading room - this bolt could only be opened if it happened on the other side, in the correct part of the outpost. As if that were not enough, it was not an ordinary bolt that just moved left and right. There was also a button on it - you had to press it first, and then you could move it and open the door. This button changed a lot. It wouldn't be a big deal for us to open a simple latch, even if it was on the other side of the door. But the specialists developing the plan to secure this facility have cleverly made it difficult for us. We had to find a way to move the tool to the other side, with which we would press the button and pull the bolt away. The reading room was a little below the level of the door, so a staircase led to it that then went up even higher. There was a

closet under these stairs. When we entered it, we managed to pull out one of the boards and thus a clearance was created through which we could see the bolt at an angle from a distance of several dozen centimeters. So we made a tool, a suitably bent rod, which we put through the hole, pressed the button and opened it. The 'l en rod is just an example of a tool that was necessary on a specific object. In another facility, it could have been some other object, a hook, a badge, whatever. It all had to be packed before going to the action. Did we make a list of the things we needed? There was something written in the briefcase, but to be honest, we were so skilled that we really didn't need the list for anything. We remembered very well what to take where.



Door locked with a bolt with a button. The photo was taken from the side of the staircase, after crossing the security.

BEARD: And you also had to remember to take a toothbrush and some clothes if the robot was outside of Warsaw. I always kept a suitcase under my desk with the necessary minimum. When a signal came from the operational department that the facility probably had interesting materials, I only called my wife, said: "Honey, don't make dinner, because I'm going on a business trip," and I was on my way. And you must remember that she had no idea why I was still away and what kind of delegation it was, because I couldn't tell her anything about what I was doing. When I told her, what was my job really about? Sir, she found out the most in the last few hours, listening to our conversation. Do you think why does he come to the kitchen all the time and look for something on the shelves, in the fridge, under the sink? He finally wants to find out what kind of delegation it was! I have a wonderful and very understanding wife, but I think that if I told her the truth then, she would simply murder me.

TOURIST: My children still know nothing of what I did. Thread. Zero. I worked in some services and that's it.

HUNTER: I remember this situation at the beginning of my work in the department. It was a period when my relatives were not used to my night outings, because I did not go to action a lot yet. One time, in the evening, I come back from a walk with my family and I see that "BEARD: ed" and "Tourist" are waiting for me at the house ...

BEARD:... Because you know. we and the "Tourist" worked together before we came to Division IX, we went to the officers' school together, to Division IX together, then for almost every job together, well always together. We understood each other without words, the work went smoothly.

TOURIST: Well, we are friends to this day, let's talk a lot.

HUNTER: So I go to the house with my family, I look, and here are these two waiting for me. They say I have to pack and let's go. I ask them what and how, to what extent, when I come back. And they said that when I come back, I will be, and at the moment I have to load my car and that's it. Now take it, man, explain to your wife that you have to leave in a few minutes, you won't eat dinner, you can't tell where and why you're going, and you have no idea when you will be back. It was like that for years, but with time the family got used to it, it was easier. We had to be always on standby, you never knew when they would call and you would have to go. In the People's Republic of Poland, it was impossible to install a telephone in an apartment just like that, a person had to wait forever in the queue. Please imagine that I was waiting until. eight years, after which I moved to Division IX, and two days later, a telephone number was available for me, because I had to be able to contact the

officers of this department immediately, even in the middle of the night.

TOURIST: After we packed everything, we went to the action. If we were going to a facility in Warsaw, of course, we only gave ourselves a small spare time, but a significant part of our work was mainly trips to Krakow and Poznań, i.e. to the Americans - unfortunately, to very difficult and well-secured facilities. We set off in such a way as to arrive at some reasonable time, in the afternoon or in the evening. First, we drove to the hotel - in Krakow they were usually Cracovia, Holiday Inn and, as far as I remember, somewhere closer to the end of the 1980s, the Forum Hotel. In Poznań, on the other hand, we landed most often in the Polonaise. We went in, there was always a reservation for us, we didn't even give any documents. We unpacked a bit in the rooms, more than once we took a shower and we had to get ready. Each time from Warsaw we were followed by Colonel Feliks Solarski - the deputy director of the entire Department II, that is, to put it simply, the deputy chief of counterintelligence. So many entrances, literally hundreds, and everything in the dark at night, and the colonel always came, despite the fact that in the eighties he was already sixty years old. And this also proves the importance of these activities, because the deputy director was really an important figure. In such Krakow, the partner for conversation for Colonel Solarski was the first deputy of the provincial commander for the SB, which is in fact the most important person in this region when it comes to secret services. These two gentlemen usually met at the headquarters, and again we occasionally went to the meeting with colleagues from Department II, i.e. the field unit of our Department II. As everything has already been discussed, Colonel Solarski was driving to the so-called control point, i.e. a flat located near the facility. He commanded the entire operation from here. He was the one who decided whether we could go in, then go out, and so on. Apart from him, in the apartment there might have been the aforementioned deputy commander, someone from the management of our department, maybe the head of Department II, the head of the "B" department or someone like that. In any event, only high-ranking officials were lamas. And, of course, we entered the facility itself plus a representative of the operational department, whose role was primarily to browse through the documents and catch those that needed to be photographed.

BEARD: The action was only possible when we were sure that the diplomats and all other employees of the facility left the facility, returned home, turned off the lights and was under the constant control of the bettors. The exception was, of course, those who normally stayed at the facility overnight. If my colleagues from the observation did not count someone or there were any other doubts, we simply gave up on entering, too bad.

TOURIST: There were houses, blocks and so on at each outpost. We had to be careful that some night owl didn't notice us. Therefore, in the vicinity of the facility, there was also the so-called intervention group of the "B" Bureau, which was responsible for looking at the windows of nearby houses, as well as the facility itself, if we entered it under the presence of the hosts. The Betkarze watched for lights in any room and let us know if necessary. They were also tasked with cleaning the street in case any uninvited guests appeared on it.

PULLER: Well, once there was a very serious situation, near the skyscraper in Starościńska, during the action at the Spanish embassy. That day I was sitting in the car in front of this skyscraper, I was in touch with the bettors watching the Spaniards at that time and I waited for the signal that the last of the diplomats had gone home and turned off the light. Then my colleagues who were already inside the skyscraper would start work, the diplomat was at a party in Stegny and at some point I got a signal that he was going towards his home. He lived on Wlaska Street, but he missed the right turn, drove Dolna up and further towards the embassy, which the bettor could still shout on the radio. Communication broke down in the field, because someone pressed a button on the radio station and drowned out others. Just in time! I did not know what was going on, I did not know where the figurehead was, and it was literally a while at night from Dolna to Starościńska Street. Suddenly I look, and next to me already. this diplomat's car passes by. Colonel Feliks Solarski, who was in charge of the entire operation, kept a cool head and did not interfere any more - the orders were given by me, his subordinate. On the second radio, on a different frequency, I coded to my colleagues from the intervention group that I had to act quickly. They always had vodka with them, which they spilled immediately, took a few sips to make their mouths stink, and started pretending to be drunk hooligans. Diplomats approached it and began to yank it. We also had MO police cars nearby with our people dressed up as policemen. In a second they appeared in front of the building, as if they stopped those of our friends who were pretending to be hooligans, and they also picked up the Spaniard. He might have protested, but he was young and allowed himself to be crammed into a police car. In the field at Malczewski's headquarters, he told how he had been attacked, he was terrified.

BEARD: This story reminded me of an adventure I had with our colleague Maciek from the faculty. Another department was responsible for the secret searches in the apartments, but we often went to the houses of diplomats. Once, during such an action, we stood in front of the door for a relatively long time, struggling with the lock. Then someone shot us there. We went inside, maybe a few minutes have

passed, I look through the glass in the door and see that there are literally a few dozen people on the sidewalk, and all of them are angry, of course, because they think it's a burglary. I look at Maciek and tell him that we have to evacuate, because they will kill us. Such a neighborhood guard doesn't know what to do if they get the bullies. There was no other way out so we went out the front door and headed towards this crowd. I have a hammer in my hand, my friend is also holding something and I look like real bandits, which they all comment on, of course, calling us off the worst. But they let us in the car and we drove. If they stopped us, the last resort would be those beams who secured the action and had a police car and uniforms. They would probably have pulled up and picked us up. It is known that they would not miss an opportunity to lightly kiss their friends.

TOURIST: Out of all the officers of the observation division, it was the members of the intervention group who were the only ones who were relatively aware of what was going on. After all, they knew why they were in front of the embassy, they knew that we were going in, they stood directly in front of the building. They certainly did not know our methods of operation, they did not know anything about isotopes, but they were aware that we enter the facilities every now and then. We tried to ensure that they were always the same people, so as not to expand the group of initiates. If someone was on vacation, and you had to enter the facility, then such a person had to come back from vacation.

HUNTER: Sometimes the bettors would put a car in front of the facility to be smashed during our action. Thanks to this, they could, as a last resort, stop a diplomat coming to the post, causing a crash. By the time they finished talking to him and completed the formalities, we were long gone.

TOURIST: I remember that once we had an adventure with a real militia. We were returning to the hotel after an action at the American consulate in Poznań. We were in our naturally unmarked car, the policemen stopped the police car next to us and went to our windows. Just like that, for a check or something. We had absolutely no documents with us, because that was the rule during the operation. You know, it was about not losing anything like that inside the facility, and not being able to identify us if we were caught. We didn't have any papers in the car either, so we honestly told these policemen that we had nothing to identify ourselves with and asked them to let us go. But then, of course, they pressed us even harder. We started to repeat again that we do not have any documents, that everything is fine and that it is best for everyone to go their own way. They did not let go. At one point, our colleague, a doctor, an engineer, approached their police car and took the key out of the ignition switch. It was just winter, a lot of snow was falling, and

he was throwing those wrenches into such a big snowdrift. The policemen were completely amazed. It was only when they realized that there would be no ID, and we quietly left. I was a bit surprised with what my colleague did, but it worked. Everything happened at a distance from the facility. At the facility itself, problems with the real militia were unlikely.

BEARD: Because the betka made sure that the police did not bother us in this area. They got it sorted out among themselves somehow.

TOURIST: When we came to the action, we obviously did not park the car in front of the facility, but at some distance there.

BEARD: We had a lot of manels, so the officer from the operations department did too. had to wave something. More than once we have told colleagues what to do, who are much above us, and no one even came up with the idea of being offended.

HUNTER: General had to carry something too. If someone just wanted to look, he could go to the museum, not to work with us. We had our hands stretched to our knees anyway.

BEARD: I was once at the facility alone with two generals. It happened that one time one of them, let's forget our name, because he is alive, showed up at the secretariat of our department and asked about me. I come and he says to get dressed, because we are going to Poznań immediately. So I take my things, go outside, sit behind the wheel of the car that was there, and look back. In the back seat is the second general - Zdzisław Sarewicz, a long-time member of the management and - at one point - the head of both counterintelligence and intelligence. My guards are good, let's go, it turns out that they have information that there is one very interesting receipt in Poznań that they must have. We arrived, our colleagues in Poznań were launched, who were securing the action, the ciphers on that day did not need to be determined, the work was fast, the matter was settled in a jiffy. But there was still some carrying equipment, so fellow generals had to grab bundles, because in this specific job there was really no such thing as steps. These were exceptional circumstances, exceptional activities, and we were all colleagues. I must say that the relationship between the employees of our department and the management of the operational departments and the entire counterintelligence was loose also outside the facility. I can also easily explain why - it was just known that if we were to safely return home from action, we generally need to have good contact, know each other and understand each other. There were casual conversations, there was laughter, there was an atmosphere.

TOURIST: Of course. General or not general - he did not question our orders. When we drove up to the facility, we told our colleagues from outside the department which suitcase to take, and that was it. We waited for a command that a paltry green light, and then got out, one by one. The American consulate in Poznań was located at 4 Chopina Street, in an old, mighty villa. There was a park in front of her and we passed it quickly. The first one opened the gate so that the others would not struggle anymore. After a while, a second, a third, and so on would appear. We tried to limit the number of people in the facility. The most important thing was not to lead to a situation in which we would have to stand for some time on the street, in front of the facility. Whether alone or even more so in a group, that would be stupid. Fortunately, in Poznań, we managed to get the key to the gate, but at the French consulate in Krakow, for example, there was a problem at first. The entrance was directly from Stolarska Street, in plain sight, and was closed with a lock that was very difficult to open. I remember it well, it was an H-type fichet, opened with such a strange key in the shape of this letter. There was no way we would be standing there in front of the facility and buried, because someone would have spotted us 100%. In order to solve this problem, I started to follow the consul around Poland and check if he had accidentally left this key in a hotel room. And in fact, once he made this mistake, he got a duplicate and the problem was solved.



Konsulat USA w Poznaniu. Fotografia wykonana na potrzeby Departamentu II.

*US Consulate in Poznań.
Photograph taken for the needs of Department II.*

ENGINEER: Unfortunately, I had one small slip-up when it comes to the French and the Fichet lock. The same as in the door was also there in the safe. Unfortunately, we did not have a raw key lock for this, so we ordered them from the AGH University of Science and Technology, and to save time and money, we asked for a simplified version. Our raw material was simply devoid of such a hump that made it impossible to insert the key into the lock with the wrong side and then pull it out without completely closing the lock. We assumed that we do not need this hump, because we will remember about the problem, but one time when I locked it, I actually took the key out too early, after making a half-turn, not a whole turn, which made it impossible to insert an ordinary key. The next morning the consul came to put his key in and thought something was wrong. So he ordered his staff to call a locksmith, and since the staff was Polish and all recruited for cooperation by the local counterintelligence unit, they informed whomever was needed about everything that was happening in the facility. I immediately received information from my colleagues from the 11 Department in Krakow that there was a problem at the space station. I knew immediately what had happened. Over the phone, I instructed the appropriate man what to do, he went there, opened the cash register, told the consul a fairy tale about a broken mechanism and took a few pennies for it, because the locksmith does not work for free. The crisis was averted. When we entered the consulate the next night, the castle was already packed, ready to be sent back to France.




US Consulate in Krakow, contemporary view.

TOURIST: In Krakow, Americans also set up on the same street as the French. Their consulate is located! at 9 Stolarska Street, but we were entering from the back, from the side of the Krakow market square, through the gate to which we had a key. It was located at the point where Grodzka Street begins. To put it simply - it was opposite the famous Wierzynek restaurant. You went deeper into the gate and there was a passage to the consulate.

BEARD: On the market square in Krakow, you had to be in the car more than an hour before you got in. There were a lot of people hanging around there, just like today, and we had to wait for the laconic moment when it would be empty.

TOURIST: After entering the premises of the facility, we locked ourselves from the inside. Many objects simply had a lock on the inside, well known from apartments - a box with a knob bolted to the door. So you would close such a lock and put a simple block on this box that would immobilize the bolt, if someone wanted to get in, they simply wouldn't be able to turn the key. Locking the door was especially important to us in those establishments where we entered when the hosts were on site. In the empty ones, we also closed ourselves from the inside, but it was a bit less important, because if someone approached the facility, we should find out about it from the bettors anyway. On the other hand, in an institution inhabited or having guards, theoretically, at any time someone could come up with the idea of entering the rooms in which we were sitting, and the bettors would not do much in such a situation. Of course they watched the windows and let us know if they noticed any movement. However, they could not guarantee us that no one would pass through the staircase to the door behind which we were operating. For example, in the US consulate in Poznań, the building plan was such that there was a proper part of the representative office on one floor, and a residential part on the higher level, so the Americans were directly above our heads. If someone, let's say, had an argument with his wife and wanted to spend the night in the consulate's premises, he would be downstairs in no time. We were counting on the fact that thanks to our blockade on the door, such someone, after unsuccessful attempts to open the lock on the door, will think that the mechanism has broken and go upstairs to sleep or at least look for some tools, while we evacuate.



Drzwi w konsulacie USA w Poznaniu. Funkcjonariusze zamykali się od środka, zakładając zacisk na środkowy zamek.

Door at the US consulate in Poznań. Officers locked themselves from the inside by putting a clamp on the middle lock.

BEARD: I have never been to this residential part of the US consulate in Poznań, because there has always been someone there. On the other hand, I was in the residential part of the Krakow consulate, which was as if in the second line and was empty from time to time. We missed the opportunity to look there, because maybe someone had left some keys, maybe some interesting notes. Based on that, what these rooms looked like, I can say that more than one or two people lived there. It was a large space. And now, imagine that we sometimes went in there, even when these people were at home. It is good at least that the consulate itself was located in a different division. But paradoxically, we entered the Americans in Poznań much more often, where we had them directly above our heads and - as "Tourist" said - they could appear in a second downstairs in front of the door behind which we were.

TOURIST: That is why, upon entering the facility, it was so important to immediately close from the inside. And then we got to work. It was different with switching on the light, it depended on what the windows of the facility look out to, and so on. In those rooms that had no windows at all, you could light yourself, but in the others you had to consider your options. Wherever it was possible and we had time, we tightly covered the windows with foil brought especially for this purpose. After turning on the light, the person standing outside did not see any difference, it was dark as before. But I remember places where it was not possible to cover all the windows. And there we just worked with lanterns in our teeth.

PHOTOGRAPHER: Sometimes I have to take pictures in the dark. Yes, yes it is. Infrared was the solution to the problem, as it was for the Spaniards. There was a problem with turning on the light in many rooms on this property. The skyscraper at Starościńska Street had many windows, it would be difficult to cover them quickly and tightly, and there were a lot of buildings around.

TOURIST: And there were other facilities in the same complex.

PHOTOGRAPHER: Exactly. So we bought the "infraredy" films, and from the "B" Office, where I used to work, I borrowed a special Sunpak lamp. These photos, taken in the dark, turned out quite well.

TOURIST: After entering the facility, I often took off my jacket, and it was not only about the temperature, but also because I wanted to minimize the number of things that restrict my movement and at the same time could get caught when moving around the facility.

BEARD: Breaking any vase would be a huge problem. The rules were simple - led like ghosts, touch nothing, don't talk. We understood


each other almost without words, and when you had to say something, you would of course whisper. And we put on such "silent shoes", felt.

HUNTER: Similar to museum slippers.

PHOTOGRAPHER: Sometimes people just wandered around in socks. Once, with a friend, I used to go to Foksal 11 here in Warsaw. where the Italian Cultural Institute was located and you could also find interesting documents. Bad weather outside, so we took off our shoes right after we got in and we had no slippers. A colleague went upstairs to combine it, and at that time I decided that I would go downstairs, because there was a room where we could comfortably set up our harvester for photographing materials. I did not even take out the flashlight, because I know the object well, I go down the stairs and suddenly I hear "splashing, splashing, splashing". I feel my socks and pants are wet. I took out the flashlight, I look and see that everything is flooded there, the pipe has burst. I didn't want to put mud on my shoes from the outside and now I have a bigger problem. If I hadn't taken my shoes off, I would have heard the splashing sound much earlier and my pants would not get wet. I'd just take my shoes off, come back upstairs and that's it. I was half wet and I had to undress. Today you can laugh, but it really was a big problem. Can you imagine what would have happened if the Italians had come in in the morning and there would be a trail across the carpet from the flooded basement to the front door?


We also had a similar story with flooding. at the Spanish Embassy. We open the door, take a few steps and suddenly we hear something like "bang, bang, bang". We shine flashlights at our feet and what turns out? The floor staves stand on end. It flooded them too, and everything just rose. Before we went, we somehow arranged these staves, but of course we didn't play with the renovation team. Do you know what saved us in such situations? The fact that cleaners were the first to come to the outlets in the morning, and this was also the case here. If our staves were toe up in one of the rooms where the cleaning lady was not allowed, it would actually be a problem. But in this case it was about the place just outside the entrance, where she too had to stand. So we knew she was getting into it, too, and she would be convinced that she was the first to do it.





Gabinet i otwarta przez funkcjonariuszy kasa pancerna ambasadora Hiszpanii. W zamku tkwi dorobiony klucz. Fotografie wykonano w ciemności, w technice podczerwieni.

The office and the armored safe of the Spanish ambassador opened by the officers. There is a key in the lock. The photos were taken in the dark, in the tech-infrared ceilings.



Pomieszczenia biurowe konsulatu USA w Krakowie i znaleziona na strychu radiostacja.

Office rooms of the US consulate in Krakow and found in the attic radio station.

PHOTOGRAPHER: You had to be most careful when pulling out the documents. It is known not to confuse the pages or even tear the dust too much on the safe.

BEARD: We used gloves a lot. Before we touched anything, Polaroid photos were taken, which then allowed us to arrange everything the same way as we had at the beginning. Sometimes, if there were any suspicions that an employee of the facility was extremely pedantic, a person looked at each object a thousand times before touching it with a finger.

TOURIST: The main goal of our activities was, of course, to get to the safes. In some institutions they were simply in offices, in others they could be hidden behind some kind of bars, and in the case of the American consulates and the Swedish embassy we were dealing with the most terrible thing, the so-called bunker. Sometimes it was also called "treasury", "cipher point", "protected area". It was the room where the most secret documents of the entire facility and communications equipment, as well as spare keys for all locks and diplomatic residences, which we could immediately copy. And at the same time, it was the most important place from the point of view of the officers of the intelligence services of these countries. The CIA made sure that their bunkers met all the standards for such a place, and so did the Swedes. The Portuguese also had something like a bunker, but it was not that safe. The most difficult was for the Americans and Swedes, where in order to get to the bunker entrance, we had to go through the entire labyrinth of security features inside the facility. One, second, third door, key locks, mechanical combination locks, and in Poznań there was even one electronic one. Even getting to the vestibule of such a bunker was quite a success.

BEARD: Do you remember one time when we broke the world record? The situation was that in Krakow they changed the locks on the doors between rooms. They ripped a key lock, Yale's with seven pins, one that many people have at home, only much longer and more difficult to open. In addition, in the same door there was also a Simplex code type, in which there were a few buttons and they had to be pressed in a specific way, for example left, right, middle or two side ones at the same time, then the middle one and so on. I remember that on the day we came to open those locks, the warden was with us. As soon as we went through the main entrance to the consulate, the boss immediately sat down in his armchair and said that he was going to sleep for an hour, because it would take us to take time to deal with these safeguards.


Okay, I'm the first to pick at the key lock, I know that it may not be easy, so I tell "Tourist" that if I get tired, it will be a change. Thirty seconds has passed, lock "pop" open. I just did it

quickly, good day. The warden saw this, he lost a bit of the urge to sleep, and straightened up in that chair. Well, there is still a fight with simplexein ahead, and the way to deal with it was just that we had a list of all possible combinations and we had to try one by one. Sir, it was possible to stand over this until death, the prospect is not merry. Well, let's start - I read, and "Tourist" punches. The combination doesn't work, and the next one doesn't. When reading the third or fourth, I was wrong and I dictated wrongly. After a second I realized it and corrected it, but "Tourist" had already punched in the wrong one. Cyk (click?) - door open. Fortunately, yes.

The night is still young, so I suggest that we take the previous key lock out of the door, unfold it, measure what is needed, and make the key right away. The "tourist" agreed, so we went to the consul's desk, we put the towel down, our handy vise went on that, and bang, bang, bang - we puke quickly on the key. We're done, the boss comes in, looks at it our work of art and says we'll put it in the lock over his dead body. Well, we know what we are doing, so we start to convince him that nothing is going to happen. Finally he let it in and we slide the key in. And what? It goes like butter.

So you see, one time the work was going fast, and another time a man stood over a castle for hours and thought that he would die there. The Swedes, for example, had one horrible, hellishly complicated castle. Literally a couple of nights in a row you would come to rummage in it, and then you got nervous about how you had to lock it up. For this we had twisted searchlights and you can hardly imagine that while opening everything was fine, when closing it, they just started to unscrew, because the pressure of the springs inside was so high. I remember the situation that outside the milk bottles were buzzing, the opening hour of the facility was approaching, and we were struggling to close the door behind us. A lot of stress.





W konsulacie USA w Poznaniu funkcjonariusze natrafili na zamki elektroniczne. Fotografia przedstawia jeden z nich. Za widoczną na dwóch pierwszych zdjęciach osłoną znajduje się klawiatura. Centralka na ostatnim zdjęciu zamocowana była za drzwiami.

At the US consulate in Poznań, officers found electronic locks. The photo shows one of them. Behind the cover visible in the first two photos there is a keyboard. The switchboard in the last photo was mounted behind the door.




Amerykanie w obu konsulatach (powyższą fotografię wykonano w Poznaniu) zastosowali także zamki typu Simplex, które otwierało się poprzez wciśnięcie paru przycisków w odpowiedniej kolejności (niekiedy więcej niż jednego równocześnie).

The Americans in both consulates (the above photo was taken in Poznań) also used Simplex locks, which were opened by pressing a few buttons in the right order (sometimes more than one simultaneously).

TOURIST: A man who was barely conscious many times returned home, he was so tired. But the effects were there, which is to say a lot. You know, today I am not even able to list all the institutions I have been to. There were so many of these actions that I can't really calculate it from my memory. The operations departments let us know where they needed documents from, and we went in there. Not only to Americans, Spaniards, Italians, Danes, Swedes and so on. We were in various institutions, I remember Indian, Argentinian, Mexican, Portuguese. Today I find myself remembering a building, a door, a safe, and an office in front of my eyes, but it is difficult for me to assign it to a specific country, because it was simply an institution where documents were less interesting and you only entered once in a while. I guess I remembered the castles more than the flags. We overcame the complicated security measures of the Austrian company Ewa, Swiss Kaba locks, German Kromer Novum, American sargents, Swedish rosenengrens and horribly difficult to open FAS. Long could be exchanged. We came, we did not play without any sense, like some blindfolding around there, we approached the subject specifically.

So now imagine the complex locks were nothing compared to the challenge that awaited us as we stepped in front of the bunker. Imagine the safest room in the facility, somewhere deep inside the building. Already? Now imagine again that a CIA specialist is coming and inside this already safe room, he puts thick, reinforced concrete walls, thus creating another room, and then completes the work by inserting a vault door with a mechanical combination lock in its entrance top class. You know. what did the Russians call what we were doing? "Secret penetration", not "secret entrance". Why exactly "penetration"? Because you can "enter" into the ambassador's office, rummaging through the castle with rummages. But getting inside such a bunker without leaving the slightest traces deserves the name of penetration. Witchcraft, sir.



Wnętrze ambasady Wenezueli w Warszawie.

Interior of the Venezuelan Embassy in Warsaw.

INFORMACJA

dot. rezultatów działań specjalnych w obiekcie krypt. "DELOS"
/ambasada Portugali w Warszawie/

W ramach długofalowego programu działań operacyjno-technicznych wobec placówek dyplomatycznych państw NATO, w bieżącym roku realizowano kolejne przedsięwzięcia zmierzające do pokonania systemu zabezpieczenia i opanowania łączności szyfrowej ambasady Portugali w Warszawie.

Cykl działań agenturalno-technicznych i kombinacji operacyjnych zakończyła zrealizowana w godzinach wieczorowo-nocnych z 12 na 13 marca akcja, w trakcie której:

- dokonano wejścia do najbardziej chronionego pomieszczenia placówki, tj. pokoju szyfranta, pokonując zamek szyfrowy zabezpieczający "bunkier";
- pokonano zabezpieczenia zamków szafy metalowej należącej do szyfranta oraz znajdującej się w "bunkrze" kasy pancernej uzyskując dostęp do urządzeń i materiałów kryptograficznych placówki;
- przejęto i sfotografowano materiały kryptograficzne obiektu, w tym gamy szyfrowe placówki ważne na 1987 rok, wykorzystywane do obustronnej łączności placówka - centrala oraz łączności okólnej;
- dokonano pomiarów konfiguracji nowego 50-cio kontaktowego wtyku komutatorowego firmy "Sony" maszyny szyfrującej "Gretag TC-812", stanowiącego istotny element w systemie zabezpieczenia łączności szyfrowej.

Funkcjonariusze zawsze starali się maksymalnie wykorzystać cenny czas spędzony na terenie placówki. Podczas jednego wejścia wykonywano niekiedy szereg skomplikowanych zadań.

Officers always tried to make the most of the valuable time spent on the premises. Sometimes a number of complicated tasks were performed during one entry.

INFORMATION .

regarding the results of special activities in the crypt facility.

"DELOS"

/ embassy in Warsaw / _____

As part of the long-term program of operational and technical activities towards diplomatic missions of NATO countries, in the bleaching year, further projects were carried out to overcome the security system and master the cipher communication of the embassy in Warsaw. The cycle of agent-technical activities and operational combinations was completed by the action carried out in the evening and night hours from March 12 to 13, during which:

- *the security of the locks of the metal garment belonging to the cipher and the safe located in the "bunker" has been defeated, gaining access to the cryptographic equipment and materials of the facility;*

- *the cryptographic materials of the facility were seized and photographed, including cipher gains of the general outposts for 1987, used for two-way communication facility - headquarters and circular communication;*

- *measurements of the configuration of the new "Sony" 50-contact commutator plug of the Gretag TC-812 encryption machine, which is an important element in the encryption security system.*


Uzyskane rezultaty umożliwiają pełną kontrolę łączności szyfrowej placówki oraz łączności okólnej centrali do końca bieżącego roku.

Ponadto w trakcie akcji:

- dokonano pomiarów ujawnionego w toku działań nowego zamka szyfrowego typu "Sergent" posiadającego dodatkowe zabezpieczenie za pomocą specjalnego klucza;
- sporządzono około 1200 fotokopii dokumentów służbowych placówki i centrali, cechowanych klauzulą "tajne" bądź "poufne", dotyczących problematyki politycznej i gospodarczej PRL za okres od kwietnia 1986 do chwili obecnej.

Akcja przebiegała bez zakłóceń, nie stwierdzono oznak dekonspiracji prowadzonych działań.

Opr. SM/BS

A handwritten signature is written over a large rectangular area that has been completely redacted with black ink.

The obtained results enable full control of e-digital communication the branch and the circular communication of the headquarters by the end of this year. In addition, during the action:

- measurements were made of a new code lock revealed in the course of operations "Sergent" type with additional protection by means of a special key; *
- approximately 1,200 photocopies of the official documents of facility 1 were made headquarters, marked with the "secret" or "confidential" clause, concerning political and economic issues of the Polish People's Republic for the period from April 1986 to the present.

The action proceeded smoothly, no signs of exposure were found. rationale for the activities carried out.

Company SM/BS

Chapter 7 BOMB

BOMB

R0ZDZ1AŁ7

TOURIST: At the beginning of 1983 we took our toys from the building on Rakowiecka Street and moved to another building. It was the same district, but we were some four kilometers apart - the Ministry of Internal Affairs headquarters was on the northern edge of Mokotów, and our department was now on the southern edge. The move was primarily about creating more favorable and safer working conditions for us, but also about ensuring an even better conspiracy. The building of the Ministry of the Interior was always full of people, and no one would associate us or be interested in what we were doing. In the new place, we were completely isolated from the world. The building had no markings, we had a security guard, no one could enter us. When we moved there, everything was still quite austere, because we didn't even have hot water, but we looked after the building, worked on it and over time, we did everything we needed to do, including central heating. On the first floor, we had our offices and a common room which we treated as a large work space. We even brought a ping-pong table there, where you could spread the lumber as needed. The only thing we missed was the kitchen. On the other hand, we never had time to cook dinner anyway, and there was a place to make coffee and tea, and we had so much work to do that some of them abused the caffeine very much. On the ground floor of this building there were laboratories: photographic, chemical, mechanical, and so on, and at the end of the corridor there was another door to the so-called "Z" studio. Only some of the faculty staff were allowed to enter. Directly behind this door was a break room, and then a toilet and shower, as required by the regulations. Another door led to the control room, and another to a large room, where a crane with an electric extraction was suspended from the ceiling.

There was also a camera hanging there, which could be viewed on a monitor in the control room. On the floor, on the other hand, you could see a large plate made of lead fittings, i.e. castings that can be joined together. Pulling this plate back, you would look into a hole about 180 centimeters deep, which was an inch lined with stainless steel.

There, at the very bottom, in a special heavy container, there were isotopes of cobalt-60 and iridium-192 - the basis of our work and our greatest curse. We bought them at the Institute for Nuclear Research in Świerk, where we pretended to be the army. We paid extra or gave gifts to the employees who helped us there. It was a reward for them loading it into our containers that they didn't know, didn't have the proper certification and didn't meet the safety rules.



ENGINEER: The new building was a luxury. Previously, it was a man who carried the isotope container to the bunker in the ministry building on Rakowiecka Street, locked the door and goodbye. It was told no one was to go in there, that was it.

PHOTOGRAPHER: I always laughed that this isotope sits in the bread oven, because in this shelter something like such an oven was built. That container was put there, and nothing else could be done. It was terrible, but we didn't have a better place until we moved to the new building.

ENGINEER: When did it all start? When I came to the department in the first half of the seventies, the isotopes had already been used, but for how many years I cannot answer. It seems no one told me about it, and neither did I. Or maybe I don't remember. Unfortunately.

TOURIST: The radiation was needed primarily to overcome the locks that we encountered on the doors of the most important rooms and strongboxes - mechanical combination locks. Security professionals love them because they are difficult to open and there is no problem with a lost and duplicate key. For most people, combination locks are associated with films like Vabank, where a cashier approaches a safe, shakes something, listens to something and after a while everything is open. I am not saying that this is complete rubbish, because in fact, when you are very skilled, you can,

by turning some of these locks, hear certain sounds that make it easier to determine the correct code. Especially if a person helps himself with some device, such as a medical stethoscope. But there are two basic problems to keep in mind when watching Yabank - first, it would take much, much longer than that. in the film. Secondly, the film Kwinto works in the interwar period, when the technology was much less advanced than in our time. Yes, the combination locks we open worked mostly on the same principle, but they were much more refined and precise, and thus - they moved silently. It must be remembered that we are talking here even about the end of the 1980s. We did not have time to play the Fifth and sit like idiots with a stethoscope, waiting for sounds that may appear, but probably not, because the mechanism is simply too high-quality. There have been various other methods of opening cryptocurrencies, but they were either too time consuming and uncertain or too invasive and left marks.

BEARD: Wait a minute, there was one more non-invasive method of determining the cipher. The operations department checked the birthdays of the cipher's children, wives, and lovers, and it was tried first. Are you laughing? This is not a joke. There were times when it worked. The worst thing was that it was the same in our Polish facilities.

TOURIST: I personally saw in one of our embassies a wardrobe with a combination lock sealed with duct tape. Employees were afraid that someone would accidentally move the knob, close it, and then no one would ever open it again. Alarm control panels too. they were dusty all over. Unfortunately, we were not responsible for securing Polish embassies. From time to time we were asked to check something, but basically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Government Protection Bureau and the intelligence were doing it.


HUNTER: I remember going somewhere abroad once and in one of our facilities a guy asked me if I could give him a universal code to open a lock. I asked him why he needed this lock at the cash register, since according to him every producer has an emergency combination. Massacre.

TOURIST: But even the employees of the most secure Western institutions had mishaps. Swedes took the codes for locks from a bunker, several hundred pages thick, on a shelf next to a bunker. Each product had a several-digit code needed to place an order. The page that was opened frequently was different from the others, so we knew that any of the numbers there might be a cipher. Such incidents, however, only happened once in a million years. The Swedes did not always manage to find ciphers in the catalog, so we were left with the use of gamma radiation.

BEARD: Before we get down to business, one more thing needs to be said. Although these events took place over thirty years ago and today the knowledge of the effects of radiation is much greater, I wish there was no doubt: we were not stupid. What we did, we did with full awareness of the dangers that resulted from this work.



ENGINEER: The most important element of the combination lock are shields with notches on the edges. Usually we have three, sometimes four such shields. The knob on the door is used to turn them. If it has a scale with numbers from 0 to 99, the number of combinations can make you dizzy. But the principle of operation is quite simple: when the cutouts in the shields line up, an elongated element ends with the so-called "Doggy", which pulls back the lock bolt.



A simplified diagram of a four-disk combination lock in the open position. You can see an oblong element (red), which fell into the clearance created by setting all the notches in the discs in one line with the knob.

((PAGE 167))



Tył zamka szyfrowego (strona przeciwna w stosunku do pokrętła) w pozycji zamkniętej. Widoczny na górze haczyk nazywany przez funkcjonariuszy „pieskiem” (przypomina głowę psa) jest zespolony ze znajdującą się za nim podłużną belką (oznaczoną kolorem czerwonym na schemacie na poprzedniej stronie). Po ustawieniu tarcz w odpowiedniej pozycji belka wpadnie w prześwit w tarczach, doprowadzając tym samym do opuszczenia „pieska”. Ten zahaczy wówczas o wycięcie w widocznym na fotografii kole (oznaczone 1). „Piesek” połączony jest z rygłem zamka i dalszy ruch pokrętłem doprowadzi do otwarcia mechanizmu.

The rear of the combination lock (the side opposite to the knob) in the closed position. The hook visible at the top, which the officers call "doggy" (it resembles a dog's head), is joined to the longitudinal beam behind it (marked in red in the diagram on the previous page). alone to leave the "doggy". ' The latter will then catch the cutout in the circle (marked 1) visible in the photo. The "dog" is connected to the bolt of the lock and further movement of the knob will open the mechanism.

TOURIST: There were two methods of determining the cipher using radiation. We called the first gamma ray and involved the use of radiation, usually produced by cobalt-60 or possibly iridium-192, to x-ray the lock mechanism. Thanks to this, we obtained a photo of him, similar to the X-ray we get in the hospital when we break our leg. As the metal traps some of the radiation, the image showed notches in the shields. This made it possible to conclude what movements of the knob need to be made to set these dials in the correct position and thus open the lock. Analyzing the photos, of course, required a lot of experience, but thanks to it we were able to narrow down the number of possible combinations to about twenty. It was known all over the world that a combination lock could be x-rayed. However, no one thought that there would be a group of people who would bring such a strong isotope into the diplomatic mission in their own hands to take a sufficiently clear picture of such a mechanism overnight.

ENGINEER: On the bunker door at American consulates in Poland, on the inside, there was a plaque on which the manufacturer, the famous company Mosler, assured that the door would withstand twenty hours of exposure. And we are talking about continuous exposure, because it was not done in installments. It was impossible to come with the same film for a week and slowly expose it to light, because a man in life would not be able to arrange everything perfectly the same, and they would also turn the lock between our visits, changing the position of various elements, and the photo would be blurry. The plates were exposed once and for all, only such a solution was possible.

TOURIST: Now imagine how strong this radiation was, since they guaranteed twenty hours of endurance, and we did it in an hour and a half or two. It really never occurred to anyone that someone would bring such a "bomb" with him. Despite this, at some point, the manufacturers of combination locks came up with the idea that instead of using metal shields, they would put simply plastic inside and thus make it impossible to take a photo of the mechanism. The radiation passed through the plastic like butter, and nothing was visible in the photo.

The second method, called gamma-ray, was a solution to this problem in the first place. The trick that allowed to outsmart the manufacturers of plastic shields was that a narrow beam of iridium-192 radiation, characterized by a lower penetration than cobalt, was passed through the lock exactly in the place where the belt should appear in a given model, i.e. this notch in shields. Then the lock was spun and the radiation strength on the other side was measured using so-called scintillation probes, which were so sensitive that they picked up whether the beam was flying through a plastic obstacle or not. If the reading jumped up during the shooting, it was a sign that this clearance may be present on a given dial. The reading spikes may have been caused by other moving elements, but everything was writing, charting, and finally we got a short list of possible combinations.

The gammametric method was useful for opening locks of a different design than standard disc locks. For example, the Spaniards had such an unusual cash register. Theoretically, it could be opened using the gamma ray method, taking a few photos, but we would not have had time to do it in one night. Gammametry in this particular case made it possible to shorten the required time even to a few or several minutes.

Another application of the gaminametric method was to open locks with metal shields - when the location of the safe did not allow taking photographs. Cobalt could be used then, and scintillation probes detected the passage through the lock of even a small amount of radiation, which we, of course, wrote down and analyzed.

It is possible to work with such isotopes without any threats. After all, in the building of our department we had this isotope laboratory, called the "Z" workshop, where there were conditions to perform many activities in accordance with safety standards. There were also normal X-ray machines on which you could x-ray some small object, such as a padlock. But the problem was that our job was not to conduct research in the comfortable conditions of a laboratory, behind a special protective cover. We operated in full conspiracy, usually between eleven o'clock in the morning and four in the morning, sometimes only with flashlights and sitting in cramped rooms where it was impossible to hide from the radiation. These special conditions required sacrifices from us already during the transport of the radiation source to the facility. If we wanted to follow all safety rules, at this stage, from the moment of taking the isotope from the hole in our studio to the moment of bringing it into the object of interest to us, it would have to be in a very, very heavy container that does

not let radiation through. However, we could not afford it, because mobility was what mattered. How would we pull such a cauldron upstairs? We had to have something lighter. The darkest page in the history of our department is an old Russian container for isotopes called Bcrnka, which was on hand when we came to work with the "Bearded" in the early 1980s. Luckily some time later it all went to hell, for scrap. I can barely remember what it looked like, I think it was made of lead. We didn't want to use it. When we measured the radiation around this container, it turned out that it exceeded the norm even several times. Well, but it was mobile, there was a need, so it was worn and used, among other things, to determine ciphers using the method we called "zetka". It belonged to the group of gamma-graph methods, i.e. methods leading to obtaining photos of the lock. Of all of us, the "Engineer" can say the most about the "zetka".

ENGINEER: Yes, the buoy came to work a few years earlier, when this method was used more intensively, so I took a look. But before I tell you what the "zetka" was, let's talk about the basic testing we struggled with using the gamma-ray method. It consists in placing a film on one side of the object and the source of radiation on the other side. In the case of an unscrewed safe, this did not pose any particular difficulties: it could be moved away from the wall and a source could be placed on the back of the safe and a plate in front of the lock. However, in the case of such a bunker at the American consulate there was a problem. We just couldn't get the isotope to the other side because we didn't have access there. Yes, theoretically, you could place a strong source of radiation behind the bunker and let the beam penetrate the back wall and door, but the chance that you could see something in such a photograph was rather poor - too far, too thick walls. The Americans protected themselves against it well, the structure of the bunker was well thought out.

Mr. Zenek, a veteran of the department, came up with an idea, namely that in the door frame of the bunker at the American consulate in Poznań, a little hole would be drilled right through. He got the warden's approval and did so. This hole was invisible to the naked eye. There was a thread inside and special plugs were made for it, with which everything was camouflaged after the work is finished, painting with even precision paint. The source of radiation was transmitted through this opening to the interior of the bunker. How? The cobalt isotopes we used in the department looked like a six-millimeter long piece of graphite from a pencil. A tiny thing, but it had enormous power, and that's all the magic of radiation. Such an isotope, for various reasons, including purely practical ones, was locked in a tiny metal capsule. So Mr. Zenek thought that he would simply screw this capsule onto a rod - initially bent, and that is why the method was called "zetka", and later in the shape of the letter "c". This rod was pushed through the hole to the other side and positioned a bit behind the slide, and on our side, in front of the slide, there was a cliché. After a while, you had a photo.

TOURIST: Okay, now let's analyze what the "Engineer" said, in terms of health, health and safety and so on. I remember it very well and I will certainly never forget the first time I saw it. First, our superior, Mr. Bohdan, still in the department's premises, opened the container and simply, with pliers, pulled out the isotope in a capsule with a thread and screwed it onto the rod.

ENGINEER: That's a pity Bohdan. Cool, decent guy.


TOURIST: I felt faint when I saw it. Then we put the whole rod into a lead "brick" and transported it to the outpost, but at that time it was not Poznań, but an embassy in Praga, if I remember correctly - Portugal. With radiation, it is of course very important to keep a safe distance, and we were standing in such a small room and there was even nowhere to move away, and the creator of the method, Mr. Zenek, was pushing this isotope through an electric tube into the room, which had a steel door with a lock and set the source in such a way that the film was properly exposed. And this method was used for years, but mainly at the American consulate in Poznań.



Zabezpieczone zamkiem elektronicznym drzwi prowadzące do przedsionka bunkra w konsulacie USA w Poznaniu.

Electronic lock secured door leading to the bunker vestibule at the US consulate in Poznań.

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

Drzwi skarbcowe słynnej amerykańskiej firmy Mosler zabezpieczające wejście do bunkra w konsulacie USA w Poznaniu. W futrynie wywiercony był otwór, przez który funkcjonariusze przepychali nakręcony na pręt izotop. To umożliwiała uzyskanie obrazu tarcz zamka szyfrowego. Na drzwiach znajdowała się tabliczka z informacją, że do prześwietlenia potrzeba minimum 20 godzin, tymczasem izotopy używane w Wydziale IX pozwalały na osiągnięcie celu nawet w ciągu półtorej godziny.

The vault door of the famous American company Mosler securing the entrance to the bunker at the US consulate in Poznań. A hole was drilled in the doorframe, through which the officers pushed an isotope screwed onto a rod. This made it possible to obtain an image of the dials of the combination lock. There was a sign on the door with the information that the X-ray requires a minimum of 20 hours, while the isotopes used in Department IX made it possible to achieve the goal even within an hour and a half.

ENGINEER: Mr. Zenek invented another method of determining the cipher with the use of a rod, this time completely harmless. Obviously, most combination locks have the ability to change the sequence of numbers needed to open. For this, a special encryption key is inserted into the back of the lock. So Mr. Zenek said that he could lead to the other side of the closed door heel with a key-shaped tip and insert it into the opening.

TOURIST: Mr. Zenek had great ideas. He still went to action with us, even though he had actually been retired for a while. In the American consulate in Poznań, his method with the encryption key was especially useful, not in the bunker door, but in the others. The Americans installed a combination lock in them, and below it there was a lock closed with a large-sized key, such as in the gate. So the buttonhole was also quite large. Mr. Zenek is translating! through it, a rod with a key-shaped tip to scramble this disappears above and insert it where it needs to be. But don't think the Americans were stupid. After all, the introduction of such a service key does not automatically reset the code and open the lock. Even if it did, so would we. We weren't stupid, and of course we wouldn't go so far as to, because in the morning the Americans would come in, put in their combination, it wouldn't work and everything would be out. Myk was different. The encryption is performed on the open lock and the service key cannot be completely pushed into this hole on the back with the lock closed. So Mr. Zenek inserted the key only as little as he could, and then started turning the dial for setting the combination on his side. When he hit the right number on the last dial, i.e. the first from the side where he had inserted the encryption key, he felt that the key had slipped slightly deeper. Unfortunately, it was a torment with the next shields, because he had to withdraw the key every time from the shield he had already set. This is due to the design of the combination lock. Determining the cipher using this method was therefore hellishly time-consuming and possible only in very favorable conditions, when a human had to move the bar from somewhere else. After all, it was not possible to put something like this in the safe, and when it comes to a bunker in Poznań - where a suitable opening was made in the door frame - the method with a key to encode nothing would be far away, because the opening to insert the lacquer from the inside was covered by a special metal plate. You had to use radiological methods, but neither of us were eager to manipulate an isotope screwed onto a rod.

We were constantly working on ways to minimize the doses we were taking. One of the first steps in this direction was to first partially and then completely stop working with the damned Berenic container and transfer this isotope to another container adapted to be screwed onto a rod. For years before our arrival, Berenika served practically everything in the department. In fact, it served not only as a container, but also a device from which the beam could be released directly. It was simply placed in the right place, for example on one side of the cash register, the opening in it was exposed and the beam was flying. The only problem is that even when the opening was closed, Berenika sowed in all directions. It was a homicide, so some time after me and "The Bearded Man" appeared in the department, sometime in the early 1980s, an important change took place. There was a very good, slightly safer set consisting of three elements: a container, yes called a flaw detector and a collimator.



Pan Zenon skonstruował specjalny zestaw ułatwiający ustalenie kombinacji przy pomocy pręta stanowiącego jednocześnie klucz do przeszyfrowania. Widoczna na górnym zdjęciu rączka pozwalała mu wygodnie wkładać i wyjmować go z otworu w tyle zamka, który widoczny jest na dolnej fotografii.

Mr. Zenon constructed a special set to facilitate the determination of the combination of the rod and the aid of the rod, which is also the key to the encryption. The handle visible in the upper photo allowed him to conveniently insert and remove it from the hole in the back of the zipper, which is visible in the lower photo.

Urządzenie	Dawka dopuszczalna wg. PN-76/J-80050	Dawka zmierzona	Krotność przek.
Opakowanie transportowe	200 mR	14.000 mR	70
Pojemnik roboczy na powierzchni	200 mR	70.000 mR	350
Pojemnik roboczy w odległości 50 mm.	50 mR	25.000 mR	500
Pojemnik roboczy w odległości 1 m.	2 mR	220 mR	110

Tabela przedstawia wyniki pomiarów dawek promieniowania, które wykonano przy pojemniku Berenika, wykorzystywanym latami w Wydziale IX. W odległości 50 mm przewidziana prawem norma przekroczona była 500 razy.

The table shows the results of radiation dose measurements carried out at the Berenik container, used for years in Department IX. At a distance of 50 mm, the norm provided for by the law was exceeded 500 times.

BEARD: Well, I'll tell you about the container first. Its advantage was that it suppressed radiation much better than Berenika, and at the same time it weighed so much that it could be carried by two people. It could be brought upstairs, anyway. We called this container a triangle, because it had three sockets, i.e. three isotopes could fit there - sometimes of the same type, but with different activity, i.e. to put it simply: the strength of the radiation.

TOURIST: Our isotope lab in the department had a gate through which people could enter with a car - a nysa or a beetle - and there it was possible to directly and relatively quickly load the triangle onto the back of the car.

BEARD: During the journey, he landed in such a large bece, which additionally suppressed the radiation. This one had a specific weight.

TOURIST: Two people got it up somehow. Steel, everything lined with wood inside and then another layer of metal. And in our cars there were also wooden racks around this container, into which 50 kilograms of lead plates were inserted.

HUNTER: We had the rear axle so weighed down more than once it was oversteering. The front wheels were almost up.

TOURIST: Behind the driver's back there was a lacquered lead plate so that the back wouldn't be buzzing. And lak bilo, it was clearly visible on the measuring devices. So on the way to such Kraków, Poznań or other parts of Poland, one had to change places. We usually used two or three cars. There was only one person with the isotope, and the rest were driving some polonaises or Fiats. We stopped every now and then and there was a change, so that one man wouldn't take too much of a dose.

POSTMAN; I remember one time a beetle caught a flat tire in the middle of the forest. It was dark, the other two cars stood on opposite sides to illuminate the broken wheel. We decided to take the triangle out to the forest when replacing the wheel, so that the source was as far away from us as possible. After a while, a car passes by, the driver slows down, opens the window and looks at us like that. The guys were already carrying this container among the trees, but it was terribly dark and the guy didn't see what they were carrying there. Suddenly one of my colleagues shouted, "Get away from the road with this body!" I don't know if the guy was fooled or nothing, but the fact is, he was gone in a moment.



TOURIST: After reaching the place, we took the triangle out of the boiler, there was no other way out. You simply had to carry it with your friend with you.

BEARD: Well, at some point in the facility, we had to remove the isotope, because the triangle was only a storage container. It was not possible to illuminate the lock directly from it.

TOURIST: Just how to take it out? After all, if we do it with pliers, it will turn out that we have returned to the starting point, i.e. the same degree of exposure as with this dangerous Bercnik container and the rod method called "zetka". And yet there is nothing that way.

BEARD: The road led through a rubber and metal hose. We just dragged an isotope through it.

TOURIST: Imagine a chain composed not of links but of beads, like a cork in a bathtub. There was a small hole in this triangle, a channel, let's say, and inside it was just such a chain, only a little thicker, about fifteen centimeters long. One of the beads of this chain, the latter, deepest in the container, was the isotope capsule. The remaining beads, on the other hand, served as plugs that closed the outlet from the container - so that as little radiation as possible escaped from the triangle. When we were ready to go, we approached this triangle holding a rubber / metal hose about five meters long. At its end there was a quick coupler, i.e. a latch that was attached to the first bead in the triangle and the isotope began to be drawn into the snake by the chain. For this we had a remote control, a crank that allowed us to move a few meters away, while the isotope traveled to the other end of the snake, where there was another element of this set, the so-called gammarid. It was a flaw detector, i.e. a device used, inter alia, to detect defects in metal, for example in a pipe.

Even though it was a commercially produced device, it took a bit of a stretch to buy it. These things are regulated by international treaties, nuclear law and so on, you know. In addition, we, of course, as counterintelligence could not buy it, but the matter was settled under the legend, i.e. the purchase was made by a substitute company. If I remember correctly, it was the "Metronex" Foreign Trade Headquarters, which, of course, did not know what it was for and for whom. The gammarid weighed about twenty kilograms - it was made of high-quality metals with great suppression of radiation, maybe half a meter long and about forty centimeters in diameter. When we saw it, we started joking that it resembles a little piglet in shape and that is how it stayed - it was said "take the piglet" and everyone knew what was going on. Despite the fact that the flaw detector is mainly used for x-raying various things, the "piglet" served us de facto as a mobile container, used when working on the site. It had two advantages. Firstly, the source was pulled into and out of it very efficiently, and secondly, it was equipped with an indicator showing whether the isotope is inside and whether the approach to the device is reasonably safe. When our radiation source went from the triangle to the gammarid and hid there, we disconnected the hose from the triangle and connected it to the third element of this set - a collimator, i.e. a tool focusing the radiation beam in the place we were interested in. To put it simply - it was a sleeve with a small hole with a diameter of a millimeter, one and a half.

ENGINEER: The rule is simple and obvious: the longer and narrower the opening, the more focused the beam.

TOURIST: Yes, we had different collimators, depending on our needs, and a whole set of tapes, clamps and magnets that allowed us to place the flax collimator in the right position, for example on the back of a safe or on a wall in another room - so that the beam would pass through through the axis of the lock, in front of which the plate was positioned when we used the gamma ray method. Unfortunately, neither the collimator itself, nor the laws of physics allowed all the radiation to go to this one place. It sowed the sides. If we would like to do all this in accordance with the safety rules, we should go home at all during the exposure. Meanwhile, at best, we moved somewhere behind the wall, and there were situations when we could not get anywhere at all and we stood in

such a small room the whole time. Sometimes it was necessary to return the source to the gammamid, rearrange it, combine it when something jammed. And once, I remember, it jammed properly.

BEARD: We were then at the facility with the "Tourist". It was at the Americans in Krakow. We dragged the source from the container to the gammamid and suddenly something blocked. On this gammamid the indicator shows that the source did not go where it needed to be, and we do not know what is happening. The isotope was armed with metal and there was a rule that it could not be rolled in a smaller circle than a few centimeters, so that nothing would bend inside. y such doses would make us want to. Krakow itself, we didn't really have a place to go. Where? To the forest? And what next? So the plan to wind up the business was out of the question. We decided to bury this snake and check where this isotope is exactly, maybe something will unblock. This is how we flew in turns - one was moving, then the other, and so on ... At some point dosimeters, that is devices for counting the dose of radiation that we had with us, reached our maximum.

TOURIST: That night we received a dose two or three times more than people working with radiation in some factories can legally receive in a year. In a year! The radiometer made a noise like when the truck was reversing, I remember it well. But there really was no option but to fly and rummage there. We finally figured out what happened. This isotope got stuck not somewhere in the conduit, but at the entrance to our gammamid. This whole bunch of beads was longer than the hole and didn't fit. Whose mistake? Our boss. You know, let's not mention the name here anymore, because I don't want to talk. But one thing has to be said - we had bosses who knew what they were doing, and we had bosses who only came to search and had no idea about the job. At that time, this is exactly what we had in chief: without experience or knowledge. The man who was the boss when we came to the department with the "Bearded" thing is different. It was a professional. He came from this department, he knew the job, he does it himself! what we do.

BEARD: one only had a drawback - that his driver was poor. Wherever he went, he fucked something. But it was not just any character. He lived for this institutional job. And he wanted to modernize, he was open to new technologies. It's a pity he left the faculty. They offered him a promotion, he accepted - that's life.

TOURIST: And after him, there were just those who had no idea about our activities. They didn't go to action, they didn't feel it. Well, one day, one of them just came, and they made him head for some lama of merit in another department. He believed that when he was the boss, he would decide. He did not want to consult us, he chose some elements for our equipment himself and at some point he bought the wrong ones for our beads. With the obvious effect, 'so la failure, we call it that, was not the fault of the hardware itself, but a human error. The equipment was good, we worked well with it. Although my favorite is the device that the Russians got together some time after our arrival, the governor - the one who knew what he was doing. It was called ptacha. We had two of them - one with cobalt and the other with iridium. It was a suitcase that was brought onto the object, a cylinder with a collimator was pulled out of it, and hung up where necessary, and that's it. Of course, something for something, because it was quite light and thus provided less radiation protection than the "triangle", but it was still better than in the case of the damned berenica.

ENGINEER: You only had to be careful with the bird, because one side was a bottom lined with absorbent material, and the other - a poorly secured lid. When you carried it in your hands, of course, there had to be a bottom on the leg side.

TOURIST: The mobility of this device was actually nothing to beat.

BEARD: Oh, I will tell the story with the Norwegians. We were going to go to their embassy and there was a nice Trioving lock in the duty room, for which we wanted to make a key. The operational department recruited a Polish woman who was in this duty-room for cooperation. She did not have a key, only the Norwegians opened her, but we found that if this girl allowed me to go inside somehow, I would take a photo of this lock, because the key locks also sometimes "glowed", as we used to say. So it was agreed with her that I would come to visit as a cousin from the village.

I wanted to bring a bird, so I couldn't be a local - the idea was that no one would be surprised why I had so many bundles. Well, I put on a kapota, a vodka, you bought sausages for business and I flew to my supposed cousin. Bird sowed, so the films that I put in a separate bag, I had to cover with lead so that I did not get light on the way. I came there, of course I did not explain

anything to this girl, but I told myself to go somewhere for a while and then I hung the equipment and the film where necessary.

TOURIST: And the shit from that photo came out.

BEARD: Come on shit. It was just not the element that interested us that was visible.

TOURIST: But we finally managed this castle.

BEARD: Of course. You know, when you took such a photo, it was not a real-time preview. Sometimes a man had to take a few photos before it turned out as it should.

ENGINEER: It depended on a million factors: whether everything was set in the right position, exposed long enough, and even whether the film was as it should be. The Russians told me, for example, that they put all the money on Agfa-Geaverl plates. I even remember the exact model: D7. It was quite an expensive product, so I went to the warden and said it was great, let them be the best, but maybe we'll try some cheaper ones. The boss agreed, so I ordered various American ilfords and some Polish photons. For taking photos of the lock, the plates were placed in such a special cassette, and since there was a lot of space there, then when we made the safe, I simply put the agfa-geavert D7 in the front, and at the back there were other, cheaper ones. The results were different, a person analyzed everything and it turned out that it is worth using different clichés for different types of safe and isotopes of different activity, instead of pushing one type everywhere, in addition the most expensive.

PHOTOGRAPHER: And do you know that these clichés were still developed on the object more than once? It was a pity for us to waste the entrance to let go, go to the department, call it and come back another day. Since we got in, we cut off as much as possible. I had bottles with me, such plastic screw-top canisters, with a capacity of about two liters, maybe one and a half, ready-made solutions. In addition, three cuvettes the size of the film we were using - everything we needed. Sometimes you still took a dark green or very dark red light bulb, which we screwed in somewhere so that you could see something. We were preferably setting up in the bathroom. Firstly, because they often had no windows at all, or only some tiny and easy to cover, which was a guarantee of complete darkness. Secondly, when they had some terracotta there, we didn't bother so much about splashing something, even if it splashed, we rubbed it off. And you know, there were objects where the bathroom could not be done, and you had to do, for example, in the corridor, where the floor was carpeted. A disaster. Therefore, in our object set we always had such large sheets of tissue paper that could be set aside for the duration of the work. Anyway, when my colleagues finished exposing the film, the whole cassette landed at my place. I put the film into the developer, which was in one cuvette. In the second we had water, although sometimes we just used the sink or even the bathtub to rinse it all off nicely. Then another litter box with a fixative. After fixation, again rinsing, drying and the photo were sent to colleagues for analysis. Oh, sometimes it happened that the image on the film was denser, so low contrast, very dark and, consequently, not very readable. We had a way for that too. The X-ray film had emulsion on both sides, so they scraped off one side while it was still wet. Of course, it was done very carefully so that there were no scratches that would later be disturbing, but in any case it was possible. The finished photo went to the reader with the screen, because we had a small, A4 format, which we took with us to the object.

TOURIST: One has to remember, however, that even when we already got a picture that we called "good", it wasn't like we had a code like on a tray. We were really good at these blocks, and yet it took us some time to capture anything from such a photograph. After all, radiation was flying through the axis of the lock, the shields were one after the other, everything merged, various other elements of the lock were overlapping, and so on. Cosmos.

BEARD: It's a bit like an ultrasound. An ordinary person only sees some stains, and the doctor in the same picture knows exactly where which organ is. As a beginner, we didn't see much in these pictures of our castles, but with time you got trained and everything was clear. Besides, there was a fierce competition in our department: whoever first got to the correct code won.

TOURIST: The best friend was Czesio. After exposing the plate, he paced impatiently and hurried to develop the picture. And once it was triggered, the first lapal and rushed to highlight on the reader. And he really was amazing in it. In addition to the knowledge we acquired over time, he

also had some kind of genuine gift. He could see the shadows better than all of us, he could identify what was needed more quickly, and was usually the first to find the right code.

BEARD: Me and "Tourist" competed with him sometimes. We also did an analysis of photos, we wrote down our types and more than once managed to beat him. And he was an ambitious man and he experienced our victory every time. I must admit that I was satisfied when Czesia managed to stay in the starting blocks. But it was a very healthy competition that improved the department's performance. It's a pity Czesia, he was a good boy and a good friend.



TOURIST: The gamma-ray method, that is the one with the cliché, failed at all in some places. First of all, because of the plastic shields that have been used for some time now, which let the radiation through and are simply not visible in the photo. Besides, playing with the cliché method did not make sense when we could not find a reasonable place to place the isotope. Take, for example, a safe embedded in a thick wall, there is another room behind it, we do not have access to it, then another wall and only a room that we managed to get to. So it is the place closest to the back of the safe where we can position ourselves with our isotope in the collimator. If we send the beam from this room towards the safe, then after flying through all these walls the radiation may be too weak to take a picture of the lock of satisfactory quality during the few short hours available during the action. So someone might say that you just need to take the stronger isotope and you'll be in trouble. But what we had was ruining our health, so please imagine what would happen if we encountered increasingly thicker walls and took more and more powerful sources of radiation. It was not an option.

It was not the first time that Russian specialists came to help. Our predecessors, I am not sure how many years earlier, started using radiation to open locks at all because they learned it from the KGB. Should we have complexes for this? No, because the Russians weren't guiding us by the hand. Yes, they came to us from time to time, presented their new ideas and equipment, and often gave us something. But they didn't stay with us all the time. They gave us basic knowledge, and we supplemented it ourselves and even designed many devices for these isotope methods. These were often devices that the Russians had and could probably sell us, but we did not even ask them for it, because we wanted to become independent. We perfected the methods ourselves, we took care of the isotopes ourselves for a while, and we carried out most of the actions ourselves.

BEARD: Well, a moment has come that even if they wanted to go somewhere with us, it was written that there would be no entry at all, because "there are no operational possibilities". We gave them such a fairy tale, and we really entered alone.

TOURIST: But when there was actually a problem to be solved, we, or more precisely our management, always had a call to the Russians. They wanted to tell stories, and we were very eager to adopt their knowledge. Anyway, I remember this cooperation very well, as well as my contacts with the Americans after 1990, because our entire service had a close relationship with them at that time. But I cannot say what my job was after 1990 and why I was seeing Americans.

BEARD: For the Americans, nothing is a permanent enemy. There are interests. Need to eavesdrop on Angela Merkel? They will eavesdrop. After ninety, it didn't matter to them whether we picked something up or not. It was important that they could get something positive from working with us. I also have good memories of these contacts.

TOURIST: Well, let's go back to the People's Republic of Poland and our cooperation with the Russians. The problem with which we certainly needed the Russians' help was the opening of the bunker door at the American consulate in Krakow. We always dealt with Poznań on our own, but in Kraków the KGB had to help us determine the code. There were just extremely thick walls that suppressed the radiation. Once we had the combination, we went in by ourselves until it changed. It was only in the second half of the 1980s that we started to come up with something completely on our own in Krakow. The "Engineer" can tell you more about the absolutely first entry into the Krakow bunker, because I wasn't in the department at the time.

ENGINEER: Yes, because we are still talking about the seventies. A KGB officer came to us, the best specialist in these isotope methods in the entire Warsaw Pact. His name was Lonia, and when Russians came to Poland, be it in the seventies or eighties, it was always him, so each of us knows him well.

TOURIST: Only I am not sure if his real name was Lonia. he introduced himself and I also remember the name he used. But it might as well have been called quite differently.

BEARD: Lońka was a good player, professional. So you, television still preserves in us the stereotypical image of stupid Russians, and over thirty years ago I saw they have devices that could detect what someone is picking at an Atari from a considerable distance. Yes, it's true that some things produce clunky. But it everything works - just like our combine harvester. Americans, very wisely, disregard the Russians at all, even though they may seem like that at times.

HUNTER: Lonia had experience, no doubt. When I met him in the eighties, he was just over fifty years old. At the time, he seemed to be an old man.

BEARD: In my opinion, he was even over sixty then. Today he would be well over ninety, almost a hundred.

HUNTER: Nothing to live anymore. After all, how many doses of this radiation did he take!

BEARD: Who knows, a Siberian boy, maybe he's sitting there somewhere preserved! I liked him.

TOURIST: He had amazing knowledge, his age was also great, and even though he could sit and just give orders, he went to work everywhere - he carried, set, screwed, twisted.

ENGINEER: We liked him, although he was terribly serious. More than once the group celebrated, there was vodka, everyone sipped, and he sat in the back with his arms folded and watched, sometimes reaching for a glass of mineral water or some coffee. I remember once we were at the facility and stood in one of the offices: me, him and some of his younger assistant, whom he brought from his side. It was necessary to connect the power supply to one of the devices and the younger Russian took it and connected it wrongly. The device fired, the smoke went out, and I will never forget the face Lonia made when looking at this man of hers. Normally the boy's face drained the blood.

BEARD: One time we are in Krakow with Lońka and some of his people. Lońka says she wants to go to the fur shops. Well, we go to one, to the other, to the third, and we have literally visited ten of them. There is a night work ahead of us, and our legs are already falling off, because we have gone the whole city. As if that was not enough - Lońka the damned did not buy anything, he did not like anything. We went back to the hotel, so I went to lie down to gather some strength for the action. I did not even squint one eye in time, and I can already hear the knocking. I open - Lońka. It's literally half an hour until we go to work, and he says we're going to this and that shop to get a fur coat. He just saw what he would buy from us and sell it at a higher price, but he did not want to buy it in the presence of these other KGB officers!

ENGINEER: Well, when Lonia came then, sometime in the seventies, to solve the problem of Krakow, he brought two important things with him. The first was the terribly powerful cobalt isotope, even more powerful than the ones we used. The second was a special scintillation probe they made - a very precise device for measuring the amount of particles emitted by this isotope. It looked a bit different than the usual ones, namely a computer with a liquid crystal display. It weighed a lot, we had to carry it. It was on that day that I learned about the gammametric cipher reading method invented by the KGB, which was already briefly mentioned by "Tourist". In front of the lock, we placed a "bomb" in the collimator,

the beam passed through the place where this target clearance should appear in the shields, and landed in an apartment outside the consulate. There were colleagues standing with the probe, catching the beam. We turned the lock, and the others waited for the measurement on the probe to jump up.

TOURIST: But unfortunately the jump in the reading of the scintillation probe did not necessarily mean that we located a cut in one of the targets. Please remember that there are various elements in the castle that move, so the results obtained had yet to be analyzed. It all took quite a long time, because the reading did not jump so immediately, but with some delay. So we usually turned the knob by two divisions, that is, two numbers, followed by a pause, say: a hundred seconds. It took this long to find out whether the fluctuation in the reading was accidental.

Why did we turn by two divisions and more than one? Because this notch occupied a relatively large part of the perimeter of the shield, so our thin beam of radiation could pass through the hole at both settings 5 and 7. The element that had to fall into this slot for the lock to open was of course only slightly narrower than the slot, so the code had to be known exactly to one division, but when working with the probe it was enough to turn it by two divisions. When we saw the reading jump, it meant that there was probably the right number somewhere in the area. Thanks to this, we saved valuable time. All obtained results were recorded, graphs were made on mile-meter paper and finally a short list of typed combinations was created. The "Engineer" was fond of using this method with the Russians, but then, especially in the 1980s, we used it on our own - especially where the location of the lock or plastic discs did not allow taking a photo. In the latter case, it was best to use not cobalt, but iridium, which had a slightly lower penetration rate.

We did a lot in gamma on our own, we had a lot of our own devices, not from the KGB. We cut down on this method as best as possible, so we commissioned its analysis at the Lodz University of Technology. Of course, we didn't mention the combination locks, we said it was about testing damage in metal. At the AGH University of Science and Technology, we asked for the submission of various scintillation probes. In Polona, such a union dealing, inter alia, with the production of measuring devices, I personally ordered other probes, power supplies, counters - a very modern and very sensitive system. We couldn't say directly what was going on, so the engineers working there learned from us that we needed to examine heterogeneous material located behind a heterogeneous obstacle and that there were air spaces in different places of the tested object. For this there was also a receiver counting the data from the probe. It was the size of a large shoe box, very heavy, with different displays. Polon provided us with software on floppy disks, which we uploaded to this receiver using a computer.

It is true that the method with the film was with us all the time, because in many places it was more convenient for us to use it, but it was in gammametry that we developed most intensively. You know, I saw this method as an opportunity to improve our working conditions. I wanted to increase our capabilities not by purchasing more and more powerful isotopes, but by building more and more sensitive scintillation probes. Unfortunately, one of my bosses did not share this view at all facilities. The problem was the thick walls of the US consulate in Krakow, where we needed the help of the Russians. I thought about some supersondes that would pick up a beam from an isotope with reasonable activity, but my boss, a man with zero experience at these entrances, was putting pressure on him to just buy an awfully powerful isotope - one the Russians had. We did not have a container for it, so it was constructed for us, also in Polonia. In order to complete it, the team hired for this task had to master a new technology. The container was made of uranium, and it was a material whose processing required new methods, not implemented in this plant. It was also equipped with a mechanical control that allows to guide the isotope at the hole where the collimators were mounted for the duration of the exposure. A tripod was also designed, which made it possible to position the container in different planes. The whole set was terribly heavy so we only used it sporadically.



15
Warszawa, dnia 23 lipca 1981 r.

pozycje
TAJNE SPEC. ZNACZENIA

Egz. nr 1

I N F O R M A C J A

Wydział I Departamentu II MSW realizował w bieżącym roku działania specjalne w obiektach krypt. "ARETE" i "AJAS". Do 23 lipca br. zrealizowano łącznie w obydwu obiektach 32 przedsięwzięcia specjalne, w wyniku których uzyskano 3.120 str. dokumentów klasyfikowanych o wartości politycznej i operacyjnej. W zdecydowanej większości były to dokumenty tajne i poufne /około 2.300 str./. Większość tych przedsięwzięć przeprowadzono w obiekcie krypt. "ARETE" /25/.

W roku 1980 w obydwu obiektach zrealizowano 57 przedsięwzięć specjalnych uzyskując 5.180 str. dokumentów klasyfikowanych, w tym 3.520 str. dokumentów tajnych i poufnych. Większość działań zrealizowano w obiekcie krypt. "ARETE" /45/.

Spośród zdobytych dokumentów na szczególną uwagę zasługują:

- nowe bloczki szyfrowe do specjalnej łączności obydwu obiektów z Departamentem Stanu /na wypadek sytuacji nadzwyczajnej/;
- informacje dot. zainteresowań wywiadowczych USA, w tym również plan działań wywiadowczych rezydentury placówkowej związany z aktualną sytuacją wewnętrzną w Polsce;
- opracowania Departamentu Stanu i ambasady USA w Warszawie dot. celów i zadań polityki USA w Polsce;

Przez pierwsze siedem miesięcy 1981 roku grupa obiektowa Wydziału IX odwiedziła konsulat USA w Poznaniu ("Arete") oraz konsulat USA w Krakowie ("Ajas") ponad 30 razy. W roku poprzednim przeprowadzono łącznie prawie 60 takich akcji. Pismo sporządzono w Wydziale I Departamentu II zajmującym się zwalczaniem działalności amerykańskich służb specjalnych.

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During the first seven months of 1981, the Objective Group of Division IX visited the US consulate in Poznań ("Arete") and the US consulate in Krakow ("Ajas") more than 30 times. In the previous year, a total of almost 60 such actions were carried out. The letter was drawn up in the Department I, Department II dealing with the activity of US secret services.

Warsaw, July 1981

SECRET SPECIAL MEANINGS

Copy no

INFORMATION

This year, HSW implemented the 1st Department of the 2nd Department special actions in crypt facilities. "ARETE" and "AJAS". Down July 25 this year realized in total in both facilities 32 before special projects, as a result of which 3-120 pages of documents were obtained classified ments with political and operational value. IN the vast majority of them were secret and confidential / approx 2-300 pages /. Most of these projects were carried out in you crypt. "ARETE" / 25 /.

In 1980, 57 projects were carried out in both facilities special, obtaining 5,180 pages of classified documents, w including 3-520 pp. secret and confidential documents. Most of the activities a crypt was built in the building. "ARETE" / 45 / .


Among the documents obtained, the following deserve special attention:

- new code blocks for special communication of both objects with the Department of State / in the event of an emergency /,
- information on US intelligence interests, including site contour intelligence plan related to the current internal situation in Poland;
- studies of the Department of State and the US Embassy in Warsaw on goals and tasks of US policy in Poland;

- dziewięć kilkadziesiąt kompleksowych opracowań ambasady USA dot. sytuacji politycznej, gospodarczej i społecznej w Polsce oraz działalności wrogich grup opozycyjnych;
- opinie i wytyczne Departamentu Stanu dot. kierunków polityki amerykańskiej wobec Polski i innych krajów socjalistycznych;
- notatki z rozmów przeprowadzonych przez dyplomatów USA z obywatelami polskimi - w większości tzw. źródła chronione - dot. najważniejszych wydarzeń w sytuacji wewnętrznej i międzynarodowej.

W latach 1980/81 w przeciwieństwie do lat poprzednich przedsięwzięcia specjalne realizowano w szczególnie trudnych warunkach operacyjnych - prawie zawsze podczas obecności figurantów zamieszkujących w obiektach. Mimo tych trudności we wszystkich przypadkach zapewniono całkowitą konspirację działań. Na podkreślenie zasługuje również fakt, że przedstawione wyżej dokumenty zdobywano dosłownie na bieżąco, często następnego dnia po nadejściu poczty kurierskiej.

We wspomnianym okresie miało miejsce stałe doskonalenie przez przeciwnika zabezpieczenia technicznego obiektów. Napotykanie przeszkody jak i rutynowe zmiany kombinacje szyfrowe były szybko pokonywane w przeważającej części własnymi siłami /np. obiekt krypt. "ARETE".



Autor pisma zwraca uwagę na to, że działania prowadzono podczas obecności zamieszkujących placówkę Amerykanów. Ostatnie zdanie dokumentu odnosi się do ustalania szyfru w drzwiach bunkra w konsulacie USA w Poznaniu przy użyciu metody prętowej, bez pomocy KGB.

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The author of the magazine points out that the activities were carried out in the presence of the Americans living in the facility. The last sentence of the document refers to setting the code in the bunker door at the US consulate in Poznań using the bar method, without the help of the KGB.

- two hundred and several dozen comprehensive studies by the US embassy on the political, economic and social situation in Poland and activities of hostile opposition groups;
- opinions and guidelines of the Department of State regarding policy directions' American towards Poland and other socialist countries;
- notes from interviews conducted by US diplomats from Polish watels - mostly so-called protected sources - regarding the most important events in the internal and international situation dowa.

"1980/81 as opposed to previous years before special projects were carried out in particularly difficult conditions operational - almost always in the presence of searching in facilities. Despite these difficulties, in all in the case of cases, a total conspiracy of activities was ensured. On the underline the fact that the above-mentioned documents does not deserve either was literally biogenic, often the day after the advent of courier service.

Continuous improvement of the work took place during this period opponent of the technical protection of facilities. Encountered Obstacles as well as routine change of cipher combinations were fast overcome mostly by one's own strength / e.g. object crypt. "ARETE".

HUNTER: This isotope that we used with the Russians in Krakow was strong as hell. I remember exactly: there was a distance of seventeen meters from the radiation source to the probe in that apartment outside the consulate. And Lońka flew with this material on a regular cruise plane: Aeroflot from Moscow to Waisha. It had a container that looked like a suitcase, and it was practically hand luggage. It was flying and it was pounding. I am going there when he came out with this suitcase to us at the airport and put it next to him to say hello. Porters were walking around Okęcie, standing on their heads so that only the newcomers would let them carry their luggage. And I remember that one of these guys ran up, grabbed the suitcase and just stayed where it was, because it didn't even budge - the lacquer was heavy. Overall, it looked ordinary, but it had reinforced handles and weighed several dozen kilograms, because inside was a container with a "bomb".

ENGINEER: When I came to the department in the first half of the seventies, there was a story there that in Warsaw, in one of the institutes subordinate to NATO, there is a small cash register that has not yet been opened. And in fact, the roach turned out to be true. The problem was that there was a thick cassette filled with pellets next to the slide, which made it difficult to overexpose. Well, when Lońka came to us with this "bomb", I asked him if he would lend me this isotope for a while. He told me to take it if I wanted to. So, together with the chief, we went to this institute, I hung the isotope behind the cash register, and the film in front, stood in front of the lock and measured the situation with the radiometer. Then the warden, who was standing behind the safe, tells me to step back immediately, because my balls are pounding so much that I will definitely not have any children. So I went with this radiometer behind the collimator, I measure it and it turns out that it was there, on the side on which the commander was standing, the greatest radiation. Well, you see how powerful such a cash register was. But Lońka's "bomb" did not resist anyway, because I opened the lock without any problems then. The isotope was so strong that when the Russians landed with it at Okęcie, the alarm was probably raised in Sweden that there was a nuclear explosion in this part of Europe.

We also helped the Russians from time to time. One time they told us that they had trouble getting into the codes used by Mexicans in Moscow. A Kniga with the same codes was also in Wai Sawa, so they asked if we would be able to take pictures of her for them. We agreed. The preparations went smoothly, it was not a difficult facility, the English strongbox that stood there, we also opened it without any problems. However, a problem arose in the field, because this knig was so great that it did not fit on the combine in any way. We did not have the time or the conditions to copy it otherwise, so we announced that we would come up with something for the day and that we would arrive at the embassy the next night prepared. In the morning I went to the bookstore rally, bought old, low-format albums, returned to our department and with my friends we practiced 'moving such a large book over the combine in such a way that it would have fears and legs. This time it went like a petal.



BEARD: As we mentioned, the gamma-ray method required turning the lock. Nobody wanted to stand next to the isotope and turn the knobs, because that meant taking enormous doses. Therefore, on our order, a stepper motor with a set of gears and a remote control was created, which turned the lock by itself by a specific value, while we could stand at a certain distance. Unfortunately, not all locks worked with this miracle.

TOURIST: At the Swedes' door, there was no way to take advantage of it. They had a combination lock there, which required a key to be inserted before starting the combination, it was not yet such an ordinary lock where you rotated left and right. There you had to spin, press, perform various maneuvers, which our engine could not. In the case of the Spaniards, there was also one lock that you had to stand by when setting the code. So you see, on the one hand, the gamma-ray method gave us some hope of improving our situation, because we used a source with a lower penetration than the gamma-ray method, and on the other hand, there were times when it forced us to behave even more risky than the gamma-ray method.



Szwedzi najważniejsze pomieszczenie swojej placówki zabezpieczyli drzwiami skarbcowymi wyposażonymi w zamek szyfrowy, którego pokrętko blokował dodatkowo mechanizm uzależniony od znajdującego się poniżej zamka kluczowego. Szyfr ustalano przy pomocy metody gammametrycznej, natomiast blokadę zwalniano przy użyciu dorobionego klucza. W bunkrze poza tajnymi dokumentami znaleźć można było m.in. klucze do wszystkich pomieszczeń placówki oraz rezydencji dyplomatów. Dolna prawa fotografia przedstawia punkt szyfrowy ambasady.

The Swedes secured the most important room of their institution with a strongroom door equipped with a combination lock, the block knob of which depends on the key lock located below. The cipher was determined using the gammametric method, while the block was named using an additional key. In the bunker, apart from secret documents, one could find, among others keys to all premises of the facility and diplomats' residences. The lower right photo shows the embassy's code point.


BEARD: We had to make changes to this Swedish castle. First he shot one, then the other, then the tizets, and all over again - so as to catch the smallest possible doses.

TOURIST: A dozen or so meters away the radiation was caught by a probe set up by us in the kitchen of the ambassador's apartment, who went on vacation. It just suited us there.

ENGINEER: I won't say, it feels good to finally make it. I remember when we entered the bunker of the Americans in Krakow for the first time. That day was especially pleasant for me, because it was me who gave the correct code. When my colleagues were analyzing the readings from the probe, I wrote down my type on a piece of paper, different from the main list created by the group. I didn't want to fool around when I stepped out of line, so I kept quiet at first. Lońka and I stood in front of the castle and started checking if any of the combinations from the list were correct. The Lord must understand - it was an important moment. We had a very important room in front of us, the Russians were testing the new technology, and a lot of people were involved in it. I dictated the numbers to Loni on the list and he was shooting. We got to the last one, he tried and what? Box. So she tells me to say on the radio that it's over for the night and we roll up. Of course, he has an average face. To this I say, just a moment more, I take a note from my pocket and dictate my combination to him. He is spinning, I have the impression that time has stopped in a place, and suddenly I hear "bang". The lock is open. Sir, Lonia, the greatest stiff of the Warsaw Pact, jumped up and kissed me. I will never forget his expression for the rest of my life, he was so happy. Later, always, always, always, when he left for Poland, he emphasized that he wanted me to be present during the actions.

It was a great moment when we opened the bunker door for the first time. My colleagues and I were very excited, so carefully, but nevertheless quite energetically we entered inside. Our Soviet comrade was the only one who stopped at the threshold, as it was said. We look, and Lońka stands in the door, holds her index finger up, and in a rather calm voice says: "Wot szcziotczik!", "And here's the counter!". We looked at the doorframe and froze. There was a small device with a lever screwed there, counting the door openings. Inside there was a list that was signed by employees as they entered. Of course, there was a meter reading next to each name. What to do? The Americans were perfectly protected against any attempts to reverse the reading. The fen counter was embedded in the resin, only the lever protruded, which caused a change in the number when the door was moved. In a word - it was not demountable. As if that was not enough, the Americans thought well what to do to prevent someone from simply buying the same model, pouring resin over it and replacing it. Namely, inside this resin, there were visible ribbons of different colors, stripes, and paints that were released in this interest during the pouring process. It was done randomly, of course, something impossible to recreate. At the end, the Americans certainly photographed it very carefully and then from time to time they could compare the counter with the photos to check it. is not counterfeit. Idea - brilliant.





Do futryny drzwi bunkra w konsulacie USA w Krakowie Amerykanie przykręcili licznik otworzyć – widoczny w lewym górnym rogu (fot. u góry). Na tyle drzwi (po prawej) widoczna jest tabliczka z informacją, że producent gwarantuje 20 godzin odporności na próby ustalenia szyfru metodami radiologicznymi – podobnie jak w przypadku bunkra w Poznaniu. Zdjęcia poniżej przedstawiają wnętrze pomieszczenia. Najważniejsze dokumenty znajdowały się w kartotekowym sejfie, którego szuflady zabezpieczone były kolejnym zamkiem szyfrowym.

The Americans screwed an opening counter to the door frame of the bunker at the US consulate in Krakow – visible in the upper left corner (photo above). On the back of the door (on the right) there is a plate with the information that the manufacturer guarantees 20 hours of resistance to attempts to determine the code using radiological methods – similar to the bunker in Poznań. The photos below show the interior of the room. The most important documents were kept in a file safe, the drawers of which were secured with another combination lock.

We began to wonder what to do. Of course, such a meter could theoretically fly through the entire range and stop at the previous number, but there were so many numbers, this range was so large that an engine would be needed - a man would not be able to tap it in one night. In addition, there was a really good chance that the counter after so many hundreds of thousands of presses would simply break down, and even if not, some filings due to wear could be deposited inside. Then, if the Americans think that the counter is not pancake for sure, then after looking inside they will notice that something is wrong. On the first visit, we just left both the counter and the list with names alone - we had no other option. But making such a number did not mean that there would be an alarm and a scandal right away. If someone there noticed at all that something did not add up, and it was different in life, then he probably thought that he or a friend made a mistake and did not sign up or slammed the door twice, and therefore the indication of many cases is different the sheet. This is life itself and when employees see something like that, they often do nothing because they are afraid that they will have problems with their supervisor. The problem would be if such a situation collapsed.

BEARD: Before another solution was found, and it was found only some time later, after I went to Division IX, the problem of this list was solved by our colleague from the Department of Technology of the Ministry of the Interior. This man could forge any signature.

HUNTER: It was an innate talent. He didn't even tighten himself too much, he just looked for a second at the original signature and rewritten it identically on the next piece of paper. Awesome.

BEARD: Well, he used to come to the object with us, sat down at the desk, had fifty different pens with him and rewritten the last two pages of the list, making appropriate, how to put it nicely, modifications.

TOURIST: But of course it was only a temporary solution. First, on deeper analysis, someone might have noticed any irregularities. Second, these people signed with different pens. It was difficult to research so many different inks and determine if any of them were unique. What if someone had ink with some unusual properties and the entries were analyzed from time to time in this regard? Each facility took the protection of a cipher point very, very seriously, and there was a fear that they could protect themselves even in this way.

ENGINEER: Even then, at the first entrance, the counter was unscrewed from the frame, carefully examined and photographed. I personally measured it, made accurate drawings. However, I graduated from this polytechnic, I know a bit about drawing, and I even reproduced all the colorful stripes inside. However, I must admit that neither of us thought at the time that it could be faked. Apparently, nothing was impossible for us, we did miracles, but for a long time it seemed to us that this was the limit. I repeat once again - we are talking about some stripes and dyes that were randomly dropped into the resin! But we, like us, got down to business. A colleague was appointed to work on attempts to counterfeit this counter, who from now on dealt only with this.

TOURIST: The same meters were bought abroad, it was not a big problem. Only now how to pour it and get exactly the same patterns inside? Our friend Zbyszek was sitting in a separate room and was fighting. In the end he succeeded, he did it in a water vacuum pump.

BEARD: He mapped all those threads and until it froze, he kept the whole thing in this pump so that it wouldn't shift and that the air bubbles wouldn't get stuck there. And it worked. What was created was a work of art. Really, there's no other word for it.

ENGINEER: During these works, and they lasted a very long time, such a general came to us, and maybe at that time also a colonel, Stanisław Groniecki, from the counterintelligence management. I remember today: he said that he would sooner grow a cactus on his hand than anyone would manage to forge such a counter. When he was ready, I remember that we approached him and asked him to show his hand. We were much lower in rank than him, but there was no problem with a joke like that - he was happy to make it too.

TOURIST: Anyway, we made more than one such counter. We had at least two in use that I remember. It was a comfortable situation, because there was a slack in case there was a mistake on the object.

BEARD: The point was that when we entered the bunker, our meter reading was of course much lower each time. Let's say that if we were away for two weeks, the Americans had already opened and closed this door many times during this time. One of us was always tasked with sitting down and turning our counter to a number one lower than what the counter above the door was showing. Sometimes you had to touch this lever a bit! It didn't happen, but theoretically, if that person stared and flew through the right number, we always had one more counter in stock. Just as if we closed the door and then for some reason wanted to open it again the same night, the Lego spare meter could also be used.



The American counter or one of its copies made in Division IX's room. The photo clearly shows smudges of paint and threads embedded in the resin.

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TOURIST: The rule was that we tried to keep the original as short as possible. If we had a situation where we were entering and our counterfeit was hanging on the doorframe, and we had the original and our second counterfeit in our hand, then of course we replaced the counter with the original one. They were identical, but still better safe than sorry. And it lasted for years.



Department IX also made a perfect copy of the counter installed in one of the safes at the Spanish embassy.

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BEARD: You can't throw yourself at a wardrobe just like that, even if you know the code. Here we are dealing with a simple rule: do not go crazy. Before starting the work, the first thing to check was which number the knob was on. If it was 21, after finishing work it had to go back to 21. Besides, you always had to move a little left and right. If the resistance was to the left, the competitor was turning left one last time. If it is on the right, it means it was clockwise the last time. It had to be like that when we left.

ENGINEER: After opening the safe, we carefully examined the interior before we even picked up anything. After closing the cash register, we had to leave everything exactly in the same place - every page, every pen, every bottle that the encryptor pressed for a rainy hour.

TOURIST: Here we also took Polaroid photos, which later helped us a lot. When everything was photographed, we reached for documents. An officer from the operations department was always with us, and he was the one who told us which materials were interesting and were to be photographed on the combine, and which we did not move. If the documents were neatly placed in binders, then the operations officer present at the facility with us could pull them out himself. Each of them had experience, they did not do it in a hurry, they calmly pulled out one document after another, nothing got mixed up. The problem arose, however, if we were dealing, for example, with a pile of pages. In this case, we advised our colleagues from the operational department not to touch her and we did the job ourselves. We took out the case, the friend looked, decided if he wanted a copy of it, and then we continued our activities alone. The number of pages copied on our combine often went into thousands. For one cassette, we could wind five hundred frames, and when entering the facility, we sometimes used even several such cassettes!

ENGINEER: And it happened that if we had a job outside the city, we had not yet managed to get to the hotel after the lobbies, and one car has already been packed to Warsaw with films. Sometimes they were even sent by plane.

TOURIST: There were situations in which the ambassador of a foreign country was just getting acquainted with some documents addressed to him, and the analytical department of our service had a thorough analysis ready for them a long time ago. It all happened at an amazing pace. In institutions, we often opened incoming diplomatic mail that has not been inspected at the airport, as well as mail leaving the facility before being packed for shipping. We had information from the operational departments about the diplomatic mail traffic and if we got a signal that the bags had arrived, members of the airport group would go with us to the action and either they entered the facility, or they were in a hurry, especially if they needed some smelly chemicals to open.

POSTMAN: People who work at the airport every day, like me, also went to open shaft blocks in squares. Imagine a notebook with pages stuck together at the sides, such as torn off. We had to unstick the whole block without leaving any visible traces, so we just cut this layer of glue with precision - so that the pages did not change their dimensions.



The main safe inside the Swedish embassy bunker. The combination lock knob, similarly to the bunker door, blocked the mechanism that was released with the use of a key. The key could be made in the department headquarters, while the officers established the code using the gammametric method.

HUNTER: There was a special device for Lego. The block was put into a press that sheared and ant, doslots not one tenth of a millimeter.

POSTMAN: And then we covered three or four spines of this block with glue, imported from abroad, of course, identical to the original. Honestly speaking - this kind of super-security with glue was not an obstacle for me.

HUNTER: Speaking of those years, one must also remember that we already met computers, with floppy disks. First they were five inches, then three inches. It's like a new technology, but the floppy disks were the least of our problems. We had such a device with two pockets, one had a floppy disk to be copied, the other had a clean one, you pressed a button. there was such a "bzzzyt, bzzzyl, bzzzyt" and the matter was settled. After that, you just had to be careful not to leave them our floppy disk in a hurry and take their original one.

TOURIST: Since now. we are with electronics: during the campaign we often did one more thing. The key element of the encryption machine was a printed circuit board with electronic components. We took x-rays of these plates and then passed them to the "A" office, that is, the cipher office. The decryption department used this to work on making a copy of such a machine.



Encryption machine in a Samsonite suitcase photographed on the premises of the Venezuelan embassy in Warsaw.

((PAGE 225))

1987-11-24
WARSZAWA, dnia 1987 r.

T A J N E
SPEC. ZNACZENIA

L. dr. 003

Wielki i Prokuratura
25.11.87
INFORMACJA

dotyczy: działań specjalnych wobec ambasady Hiszpanii w Warszawie

Kontynuowane w ostatnich latach liczne działania operacyjno-techniczne wobec ambasady Hiszpanii w Warszawie doprowadziły do opanowania łączności szyfrowej, pozwalającej na pełną kontrolę całej bieżącej tajnej korespondencji, wysyłanej i otrzymywanej przez tę placówkę.

Zapewniono jednocześnie dopływ najbardziej tajnych i często wyprzedzających informacji o planach NATO, a także ocenach państw Paktu odnośnie naszej sytuacji społeczno-politycznej i gospodarczej.

W związku z zaostrzeniem reżimu bezpieczeństwa i wprowadzonymi przez przeciwnika zmianami w technicznym zabezpieczeniu placówki koniecznym było w ostatnich kilku miesiącach podjęcie złożonych działań w celu utrzymania i rozszerzenia posiadanych pozycji operacyjnych. Zmiany te polegały na:

- dodatkowym zabezpieczeniu strefy specjalnej placówki i pomieszczeń szyfranta/system zamków elektromagnetycznych/;
- wprowadzeniu nowych specjalnie opracowanych dla potrzeb hiszpańskiej służby zagranicznej kas pancernych typu "Soler";
- zabezpieczeniu kas szyfranta przez nieznane nam dotychczas zamki/szyfrowy i zapadkowy/, a także licznik otwarć.

W toku czterech kolejnych przedsięwzięć operacyjno-technicznych, po pokonaniu dodatkowych zabezpieczeń strefy specjalnej placówki i uzyskaniu wejścia do pomieszczeń szyfranta, technicznie opracowano metodę otwarć kasy "Soler"/zamki szyfrowy i zapadkowy/. Rozpracowany został system zapewniający przyszłe

W ramach współpracy z Biurem „A” funkcjonariusze Wydziału IX badali każde nowe urządzenie, które pojawiło się w placówce – w tym przypadku przystawkę do telefonu ambasadora Hiszpanii. Błoczki szyfrowe i informacje o nadchodzących zmianach w systemach łączności uzyskiwano z wyprzedzeniem.


((PAGE 226))

As part of the cooperation with the "A" Office, Division IX officers examined each new device that appeared in the facility - in this case the telephone set of the Spanish ambassador. Cipher blocks and information about upcoming changes in communication systems were obtained in advance.

konspiracyjne otwieranie kasy szyfranta, pomimo zainstalowanego w niej licznika otwarcia/przygotowany został jego duplikat/. Stwierdzono, że placówka przygotowuje się do zmiany w technice szyfrowania depesz, planując wprowadzenie urządzeń nowej generacji. Ponadto zdobyto bloki szyfrowe, które będą wprowadzone do eksploatacji przez placówkę w 1988 roku. Umożliwi to nam pełną kontrolę działalności ambasady.

Równolegle rozpracowano wprowadzone w lipcu br. -specjalnie dla ambasadora - urządzenie służące do kodowania rozmów telefonicznych o charakterze tajnym. Jest to specjalny aparat z przystawką "Gretacoder-103" /firmy szwajcarsko - zachodnioniemieckiej "Gretag"/. Uzyskano instrukcję jego obsługi, wykaz stosowanych kluczy szyfrowych oraz spis abonentów. Rozpoznano sposób przygotowania urządzenia do pracy i metodę wprowadzania kluczy szyfrowych.

Ogół przedsięwzięć przeprowadzono bez zakłóceń. Nie stwierdzono oznak dekonspiracji.



Oprac. RS
JS/87

Warszawa, dnia 1986.12.19

T A J N E spec. znaczenia

Egz. pojedynczy

NOTATKA

ze wstępnego opracowania urządzeń szyfrowych uzyskanych w wyniku
akcji specjalnej Departamentu II MSW na obiekcie "METYS" w dniu
1986.12.17.

W wyniku akcji specjalnej w dniu 1986.12.12
uzyskano instrukcję obsługi oraz zestawy kluczy szyfrowych do
urządzeń Gretacoder 505 i Hagelin 550. Po przeanalizowaniu tych
materiałów stwierdzono, iż:

1. Szyfrator Gretacoder posiada następujące zabezpieczenia przed
ingerencją z zewnątrz:
 - hermentyczna obudowa,
 - zamek urządzenia typu KESO otwierany przy pomocy kluczyka
i śruby, przekręcanych w odpowiedniej kolejności,
 - układy elektroniczne wykrywające + zanik zasilania zewnętrzne-
go i kasujące dzienny klucz szyfranta zapisany w pamięci RAM.
2. Szyfrator Hagelin 550 posiada identyczne zabezpieczenia jak
znane egzemplarze. Z analizy korespondencji wynika, że szyfrator
ten nie jest używany i jest urządzeniem rezerwowym.
3. Moduły elektroniczne zawierające klucze szyfrujące nie posiadają
własnych zabezpieczeń i są chronione w szafie pancerniej.
4. Urządzenia powyższe po odłączeniu i przewiezieniu będą stanowiły
wartościowy materiał do odtworzenia konstrukcji i prac dekrypta-
zowych.
5. Zabezpieczenia urządzeń umożliwiają powrót do stanu pierwotnego
bez natychmiastowej dekonspiracji.

W trakcie akcji specjalnej w dniu 1986.12.17
wykonano następujące czynności:

13

Niektóre maszyny szyfrujące przewożono nocą do pomieszczeń Wydziału IX,
gdzie można było przeanalizować ich konstrukcję, wykonać zdjęcia rentgenow-
skie i skopiować dane. Tu funkcjonariusze pochylają się nad maszyną wyniesio-
ną z ambasady Argentyny w Warszawie.

((PAGE 228))

Some encryption machines were transported to Department IX rooms at night, where their construction could be analyzed, X-rays were taken and the data copied. Here, the officers bend over the machine taken from the Argentine embassy in Warsaw.

1. Odłączono szyfratory z sieci, wyjęto z obudowy płytę Hagelina 550, wyjęto z kasy moduły elektorniczne zawierające klucze szyfrowe, dla kierunku polskiego i dookólny oraz przewieziono powyższe urządzenia do Wydziału IX Dep.II MSW.
2. Wykonano dokumentację urządzeń przed demontażem, zdemontowano obudowy i wykonano dokumentację fotograficzną całych zespołów.
3. Rozmontowano urządzenia do poszczególnych podzespołów elektronicznych - płytek drukowanych.
4. Wykonano dokumentację fotograficzną i rentgenowską płytek drukowanych oraz umieszczonych na nich elementów elektronicznych.
5. Wyjęto umieszczone na podstawkach trzy pamięci typu PROM urządzenia Gretakoder 505 i skopiowano do dalszej analizy ich zawartość /algorytm szyfratora/. Skopiowano bez wylutowywania pamięci typu PROM kluczy elektronicznych /szt. 2/. Pamięci typu PROM /szt.4/ szyfratora Hagelin 550 były wlutowane do obwodu drukowanego. Zrezygnowano z kopiowania ich ze względu na to, iż posiadamy już kopie ich zawartości z innego egzemplarza tego szyfratora, pakiet elektroniczny posiada własne zasilanie z akumulatora /wbudowanego/, obciążenie kopiarki pamięci PROM wszystkimi elementami pakietu elektronicznego mogłoby spowodować uszkodzenie jej zasilacza.
6. Po zakończeniu powyższych prac zamontowano urządzenia i sprawdzono ich zachowanie po włączeniu do sieci. Stwierdzono, iż urządzenie Gretakoder 505 po włączeniu chwilę oczekuje na wczytanie hasła identyfikacyjnego, a następnie samodzielnie wczytuje go z wmontowanego modułu z kluczami i przechodzi w stan czuwania - zapalona lampka PLEIN. Stan ten nie sygnalizuje, że dokonywane było rozłączenie urządzenia i jego demontaż.
7. Urządzenia przewieziono ponownie do obiektu i zainstalowano zgodnie ze stanem pierwotnym. Stwierdzono, że urządzenie Gretakoder 505 po podłączeniu nie włącza co 16 minut silnika dalekopisu, co obserwowano przed rozłączeniem.

- 3 -

8. Operacji legendujących zmianę zachowania szyfratora nie wykonywano. Szyfrator jest podłączony bezpośrednio do sieci, bez zewnętrznego zasilania rezerwowego. Po zwykłym zaniku napięcia w sieci występującym czasami bez naszej ingerencji, urządzenie także zmieniłoby swoje zachowanie.

NACZELNIK WYDZIAŁU IX, DEP. II MSW

MJR/MGR J. T. [REDACTED]

Wyk. 1 egz.
Oprac. kpt.R.O. [REDACTED]
Druk. MD.

SPEC. MEANINGS

c of the Spanish Embassy in Warsaw

MINISTRY

HOME AFFAIRS

atan ecial vn

. r,

Numerous operations of the opera

political and technical aspects of the basade of Spain in Warsaw led

to master encryption connectivity, allowing for full control of the whole
bleaching secret bark ondencjl. sent and received by this plan
tip.

At the same time, the inflow of the most secret was ensured
and often advance information on NATO plans, such as assessments
states of the Pact regarding our socio-political and economic situation
Due to the tightening of the security regime

and changes introduced by the opponent in the technical security

It was necessary to undertake the task of establishing the facility in the last few months
complex activities to maintain and expand held positions
operational. These changes consisted of:

additional protection of the special facility area

and the code room / electromagnetic lock system /;

introducing new ones specially developed for the needs

of the Spanish foreign service of "Solcr" type strongboxes;

securing the encryptor's cash registers by hitherto unknown to us
locks / combination and ratchet / and a counter of openings.

In the course of four further operational and

teclinal. after overcoming the additional safeguards of the special zone

a general facility and obtaining access to the code-code's rooms,

the method of opening the cash register ** Soler "/ combination zainkl was developed technically
and ratchet /. A system to ensure future has been developed

Within the framework of cooperation with the "A" Office, the officers of the IX Division examined
each one

a new device that appeared in the facility - in this case, an attachment

to the phone of the Spanish ambassador. Cipher blocks and information about the coming-
changes to communication systems were obtained in advance.

2

conspiratorial opening of the crypto's cash register, despite the fact that it is installed in it
counter openings / his duplicate has been prepared /. Found these outpost

He is preparing for a change in the technique of encrypting messages, planning to introduce
new generation devices. In addition, the cipher blocks that will be acquired

put into operation by the facility in 1988. This will enable us

Full control of the activities of the embassy.

At the same time, the works introduced in July this year were investigated. -specially

for the ambassador - a device for coding telephone conversations o

secret character. It is a special camera with "Gretacoder-103" attachment

/ the Swiss - West German company "Gretag" /. His instruction was obtained

service, list of used cipher keys and list of subscribers. Recognized

the method of preparing the device for work and the method of entering the keys

■ digital.

All activities were carried out smoothly. I did not find

. "" About dekoosplracjl.

I'll tire, RS

JS / 87

Warsaw, 12/12/1919

SECRET spec, meanings

Single exam

NOTE

from the preliminary development of cipher devices obtained as a result of special action of the Ministry of Interior and Administration II at the "METYS" facility on 1986,12,17.

As a result of the special action on 1986 ^ 12.12 the user manual and sets of combination keys for devices Grotacoder 505 and Hagelln 550. After analyzing these Bateriałów, it was found that:

1. The Oretacoder has the following security measures interference from outside:

- airtight housing,
- KESO type device lock opened with a key
- 1 bolt, turned in the correct order
- electronic circuits, detecting + power failure- external- go 1 deleting the daily encryption key saved in RAM.

2. The Hagelln 550 encoder has the same security as known copies. Correspondence analysis shows that the encryptor this one is not used and is a backup device.

3. Electronic modules containing keys: they do not have encryption own security 1 are protected in the armored cabinet.

U. The above devices, after disconnecting and transporting, will constitute valuable material for the reconstruction of the construction of 1 decrypt's works new.

5. Device protection enables a return to primary atane without immediate exposure.

During the special action on 12/12/17 the following steps were taken:

13

Some encryption machines were transported to the premises of Department IX at night, where it was possible to analyze their construction, take X-rays skie and copy the data. Here, the officers bend over the machine elevated from the Argentine Embassy in Warsaw.

2

5

1 «The encryption devices have been disconnected from the network * the Hagelin 550 CD is removed from the case

electronic modules containing encryption keys were removed from the cash register, 'H.a in the Polish direction and omnidirectional and the above was transported devices for the DC Department, Department II of the Ministry of the Interior.

2. Documentation of the devices was made before disassembly, and disassembled housing and photographic documentation of the entire assemblies was made.

3 »Disassembled devices for individual electro- other - printed circuit boards.

4. Photographic and X-ray documentation of the printing plates was made important and placed on them electronic components.

5. The PROM memory trims placed on the sockets of the of Gretakoder 505 and copied for further analysis of their content value / encryption algorithm /. Copied without desoldering pa-

PRCM buckle of electronic keys / pcs. 2 /. Type memories The PROM / 4 / Hagelin 550 encoder were soldered to the circuit printed. They were not copied due to the fact that

We already have copies of their contents from another copy of this encryptor, the electronic package has its own power supply from latorka / built-in /, PRCM memory copier load all components of the electronic package could cause damage Its power supply.

6. After completing the above-mentioned works, the devices were installed and no their behavior after connecting to the network. It was found that the Gretakoder 505 turns on and waits for loading password, and then loads it by itself

1 goes into standby mode from the installed key module

PLEIN lamp is on. This state does not indicate that it was being done

was the disconnection of the device 1 Its disassembly.

7. The equipment was taken back to building 1 and installed in accordance with the original state. It was found that the Greta devices After connecting the 505 encoder, it does not turn on the long-distance motor every 16 minutes. writing, which was observed prior to disconnection.

14

3

8. Operations that legalize the change of behavior, the encryptor is not performed important. Encryption device It is connected directly to the network, without any external external backup power supply. After an ordinary power failure in aieci occurring sometimes without our intervention, device would also change its behavior.

Lec, 1 copy

Back up, Capt.

Printing. KD.

D

15

CHAPTER 8

MYSTERY HUNTERS

CHAPTER 8

GENERAL ANDRZEJ KARKOWSKI: Are you interested in the case of Hungarians who have entered one of the embassies at home and have not left? It's not a rumor. We had good contact with Hungary, good cooperation, a high level of mutual trust and they sent us this information. I have no doubt that they had the consent of the Russians, but the fact remains - the information came. And it also shows that the matter was taken seriously. Sir, you must be aware that you are writing about activities that are absolutely unique on a global scale. It was insane, but insane that provided us with materials worth its weight in gold. There was a demand, my colleagues from Department IX did not lack fantasies, and that was the point. And more than once we have known that in Krakow, when we enter the building, not only the Americans who live there permanently, but also, so-called swallows, are sitting on the so-called `` swallow '' by soldiers who happened to travel around the country. They might have had guns, and we didn't know what they would do if they caught us. In addition, we knew about the case with Hungary. Everything had to be buttoned up to the last button. This is something. which is actually difficult to describe. I know what it feels like, my colleagues know. But you have to experience it to feel it. You have to enter such a place and walk up the creaking stairs on all fours, knowing that the host is a few inches away from you. In my department, maybe three people knew about it. It disappeared and that's it, none of the other colleagues in the department knew where we went. And we've kept it a secret for so many years.

(FOOTNOTE: In the 1980s, deputy head and then head of Division I, Department II - a counterintelligence unit dealing with fighting the activities of American secret services. On behalf of his department, he accompanied the officers of Division IX at the entrances to US consulates in Kraków and Poznań. he was, inter alia, the head of the State Protection Office.)

GENERAL KARKOWSKI: Despite all the stress associated with such an entrance, I have never had nightmares at night. And I will tell you that now, years later, I have a dream about these activities once a year. And although in reality such a situation has never happened, it is always the same in a dream - we fall into the hands of the Americans.

PHOTOGRAPHER: Did you know that this department was called the "Executioner Department"? We went out for action and you never knew if we would be back. If we hadn't come back - probably no one would have found out what happened to us. Even the family.

HUNTER: The deputy chief of counterintelligence, Colonel Feliks Solarzski, always signed reports on our actions with his lucky pencil. On the one hand, he knew that we manage to do what we do because of skill, not because of luck. On the other hand, these activities were so risky that even when the pencil was as short as a matchstick at the end of the 1980s, the boss was still waiting for our return at

night with him in his hand. Just in case.

BEARD: What was the plan in case of a mishap? There was no specific one, because it depended on the circumstances, on a specific institution. But there was only one guideline: not to get caught. If I had come face to face with a man in the facility, I would have hit him, for sure. Nothing personal, but nothing else would be possible. All equipment under the armpit and legs.

HUNTER: I think by the way, I would make a mess on the object and roll up a few things to make it look like a regular break-in. It would be donated to charity.

BEARD: We never took a single cent or a single thing from any facility in our lives. And sometimes it was hard to believe what we saw. Remember one time when we opened a cash desk at the Swedes and there were three shelves full of dollars inside? Can you imagine how much money it was at that time? And it never occurred to you to even touch it with a finger.


TOURIST: Sometimes they had gold, lots of gasoline vouchers. Private things also happened. Oh, a bottle for example.

POSTER: One time we came to the Swedes before some holiday. In the corridor there were such huge gift baskets, among them were the most beautiful oranges and bananas I have ever seen. I remember that at the same time there were empty shelves. We looked at it, we looked at it, but neither of us even touched it. And yet no one in life would have realized if we had taken one banana at a time.

BEARD: It's sad, but I will never forget the smell of this particular embassy. We had deep socialism, we washed ourselves with some kind of soap or some other gray rubbish, and there you would go in and feel those Western cleaning products. The order was perfect, the floors were lit and smelled like a lemon, there was a soap in the bathroom, white soap.

HUNTER: Surely some of these things might disappear and no one would notice. Honestly, even if you took something valuable and they drank, it would rather be one of the employees of the facility. Only we were from counterintelligence and we were copying documents, we were not thieves. It may sound haughty, but there really was such a deeply ingrained honesty in our group. Only such people were fit for the job.

BRODACZ: We were there to take away their "hemliga", as the Swedes called it. So secret materials.



Sejf i szafka w bunkrze konsulatu USA w Poznaniu, w których Amerykanie przechowywali najważniejsze dokumenty placówki. W tym pierwszym regularnie pojawiały się m.in. tajne materiały CIA. Jako że sejf nie był do niczego przymocowany, można było odchylić go od ściany, umieścić z tyłu izotop, uzyskać zdjęcie zamka i dzięki temu ustalić szyfr.

A safe and a locker in the bunker of the US consulate in Poznań, where the Americans kept the most important documents of the facility. The first one regularly featured, among others secret CIA material. As the safe was not attached to anything, it was possible to tilt it away from the wall, put an isotope on the back, get the lock removed and thus determine the code.

GENERAL KARKOWSKI: It all **worked** together nicely. My colleagues from Department IX dealt with technical problems, while I was examining the contents of the cabinets. So: yes - I know what was in them. Hardly any counterintelligence can boast of having in hand a plan of intelligence needs of foreign services in their country, and we had it. Great thing, isn't it? As for the CIA, the full list of agent sources would have to be found in the embassy in Warsaw, where entry was impossible due to the number of people there, but in American consulates in other cities we found traces of the presence of bidders, i.e. people who came to Americans with an offer to become their agents. And believe me, such matters continued. What Americans did must be treated with great respect, because they did it very skillfully - both those who were intelligence officers and those outside of it. Thanks to the wide cognac among Poles, they had a very, very deep review of opinions. Many apparently ordinary conversations were carried out according to the intelligence question mark, i.e. they conducted de facto penetration activities in white gloves. They were trained people, they knew how to talk to Poles in order to obtain the maximum amount of information that was of equal interest to the management of our state.

Some materials with the annotation "protect source" were very interesting. This meant that the interlocutor was not an agent source in the classic sense of the word, but an ordinary chatter with whom it was worth maintaining a close relationship. Unfortunately, many Poles, on various social occasions, did not hesitate to talk. I am convinced these people would not want this to come out to the public right now. We knew what the Americans had learned from them, and we also knew what they thought about it. From all this, analyzes were prepared for us, for the intelligence, for the state leadership. Thanks to us, the management knew the assessments, forecasts, and even plans of Americans and other countries towards Poland, because these documents concerned not only the policy of the United States.

How can we be sure that we were not dealing with disinformation, false material deliberately presented to us by the Americans? Hence, the scope of this information obtained by us was very large. Disinformation can be carried out in one narrow channel, but not so wide, and for so many years. The messages from these documents were confirmed, we had everything on the tray. Can you imagine how valuable this knowledge was? How the government used it is hard for me to say. The fact remains that thanks to us, he had priceless information that, when combined, led to very important conclusions. How often does it happen that politicians know so much about another country's plans for their country?

TAJNE SPEC.ZNACZENIA

W Y K A Z

dokumentów specjalnych przekazanych z Wydziału VIII Dep.II
do Wydziału I Dep.II MSW w okresie I kwartału 1980 roku

I. Wykaz z "Arete" 21.12.1979r.

1. Tajny dokument CIA z 01.10.1979r. omawiający zasady zbierania informacji przez rezydenturę pracowników ambasady USA w Warszawie, które służą do opracowywania wywiadowczych prognoz sytuacji polityczno-społecznej i gospodarczej Polski. - 6 stron
2. Tajny dokument CIA z 13.11.1979r. zawierający wykaz większych zakładów przemysłowych w Polsce, przesłany w celu interesowania się nimi przez rezydenturę wywiadu amerykańskiego w ambasadzie USA w Warszawie. - 8 stron
3. Poufna informacja ambasady USA w Warszawie do Dep. Stanu z 4.12.1979r. dot. polskich planów zorganizowania pożyczki konsorcyjnej przy udziale banków amerykańskich. - 3 strony
4. Poufna informacja ambasady USA w Warszawie do Dep. Stanu z 13.11.1979r. dotycząca importu ropy naftowej przez Polskę. - 3 strony
5. Poufna informacja amb. USA w Warszawie do Dep. Stanu z 7.02.1979r. dot. polsko-zachodnioniemieckich wizyt na wysokim szczeblu w związku z sytuacją ekonomiczną PRL. - 1 strona
6. Poufna inf. amb. USA w Warszawie do Dep. Stanu z 26.10.1979r. dot. nowych koncepcji rozwiązania trudności ekonomicznej Polski /na podstawie rozmowy z doradcą I Sekretarza, KC, P. Bożykiem/. - 8 stron

Fragment wykazu dokumentów zdobytych w konsulacie USA w Poznaniu, w nocy z 21 na 22 grudnia 1979 roku. Wspomniany w nagłówku Wydział VIII Departamentu II to komórka analityczna, pośrednik między zdobywającym materiały Wydziałem IX a odbiorcą, czyli Wydziałem I.

FO-1690

Warszawa, dnia 6 lutego 1982 r.

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TAJNE SPEC. ZNACZENIAW Y K A Z

dokumentów uzyskanych w wyniku realizacji przedsięwzięć
specjalnych w obiekcie krypt. "ARETE" w dn. 5-6. 02. 1982r.

- | | | | |
|---------------|-----|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| Proua
82-1 | 1. | Poufna informacja delegacji USA przy NATO z 3. 02. 82r. dot. poszerzonego posiedzenia Rady NATO w sprawie Polski w dniu 3. bm. | - str. 15 |
| ● | 2. | Poufna inf. delegacji USA przy NATO z 2. 02. 82r. dot. kompendium sankcji państw NATO wobec Polski i ZSRR. | - str. 20 |
| ATona
82-1 | 3. | Tajna inf. Dep. Stanu z 29. 01. 82r. dot. stanowiska USA na posiedzenie Rady NATO w dniu 3. 02. br. | - str. 12 |
| Game
81-29 | 4. | Tajna inf. ambasady USA w Bonn z 1. 02. 82r. dot. przygotowań RFN do Rady NATO w dniu 3. 02. br. | - str. 2 |
| ● | 5. | Tajna inf. amb. USA w Bonn z 29. 01. 82 r. dot. przygotowań RFN do Rady NATO w dniu 3. 02. br. | - str. 3 |
| SIGN
8-10 | 6. | Tajna inform. amb. USA w Rzymie z 1. 02. 82r. dot. przygotowań Włoch do Rady NATO w dn. 3. 02. br. | - str. 1 |
| ● | 7. | Poufna inform. ambasady USA w Rzymie z 29. 01. 82r. dot. przygotowań Włoch do Rady NATO w dn. 3. 02. 82r. | - str. 2 |
| DELOS
84-1 | 8. | Tajna informacja amb. USA w Lizbonie z 3. 01. 82r. dot. przygotowań Portugalii do Rady NATO w dn. 3. 02. br. | - str. 2 |
| DELFA
81-2 | 9. | Tajna inf. amb. USA w Ankarze z 29. 01. 82r. dot. przygotowań Turcji do Rady NATO w dn. 3. 02. 82r. | - str. 1 |
| | 10. | Tajna inf. amb. USA w Luksemburgu z 1. 02. 82r. dot. przygotowań Luksemburga do Rady NATO w dn. 3. 02. 82r. | - str. 2 |

Fragment wykazu dokumentów zdobytych w konsulacie USA w Poznaniu w lutym 1982 roku.

TOURIST: Some may find it hard to believe, but we really didn't know what exactly we were getting from the safes in all these facilities. General Kapkowski knew we did not. Our role was to break the security, make a copy and that's it. We delegated everything to the operational departments and the analytical department - and they made use of it. If we wanted to read it all, we wouldn't have enough time for anything else. Do you know how many pages of documents a year were? We in the department had copies of all these materials obtained, and at one point there was so much accumulated that one of the walls of the inch was lined with cardboard boxes full of documents. We copied tens of thousands of pages a year, and only today we find out what it was. Some time ago, the media reported that the Institute of National Remembrance contained single documents concerning the takeover of the archives of Spanish intelligence by Poles. Of course, it was about the effect of our operations. A lot of articles and comments on this subject have been published on the Internet, because it turned out that the documents contain the name of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jacek Czaputowicz, who was registered by the Spaniards as a source of information in the 1980s. It is clear from the articles that it was about data saved on floppy disks. So the readers wrote in the comments that it was a shame, that it was impossible, that the Polish services did not even have a computer at that time. Do you see I said that Westerners at the time did not believe in our ability to overcome their security. And thirty years later, even our countrymen do not believe it. Until I read the articles in question, I had no idea what the floppy disks contained, even though I was a member of the group that entered the facility that night.

Warszawa,

TAJNE SPEC. ZNACZENIA

MINISTER SPRAW WEWNĘTRZNYCH

GEN. BRONI CZ. KISZCZAK

R A P O R T

Melduję, że w dniach 28/29.04.br skutecznie wykonano działanie specjalne wobec rezydentury wywiadu *hiszpańskiego* w ambasadzie w Warszawie.

W ich wyniku skopiowano archiwum rezydentury w postaci zabezpieczonych dyskietek komputerowych oraz dokumenty sporządzone na podstawie informacji zebranych od agentów w Polsce.

Uzyskano istotny postęp w opanowaniu środków bezpieczeństwa stosowanych przez rezydenturę do ochrony pomieszczeń szyfrowych, środków łączności z centralą wywiadu w *Madrycie*... oraz sejfów wykorzystywanych do ochrony danych. W szczególności:

- opracowano system kontroli kasy pancernej rezydenta zabezpieczonej zegarowym mechanizmem tzw. "timerem". Zapewniono pełny wgląd w zawartości kasy w zależności od potrzeb kontrwywiadu.
- uzyskano szczegółową dokumentację elektronicznego szyfratora nowej generacji *MX*... tj. systemu wprowadzonego ostatnio na wyposażenie wywiadów NATO.

Raport dotyczący przejęcia archiwum wywiadu hiszpańskiego.

- 2 -

Uzyskany w wyniku działań specjalnych bogaty materiał operacyjny zostanie wykorzystany w poszczególnych rozpracowaniach szpiegowskich oraz w dalszych pracach technicznych umierzających do rozpracowania środków łączności i bezpieczeństwa przeciwnika.



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
- 2 -

The rich operational material obtained as a result of special operations will be used in individual espionage studies and in further technical works of the dying to work out the ways of communication and security of the enemy.

BEARD: You know, the "Tourist" was so modest, and he not only was at the facility that day, but even personally developed a method of opening the safe in which these floppy disks were placed. It was a unique safe, because inside the Spaniards installed this whole timer, a clock device that prevented the safe from being opened for some time. Their intelligence officer, leaving the facility, set the timer so that it would not be released until the next day, when the Spaniards returned to work. In short, the cash register was impossible to open even for the owner at night. Well, we opened the car wash thanks to the solution invented by "Tourist". Driving school college, really.

TOURIST: But let's finish with the clock. I think that a few security specialists in the world, after reading this, will be scratching their heads about how Poles dealt with such a mechanism. Let's not spoil their fun.



HUNTER: As if it was not enough what we copied on the combine, back in the 1980s, together with the Russians, we conducted special operations on the objects "Tales" and "Dion", that is, in the Swedish and Italian embassies in Warsaw. In the first one, an integrated circuit was turned into a teletype. From that moment on, the device radiated into the power grid. When a Swede sat down there to write a secret message and tapped, a perforation tape with unencrypted text would slide out normally.



Sejf, z którego funkcjonariusze Wydziału IX wyjęli w 1988 roku dyskiety zawierające materiały hiszpańskiego wywiadu. Na ostatniej fotografii wyraźnie widać zainstalowany w kasie timer, który uniemożliwiał jej otwarcie poza godzinami pracy placówki. Metodę pokonania zabezpieczenia opracował „Turysta”.

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A safe from which the officers of Division IX took out in 1988 floppy disks containing Spanish intelligence materials. The last photo clearly shows the timer installed in the cash register, which prevented it from being opened outside of opening hours. The method of overcoming the security was developed by Tourist.



Niektóre elementy systemu zainstalowanego w latach 80. przez KGB w pomieszczeniach sąsiadujących z obiektem „Dion”, czyli ambasadą Włoch w Warszawie. Sprzęt umożliwiał zdalne przechwytywanie wiadomości wysyłanych z placówki.

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Some elements of the system installed in the 1980s by the KGB in rooms adjacent to the "Dion" facility, i.e. the Italian embassy in Warsaw. The equipment allowed for remote interception of messages sent from the facility.

TOURIST: In contrast, so much equipment was brought to the premises located wall-to-wall with the premises of the Italian embassy that it barely all entered the van. At the moment when the Italian was tapping the keyboard at his home, his devices were emitting a signal, so to speak, into the air. It was the so-called flyout. The equipment brought by the Russians was able to detect this, and thanks to that you had the text even before it flew through the encryption cables. We were present in many of these activities, but we could not devote all our time to servicing these devices. We had too much of our own work, that is, to enter the facilities alone. That is why in the 1980s a large group of officers was brought to us, who, although they worked with us in the department, did not quite know what we were doing. These were the people who came to deal with the electronic scrutiny of the encryption communications of these two embassies. Preparations were made for the full takeover of these devices from the Russians, but then in 1989, 1990, the KGB dismantled all the equipment and took it out of Poland.

BEARD: We were a nice crate, there was a lot of laughter, a nice atmosphere. There is something to mention. One day I remember walking with my friend Kapkowski to one of the American residences in Poznań, a villa near the consulate. There were a lot of people around this place, even at night, so when we got a radio signal that there was a green light and we could leave, we flew as fast as we could. It was November, literally a millimeter of snowball fell, and we were running on the terrazzo wall. Well, sir, Kapkowszczyk raised a nice eagle, called with his ribs, the end of the world. He was a good trade, it has nothing to do with it. But he slaughtered well, then three weeks later no one saw him in "the company".

GENERAL KARKOWSKI: What can I say? It hurt, it hurt.

PHOTOGRAPHER: Everyone has had some adventures.

ENGINEER: I remember a situation where one colleague left something on the site that he shouldn't have. We returned to the department after the action, we hope that we are not missing anything from the equipment, and it suddenly turns out that there is no one radio station. We figured out who she belonged to and we call the guy home because he has already gone to sleep. He picks up, we ask where his radio is, and he says, "Fuck, I left it at the checkout." We didn't say anything to the warden, there was still a moment to open the facility, my colleagues rushed there and managed to get the radio station back at the last moment. And I have to say that the one who did it was a nice bastard, because we helped him, and then he used to cable on his friends in all sorts of stupid things like being late. He was so grateful.

PHOTOGRAPHER: Once I was with a friend at the Italian Cultural Institute. I was upstairs and he was downstairs. At one point he started talking to me, but you know, in a whisper, and I didn't really hear him. So I stood on the stairs and wanted to lean out to him, and there was such a giant glass pane, like an exhibition window. I didn't notice the darkness around it and I hit it with my head so much that I felt hot - and with pain and nerves, because if it would break, the whole city would spring to its feet. Well, we probably wouldn't fix it by morning. Our faculty was first class, but that doesn't mean we didn't have a lot of laughter with all of this.

BEARD: Our successes were immediate, very tangible. What can I say - the work was therefore almost narcotic. We knew we were doing a good job. Colonel Solarski, who supervised us, when he found out how many secret documents we brought on a given day, told us at once that we had to hit a puppet - that's what we called nice albums for the management. Inside there were photos of the most important documents obtained during a given action. Well, when the boss said that we were to make a puppet, everyone was already getting positive, because it meant that the materials would go to the desk of the director, minister or even higher. And if so, there will be bonuses. So it was a pleasure to make a puppet, of course.

TOURIST: On the other hand, our anonymity meant that we were not as appreciated as we should. There was a bonus, but for anonymous people. Documents were appreciated and non-anonymous management was appreciated - as is usually the case in life. We were nothing, we didn't exist, most politicians did not even know where all this information came from, because they received it not in the form of a puppet, but in the form of an already prepared analysis. The first secretary of the Central Committee certainly knew, but the others did not, so they congratulated the services in general, sometimes they even thought that it was all thanks to the intelligence. After all, we obtained more intelligence than the intelligence itself, only people did not even think of it. Counterintelligence was not associated with such activities.

ENGINEER: When I left the facility in the seventies, I knew that a few hours later such a Gierek would be sitting in his office and looking at the album with the documents I had photographed. On the left - photos of the original, on the right - a translation that has already been made, and in the center - a jackdaw. It worked so fast.

TOURIST: Instantly. For example, from the English language we had such a lady, of course an officer, lived in Ursynów. It was downloaded at indecent times, sometimes even people went to the house to get it. She looked at these prints, decided what to do first, and translated at an amazing pace. It was a machine.

GENERAL KARKOWSKI: Personally, I only went to the Americans, and I had a hard time anyway. Nothing could be planned, I didn't know when to go on vacation. There was a phone call to go to the consulate, it was done.

PHOTOGRAPHER: More than once the hands have fallen off the steering wheel. Once I went to Krakow, then to Warsaw right away, I refueled and they immediately told me to join someone in Gdańsk. I got there, it turned out that they misled me because they said that there would be an action without more equipment, but everything we had was needed. So I had to go back to Warsaw for things. I was wondering if I would come, because I was tired and the car was the same. We had a Mercedes then, but a complete dead body, so it was not sure if he could do it.

TOURIST: I remember going on vacation with my family. I enjoyed five minutes, they located me, called me. I had to go back.

ENGINEER: There was a year when I spent 180 nights on the facilities. A lot of people went on sick leave, we had no hands to work. There was a demand, there had to be people who would go for the action. There was no staff turnover because, firstly, it took a long time for the new employee to become completely independent, and secondly, you couldn't initiate too many people into these activities. Our group was small and was supposed to stay that way. Therefore, when there was a shortage of labor, the family did not actually see me. I was on one great eternal delegation.

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TAJNE SPEC.ZNACZENIA

ZESTAWIENIE

przedsięwzięć specjalnych w obiektach kontrolowanych
przez Dep. II MSW w okresie 1.01.1980 - 30.06.1980r.

O b i e k t	Ilość akcji	Ilość stron do- kumentów	Ilość ważniejszych dokumentów
Arete+Ajas <i>USA</i>	17	2915	421
Bella <i>Rush</i>	5	410	9
Gamma <i>RFN</i>	51	7330	471
Dike <i>Fr</i>	4	695	42
Demeter <i>Belgia</i>	1	197	6
Delta <i>Amia</i>	8	4267	530
Delos <i>Portug</i>	1	105	5
Dion <i>Niocy</i>	1	573	50
Parnas <i>India</i>	14	916	49
Minos <i>Hiszp.</i>	4	1907	84
Pireus <i>Jap.</i>	1	249	16
Pitagoras <i>Pakist.</i>	2	128	2
Hellada <i>Alg.</i>	1	22	4
Czołówka	57	14855	408
Ra z e m:	167	34569	2097

Tabela przedstawia liczbę tajnych wejść do poszczególnych placówek w pierwszym półroczu 1980 roku oraz rezultaty przeszukań. Wyjątkiem jest wiersz zatytułowany „Czołówka” – dotyczący akcji w hotelach.

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The table presents the number of secret entries to individual facilities in the first half of 1980 and the results of searches. The exception is the poem entitled "Czołówka" - concerning actions in hotels.

TAJNE SPEC. ZNACZENIA

ZESTAWIENIE

przedsięwzięć specjalnych w obiektach kontrolowanych
przez Departament II MSW w okresie 1. 01. 1982 r. do
31. 12. 1982 r.

Obiekt	Ilość akcji	Ilość stron dokum.	Ilość waż- niejszych dokumentów	Uwagi:
ARETE AJAS	44	19158	2591	
BASTION	2	980	9	
CZOŁOWKA	14	3132	63	
DEMOS	10	814	67	
DELOS	7	2137	42	
DIKE	4	3374	59	
DION	1	195	1	
GAMMA	24	2514	56	
MINOS	10	2803	206	
MUZA	1	489	7	
PITAGORAS	2	162	20	
TALES	4	1823	174	
	123	37581	3295	

Wykaz tajnych przeszukań w 1982 roku.

List of secret searches in 1982.

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TAJNE SPEC .ZNACZENIAZ E S T A W I E N I E

zdobytych informacji szyfrowych w obiektach
kontrolowanych przez Dep. II MSW w okresie
1. 01. 1980-30. 06. 1980r.

Delfa	Turcja	- 1556
Pireus	Jap.	- 701
Demeter	Belg.	- 143
Parys	Indonezja	- 133
Delos	Port.	- 84
Herodot	Tunizja	- 64
Mit	Wenezuela	- 48
Hera	Nigeria	- 37
Muza	Argent.	- 33
Minos	Hisp.	- 29
Dion	Włochy	- 21
Melon	Meksyk	- 17
Homer	Mandao	- 10
Atena	USA	- 3
Diadem	Fr.	- 2

R a z e m : - 2881

Wykaz przedstawia liczbę przechwyconych zdalnie informacji szyfrowych w pierwszym półroczu 1980 roku. Działania te były możliwe m.in. dzięki pracy funkcjonariuszy Wydziału IX, którzy kopiowali bloczki szyfrowe i badali konstrukcję maszyn szyfrujących na zlecenie Biura „A”. Obiekt „Atena” to ambasada USA w Warszawie.

The list shows the number of remotely intercepted cipher information in the first half of 1980. These actions were possible, among others thanks to the work of Division IX officers, who copied cipher blocks and examined the construction of encryption machines at the request of Bureau "A". Object "Atena" is the US Embassy in Warsaw.


GENERAL KARKOWSKI: One time we came back from the action in Krakow and at the entrance to Warsaw, in Okęcie, our car broke down. It was probably minus 25 degrees, snow, terrible winter and the car simply refused to obey. So I just got on a bus with Colonel Solarski. We got to Rakowiecka Street and it soon turned out that we had to go to Poznań immediately. I looked at this poor, probably over sixty-year-old Colonel Solarski and went to the director of Department 11 to ask if Fela could stay in Warsaw. Another night action, this frost, might just let him go. So what? The director did not bend and we were driving with Solarski to Poznań. It was like that for years - hard, intense, but it worked. Until finally something changed.

BEAD: Czesio saved us. He had a gift, great hearing, like Paganini. Standing by the bunker, he heard a murmur.

PHOTOGRAPHER: I do not know how it would have ended had it not been for Czesio, of the late. A murmur was coming from the bookshelf next to it. This piece of furniture caught his attention not only because it had a slight humming noise, but also because it was simply new and even nothing completely fit there. There was a camera inside, or rather a device with a motion sensor, which took a photo from time to time, that day I was not there, and since the device installed there was not an ordinary camera, they decided not to touch it. It was too much of a risk, they preferred to come back with me the next day. They couldn't just pull it out like that, and there was no reason. The mere presence of the device did not mean that we were exposed.

TOURIST: Exactly, there was no evidence that this camera was set up there as a trap for us. From what I remember, the presence of an American security technician was registered in Poznań just before this event. The operations department controlled these things very solidly. This man left, so we suspected that this camera, which was quite complicated and well hidden, would be potentially touching anything until that man returned.

PHOTOGRAPHER: The device had a motion sensor, so it wasn't like you had to change the film after two hours of filming a bare wall. One roll of film could sit there for a very long time. It was the weekend and nothing happened during the day, so when we showed up at the consulate the next night, I first looked at the frame counter. Nothing was done there, so luckily everything indicated that it was the same tape as the day before. We breathed a sigh of relief. Then I took it all out and made a photographic documentation. On the side of this bookcase, a lamp, where there was a lens hole, there was a sticker like an ordinary sticker, which in fact functioned as a Venetian mirror. The camera worked in infrared and had the motion sensor mentioned, so I fiddled with it a bit to know what it was - just in case, for the future. And above all, I took the film out of it, cut it literally a microscopic piece for research, and lit the rest carefully. Management asked me about five times after that if I had done it carefully - yes, carefully.



((PAGE 258))

The camera was hidden under a shelf in a bookcase next to the bunker door at the US consulate in Poznań. The device with the display is a frame counter, and the longitudinal element resembling a sleeve - a motion sensor that activates the camera.

FOOTNOTE: Unfortunately, it is unclear exactly in which year these events occurred. Most of the opinions among the officers, however, that it was still in the first half of the 1980s. The lists of actions carried out in the department's files indicate that in 1983 there was a break at the entrances to the facilities "Arete" (Poznań) and "Ajas" (Krakow), which can be associated with the discovery of the recording device.

TOURIST: After this event, for natural reasons, we suspended our activities towards American consulates - both in Poznań and, just in case, also in Krakow. The risk was too great, one had to wait and, above all, try to figure out why that camera even appeared there. Was it a routine activity? If not, were we the Americans' target, or was someone inside the facility suspected? Everything indicated the latter. Why? It seems that someone above, perhaps on the Central Committee, misused the materials we obtained. Someone somewhere said slightly too much in an interview and the Americans realized that Poles had information from the consulate in Poznań. They began to suspect that they had a mole. They still did not admit the thought that it might be an outsider. The camera was a lama to see which of the employees of the facility was drilling. We had no signals that the Americans knew about our entries, and after a long break we came back with success.

HUNTER: Of course we're back. How else! I remember that when we came back to the consulate in Poznań, we even looked at the piece of furniture with the camera in it. It was already standing in a different place, unfolded.

(The records show that it was in 1986. In the same year, the US consulate in Krakow was also returned to.)

BEARD: We used to walk without balaclavas, but when we returned to the Americans, we started to cover ourselves, fearing that there might still be some recording devices there. Initially, our priority was to determine if there are any cameras or not. The search was negative, it was safe. Of course, as safe as it can be when a person enters a foreign facility at night.

MINISTERSTWO
SPRAW WEWNĘTRZNYCH
DEPARTAMENT II

1. dr. ODS _____

WARSZAWA, dnia 1987-01-18 r.

*człowiek
kapitał i
in. Minister
12.01.87*

T A J N E
SPEC. ZNACZENIA

INFORMACJA

dotyczy: wypracowania możliwości kontroli tajnych dokumentów konsulatu USA w Krakowie

W działaniach prowadzonych od 1983 roku wobec konsu-
latu USA w Krakowie wypracowano możliwość kontroli całego budynku
poza bunkrem, gdzie Amerykanie do połowy 1986 roku wykorzystywali
aparaturę do tajnej rejestracji nieupoważnionego wejścia.

W toku kolejnych akcji przy użyciu sprzętu do wykrywa-
nia promieniowania podczerwonego, ultradźwięków i mikrofal wyeli-
minowano możliwość istnienia takich urządzeń. W tej sytuacji w dniach
18-23 grudnia 1986 roku podjęto działania wobec szyfrowego zamknięcia
skarbcza, gdzie:

- pokonano wszystkie zabezpieczenia skarbcza i szaf pancernych,
opanowano system zamków szyfrowych, zapewniając możliwość
kolejnych tajnych wejść i dotarła do klasyfikowanych dokumentów;
- sfotografowano 865 stron różnych dokumentów, w tym tajnych
i poufnych, dotyczących problematyki politycznej oraz mających
znaczenie operacyjne /instrukcja o trybie przyjmowania oferentów,
naprowadzenia na działania obywateli PRL godzące w interesy
państwa/;
- uzyskano, przez opanowanie szyfrowych systemów zamków oraz
kluczy, możliwość wejścia do innych pomieszczeń placówki;
- stwierdzono, że placówka wyposażona została w wielostanowiskowy
system informatyczny firmy "Wang" wykorzystywany m. in. do
przechowywania informacji.

33

Funkcjonariusze wrócili do amerykańskich bunkrów w 1986 roku. Wspomniane
w pierwszym zdaniu „działania prowadzone od 1983 roku” to oczywiście próby
ponownego, a nie pierwszego wejścia do skarbcza.

Officers returned to the US bunkers in 1986. The "activities carried out since 1983" mentioned in the first sentence are, of course, attempts to re-enter the treasury, not the first one.


Ustalono, że system bezpieczeństwa skarbcza po wielu udoskonaleniach /wymiana zamków na specjalnie opracowane konstrukcje, przebudowa pomieszczeń/ nadal oparty jest o licznik otwarć drzwi pancernych i można go zamienić - co też wykonano.

Wszystkie przedsięwzięcia przebiegały bez zakłóceń. Dekonspiracji nie stwierdzono.

W związku z powyższym planuje się przeprowadzenie kolejnych działań specjalnych wobec obiektu, ze zwróceniem uwagi na:

- zsynchronizowanie ich terminów z kursami poczty dyplomatycznej na linii ambasada-konsulat - ambasada /uwzględniając przepisy obiegu dokumentów tajnych w placówce/;
- techniczno-operacyjne opanowanie komputerowych zbiorów informacji i urządzeń do ich zapisu;
- rozpoznanie i opracowanie elektronicznych maszyn do pisania, wykorzystywanych do informacji klasyfikowanych.

Oprac. JK
JS/87



34

Dokument podpisany został przez funkcjonariusza, z którym niestety nie udało mi się porozmawiać. Z niewiadomych przyczyn w piśmie mowa jest o „aparaturze do tajnej rejestracji nieupoważnionego wejścia” zamontowanej w konsulacie w Krakowie. Moi rozmówcy podkreślają, że napotkali takową wyłącznie w Poznaniu, a z wejść na teren przedstawicielstwa w Krakowie zrezygnowali jedynie profilaktycznie.

((PAGE - 262))

The document was signed by an officer with whom, unfortunately, I was unable to talk. For unknown reasons, the letter mentions "apparatus for secret registration of unauthorized entry" installed at the consulate in Krakow. My interlocutors emphasize that they encountered one only in Poznań, and they resigned from entering the premises of the representative office in Kraków only prophylactically.

TOURIST: The activities of our department have been exposed in only one place. Fortunately, it was not about outposts, but about diplomatic mail passing through Okęcie. Here, too, the source of the problem was the use of materials by the Central Committee. Namely, the documents taken from the West German Depka-75 cassette, which we told you about, ended up in the Central Committee in an inappropriate form. Everything indicates that someone important from the Ministry of the Interior wanted to show off and simply took an album with photos of these materials to a larger group of PZPR politicians, instead of a collective analysis in writing. Someone saw these photos and I think reported where it was needed. There was even such a rumor as to which politician it could have been. Let's face it, there must have been many a Western spy in the Central Committee - there are no miracles. This is why the rule was that the information we gained was mixed up there with others, and the politicians had no idea where it was coming from.

POSTPONENT: - Depka stopped walking overnight. With us, with the Russians, in all demolished people. Detriment.

EXTRA PAGES

PAGE 240 POLISH:

WYKAZ

dsp""sej"ale>"%"11':Z.:1""elt2The

Worazawa, doło G lutego 1982 r.

TAJNE SPEC..NAC.ENIA

1. Poufna Informacja delegacji USA przy NATO S:- f 3.02.82r. dol. poszerzonego posiedzenia Rady NATO w sprawie Polaki w doło 3. bm.
2. Poufna Inf. delegacji USA przy NATO z 2.02.82r. dol kompendium aankcJI państw NATO wobec Polski I ZSRR. atr. 20
3. Tajna Inf. Dep. Stanu z 29. 01. 82r. doŁ etanowteks USA na posiedzenie Rady NATO o dniu 3. 02. br. - str. 12 zz- Ł
4. Tajna Inf. ambasady USA w Bonn z 1.02. 82r. dot. przygotowań RFN do Rady NATO w doło 3.02. br. - str. 2 3,-z j
5. Tajna Inf. amb. USA w Bono z 29.01. 82 r. dot. przy-gotott 00 RFN do Rady NATO w dniu 3. 02. br. - att, 3 6. Sajan Worm. aznb. USA w Rz, tie z 1.02.82x. PION doŁ przygotowań Włosh do Rady NATO w dn. 3.02. br. - str. I 0-
5. Poufna Inform . ambasady USAw Rzymie z 29. 01. 82r. dol. przygotowań Wło. do Rady NATO w dn. 3. 02. 82r. - str. 2
- Taj. Informacja szub. USA w Lizbonie z 1.01.02r. dot. przygotowań Portugalii do Rady NATO w do. 3. 02. br.
9. Tajna Inf. amb. USA w Ankarze z 29. OL 82r. dol. 1-1 przygo.w. Turcji do Rady NATO w dn. 3. 02. 82r. - etr. 1
10. Tajna Inf. amb. USA w Luksemburgu z 1.02. 82r. dol. przygotowań Luksemburga do Rody NATO da. 3.02.82r. - str. 2

Fragment wykazu dokumentów zdobytych w konsulacie USA w Poznaniu lutym 1982 roku.

1. Confidential information of the US delegation to NATO S: - f 3.02.82. dol. extended meeting of the NATO Council in the frame of Poles in dolo 3.Bm.
2. Confidential Information of the US delegation to NATO of 02.02.82. bottom of the compendium of NATO member states' obligations towards Poland and the USSR. atr. twenty
3. Secret Information of the State Dept. of 29 January 82 doL ethane text of the USA to the meeting of the NATO Council on 03.02. - p. 12 zz- L
4. Secret Info of the US embassy in Bonn from 1.02. 82r. on Germany's preparations for the NATO Council on 3.02. br. - p. 2 3, -z j
5. Secret Inf. Amb. USA in Bono with 29.01. 82 on Germany's preparations for the NATO Council on 03.02. - att, 3 6. Sajan Worm. aznb. USA in Rz, tie with 1.02.82x. DIVISION of Wlosh's preparations for the NATO Council on 3.02. br. - page I 0-
5. Confidential information. US Embassy in Rome from January 29, 82 dol. Wlo preparations. to the NATO Council on 03.0282r. - page 2
- Taj. Information szub. USA in Lisbon from 01/02/02. on Portugal's preparations for the NATO Council in the 3 February this year
9. Secret Inf. Amb. USA in Ankara from 29. OL 82r. dol. 1-1 prep. Turkey to the NATO Council on 03.0282r. - etr. 1
10. Secret Inf. Amb. USA in Luxembourg from 1.02. 82r. dol. Luxembourg's preparations for the House of NATO will give. 3.02.82r. - page 2

An excerpt from the list of documents obtained at the US consulate in Poznań in February 1982.

Page 242 POLISH:

Warszawa,
TAJNE SPEC. ZNACZENIA
NIN/STER SPRAW WEWNETRZNYCH
GEN. BRONI CZ. KISZCZAK
RAPORT

Melduje, Ze w dniach 28/22.04.br skutecznie wykonano drialanie specjalne wobec rezydentury wywiadu w ambasadzie w Warszawie.

W ich wyniku skopiowano archiwum rezydentury w postaci zabezpieczonych dyskietek komputerowych Oraz dokumenty sporządzone na podstawie informacji zebranych od agentów w Polsce.

Uzyskano istotny postep w opanowaniu drodków bezpieczeństwa stosowanych przez rezydentur, do ochrony pomieszczed szyfrowych, trodków łącznodci z centralą wywiadu w ----- oraz sejfów wykorzystywanych do ochrony danych. N szczególności: - opracowano system kontroli kasy pancernej rezydenta zabezpieczonej regarm,,Imechanizmem tzw..timerem.. Zapewniono palny wglad w zawartodci kasy w zalernodci od potrzeb kontrwywiadu. - uzyskano szczegółową dokumentację elektronicznego Szyfratora nowej generacji MX tj.systemu wprowadzonego ostatnio na wyposatenie wywiadów NATO.

Raport dotyczący przejęcia archiwum wywiadu hiszpańskiego.

Page 242 ENGLISH:

Warsaw,
SECRET SPEC. MEANINGS
NIN / STER OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS
GENE. WEAPONS CZ. KISZCZAK
REPORT

Reports that on April 28/22 this year, special drialans were successfully performed against the intelligence residency ... at the embassy in Warsaw.

As a result, the residency archive in the form of secured computer floppy disks and documents prepared on the basis of information collected from agents in Poland were copied.

Significant progress has been achieved in mastering the security measures used by residences for the protection of cryptographic rooms, links with the intelligence headquarters in ----- and safes used for data protection. In particular: - a system of control of the resident's safe secured by regarm, with the so-called timer mechanism, was developed. - detailed documentation was obtained for the next-generation electronic encryptor MX, i.e. the system recently introduced to equip NATO interviews.

Report on the seizure of the Spanish intelligence archive.

- MINISTERSTWO SPRAW WEWNĘTRZNYCH orenstazipwr n
o

wAssonw. e. 1987-01-

INFORMACJA

Tkana SPEC. ZNACZENIA

dotyczy: wypracowania motliwudei kontroli tajnych dokumentów konsulatu USA w Krakowie

W działaniach prowadzonych od 1983 roku wobec kocuu-latu USA w Krakowie wypracowano motliwość kontroli całego budynku poza bunkrem, gdzie Amerykanie do połowy 1986 roku wykorzystywali aparaturę do tajnej rejestracji nieupoważnionego wejścia. .

W loku kolejnych akcji przy użycia sprzętu do wykrywa-nia prornientowa podczerwonego, ultradźwięków t mikrofal wyelimi-nowano motliwość Istnienia takich urządzeń. W tej sytuacji w dniach 18-23 grudnia 1986 roku podjęto działania wobec szyfrowego zamknięcia skarbca, gdzie:

pokonano wszystkie zabezpieczenia skarbca i szaf pancernych, opanowano system zamków szyfrowych, zapewniając możliwość kolejnych tajnych wejść i dotarcia do klasyfikowanych dokornentdw:

sfotografowano 865 stronróżnych dokumentów. w lyrn tajnych i poufnych, dotyczących problematyki politycznej oraz mających znaczenie operacyjne instrukcja o trybie przyjmowania oferentów. naprowadzenia na działania obywatel PRL godzące w Interesy państwa;

uzyskano , przez opanowanie szyfrowych systemów zamków oraz kluczy, możliwość wejścia do innych pornieszczen placówki:

stwierdzam, te placówka wyposażona została w wielostanowiskowy spitem Informatyczny firmy "Wang" wykorzystywany m. in do przechowywania informacji.

Funkcjonariusze wrócili do amerykańskich bunkrów w 1986 roku. Wspomniane w pierwszym zdaniu „działania prowadzone od 1983 roku” to oczywiście próby ponownego, a nie pierwszego wejścia do skarbca.

PAGE – 261 – ENGLISH:

- MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS orenstazipwr n
about

wAssonw. e. 1987-01-

INFORMATION

Woven SPEC. MEANINGS

concerns: the development of a motivation to control secret documents of the US consulate in Krakow

In the activities carried out from 1983 towards the end of the USA in Krakow, the motivation to control the entire building, except for the bunker, was developed, where until mid-1986 the Americans used the equipment to secretly register unauthorized entry. .

In the course of successive actions, the presence of such devices was eliminated with the use of proportional infrared, ultrasound and microwave equipment. In this situation, on December 18-23, 1986, measures were taken against the cryptographic closure of the vault, where:

all the security of the vault and armored cabinets were defeated, the system of combination locks was mastered, providing the possibility of further secret entrances and reaching the classified documents:

865 pages of different documents were photographed. in secret and confidential letters, relating to political issues and of operational significance, instructions on the procedure for accepting bidders. indications of the actions of Polish citizens against the interests of the state;

the ability to enter other parts of the facility was obtained by mastering the combination systems of locks and keys:

I state that the facility was equipped with a multi-station IT screen by the "Wang" company, used, among others, for storing information.

Officers returned to the US bunkers in 1986. The "activities carried out since 1983" mentioned in the first sentence are, of course, attempts to re-enter the treasury, not the first one.

Ustalono, że system bezpieczeństwa skarbcza po wielu udoskonaleniach /wymiana zamków na specjalnie opracowane konstrukcje, przebudowa pomieszczeń/ nadal oparty jest o licznik "otwarć drzwi pancernych i można go zamienić - co też wykonano.

Wszystkie przedsięwzięcia pi-żebiegały bez zakłóceń. Dekonspi-racji nie stwierdzono.

W związku z powyższym planuje się przeprowadzenie kolejnych działań specjalnych wobec obiektu, ze zwróceniem uwagi na:

- zsynchronizowanie ich terminów z kursami poczty dyplomatycznej na linii ambasada-konsulat - ambasada /uwzględniając przepisy obiegu doku-mentów tajnych w placówce

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rozpoznanie i opracowanie elektronicznych maszyn do pisania, wykorzysty-wanych do informacji klasyfikowanych.

Oprac. JK

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-2-

It was established. These vault security system after many improvements / replacement of locks with specially developed structures, reconstruction of rooms / is still based on the "armored door openings" counter and it can be replaced - which was also done.

All undertakings went smoothly. There was no disclosure.

In connection with the above, it is planned to conduct further special operations towards the facility, paying attention to:

- synchronizing their dates with the diplomatic mail courses on the embassy-consulate - embassy line / taking into account the provisions of the circulation of secret documents in the posts

technical and operational mastering of computer information sets of devices for their recording;

identification and development of electronic typewriters used for classified information.

Comp. JK

The document was signed by an officer with whom, unfortunately, I was unable to talk. For unknown reasons, the letter mentions the "apparatus for secret registration of unauthorized entry" installed in the consulate in Krakow. My interlocutors emphasize that they encountered one only in Poznań, and they resigned from entering the premises of the representative office in Krakow only prophylactically.